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## **Metadata - Statistical framework to measure corruption**

Prepared by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

## Metadata - Statistical framework to measure corruption.

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## 1.1 Bribery

<b>Component</b>	1.1 Bribery of national public officials and persons working in the private sector (UNCAC Art. 15 and Art. 21)		
<b>Type of measure</b>	DIRECT MEASURE		
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	1.1.a Prevalence of bribery in dealings with public officials among the population		
<b>Tier</b>	1. The methodology to estimate the indicator exists and countries are already producing estimates		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measure the proportion of persons who had at least one contact with a public official and who paid a bribe to a public official or were asked for a bribe by those public officials during the previous 12 months.			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Total number of persons who paid at least one bribe to a public official in the last 12 months or were asked for a bribe in the same period, over the total number of persons who had at least one contact with a public official in the same period, multiplied by 100.			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	National Statistical Office or Anti-corruption Unit	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Victimization surveys in households or Household survey with a module on bribery	<b>Frequency</b>	Annual
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	Sex of bribe payers By sex of the public official(s) who asked for the bribe By public official function	<b>Definitions</b>	Bribery: the promise, offering or giving to a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties. Or the solicitation or acceptance by a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties. It can include public or foreign public officials



<b>Component</b>	1.1 Bribery of national public officials and persons working in the private sector (UNCAC Art. 15 and Art. 21)		
<b>Type of measure</b>	DIRECT MEASURE		
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	1.1.b Prevalence of bribery in dealings with public officials among businesses		
<b>Tier</b>	1. The methodology to estimate the indicator exists and countries are already producing estimates		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measure the proportion of businesses who had at least one contact with a public official and who paid a bribe to a public official or were asked for a bribe by those public officials during the previous 12 months.			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Total number of businesses who paid at least one bribe to a public official in the last 12 months or were asked for a bribe in the same period, over the total number of businesses who had at least one contact with a public official in the same period, multiplied by 100.			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	National Statistical Office or Anti-corruption Unit	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Business victimization surveys or business survey with a module on bribery	<b>Frequency</b>	Annual
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	By sex of the public official(s) who asked for the bribe By sex of the victim by type of service by size and business sector	<b>Definitions</b>	Public official: (i) any person holding a legislative, executive, administrative or judicial office of a State Party, whether appointed or elected, whether permanent or temporary, whether paid or unpaid, irrespective of that person's seniority; (ii) any other person who performs a public function, including for a public agency or public enterprise, or provides a public service, as defined in the domestic law of the State Party and as applied in the pertinent area of law of that State Party; (iii) any other person defined as a "public official" in the domestic law of a State Party

<b>Component</b>	1.1 Bribery of national public officials and persons working in the private sector (UNCAC Art. 15 and Art. 21)		
<b>Type of measure</b>	DIRECT MEASURE		
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	1.1.c Cost of bribery among the population and businesses.		
<b>Tier</b>	1. The methodology to estimate the indicator exists and countries are already producing estimates		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Estimate the total monetary value of bribes to public officers by population and businesses, during the previous 12 months.			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Total amount of monetary value of bribes paid by all people that had contact with a public official and paid a bribe over a 12-month period.			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	National Statistical Office or Anti-corruption Unit	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Victimization surveys in households or businesses, Household or business surveys with a module on bribery	<b>Frequency</b>	Annual
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	by public official function	<b>Definitions</b>	Public Sector: Set of administrative bodies through which the State fulfills or enforces its policy and will, expressed in the fundamental laws of the country. It includes all administrative bodies of the federal legislative, executive, and judicial branches and autonomous public agencies. It therefore includes the Central Sector and the Parastatal Sector, and all local levels

<b>Component</b>	1.1 Bribery of national public officials and persons working in the private sector (UNCAC Art. 15 and Art. 21)		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT MEASURE	PERCEPTION	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	1.1.d Perception of corruption in the public sector		
<b>Tier</b>	1. The methodology to estimate the indicator exists and countries are already producing estimates		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measure the proportion of persons who perceive the public sector is corrupt.			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Number of persons who answered that they perceive the public sector is corrupt, divided by the total number of respondents, multiplied by 100 and weighted in line with the sampling scheme.			
<b>Resp. Institution of processing, compiling, and releasing data</b>	National Statistical Office or Anti-corruption Unit	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Victimization surveys or Household surveys with an item on corruption	<b>Frequency</b>	Annual
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	by sex of respondent by government branches (e.g., executive, legislative and judiciary) by government level (e.g., national and local) by age	<b>Definitions</b>	This indicator is a better measure than the perception recorded among public officials because it overcomes the reporting bias of those who may be corrupted themselves or those who fear retaliation if they report corruption. International standards to use population and business surveys to measure the perception of bribery can be found at: <a href="https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Crime-statistics/CorruptionManual_2018_web.pdf">https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Crime-statistics/CorruptionManual_2018_web.pdf</a> .

<b>Component</b>	1.1 Bribery of national public officials and persons working in the private sector (UNCAC Art. 15 and Art. 21)		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	RISK - CONSTRAINTS	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	1.1.e E-Government coverage		
<b>Tier</b>	2. The indicator is not produced regularly but it can be produced with existing information sources		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measure the share of persons who carried out at least one public procedure and who did so through a digital platform.			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Number of persons who carried out a public procedure through a digital platform in the past calendar year or 12 months, divided by the total number of persons who carried out at least one public procedure in the past calendar year or 12 months, multiplied by 100.			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	National Statistical Office	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Household surveys	<b>Frequency</b>	Annual
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	by sex by age by type of procedure	<b>Definitions</b>	E-government: It can be defined as the use of ICT by government agencies for the purpose of increasing and improving accessibility, effectiveness, and accountability. The principal goals of e-government should be efficient and improved service to customers, increased transparency, empowerment through access to information, efficient government purchasing and efficient administration. Public procedure: Government agencies are responsible for issuing licenses, authorizations and permits, as well as keeping control on official documents. Persons and businesses conduct public procedures to obtain them.

<b>Component</b>	1.1 Bribery of national public officials and persons working in the private sector (UNCAC Art. 15 and Art. 21)		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	RISK - CONSTRAINTS	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	1.1.f Reporting behavior of bribery in dealings with public officials among the population/business.		
<b>Tier</b>	2. The indicator is not produced regularly but it can be produced with existing information sources		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measure the level of reporting of bribery cases by people and businesses.			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Number of victims of bribery who paid a bribe to a public official and reported it to the relevant authorities who reported the behavior to competent authorities or other officially recognized conflict resolution mechanisms in the past calendar year or 12 months, divided by the total number of all persons that paid a bribe to a public official in the past calendar year or 12 months and multiplied by 100.			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	National Statistical Office	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Victimization surveys in households or businesses, Household or business surveys with a module on bribery	<b>Frequency</b>	Annual
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	by sex of the public official(s) who asked for the bribe by sex of the victim by age of the victim by type of service by size and business sector	<b>Definitions</b>	

<b>Component</b>	1.1 Bribery of national public officials and persons working in the private sector (UNCAC Art. 15 and Art. 21)		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	RESPONSE – DE JURE	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	1.1.g Criminalization of bribery		
<b>Tier</b>	N/A		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Assess the criminalization of bribery or related conduct in the national legislation as per Article 15 of UNCAC			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Does the country comply with the criminalization of bribery in accordance with Article 15 of the UNCAC?			
<b>Options:</b> Yes or No			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	National prosecutor's office, Ministry of Public Administration / Civil Service, Anti-Corruption Agency	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative record	<b>Frequency</b>	Annual
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	N/A	<b>Definitions</b>	Criminalization: Is an act or determination of a ruler about certain acts which by the society or members of the society considered as acts which can be penalized as a criminal act or making an act to become a criminal act and therefore can be penalized by the government by and on behalf of the government.

<b>Component</b>	1.1 Bribery of national public officials and persons working in the private sector (UNCAC Art. 15 and Art. 21)		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	RESPONSE – DE FACTO	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	1.1.h.1 Bribery investigation		
<b>Tier</b>	1. The methodology to estimate the indicator exists and countries are already producing estimates		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measure the rate of persons under investigation of bribery.			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Total number of persons under investigation for bribery recorded in a given year divided by the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Ministry of Public / Civil Service, National Anti-Corruption and/or Transparency Agency, Ministry of Justice, Office of the Prosecutor	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Annual
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	By sex	<b>Definitions</b>	Investigation: investigation is understood as the gathering of evidence about the detected case of corruption, including information about its extent, nature, effects, and the parties involved, to decide whether and which measures need to be taken. Investigations may be carried out internally within the organization concerned or through law enforcement agencies or other external actors, such as anti-corruption agencies, the police, or prosecutors. This indicator is not constrained only to criminal investigations.

<b>Component</b>	1.1 Bribery of national public officials and persons working in the private sector (UNCAC Art. 15 and Art. 21)		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	RESPONSE – DE FACTO	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	1.1.h.2 Bribery prosecution		
<b>Tier</b>	2. The indicator is not produced regularly but it can be produced with existing information sources		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measure the rate of persons formally presented with a charge of bribery.			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Total number of persons prosecuted for bribery recorded in a given year divided by the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000.			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Ministry of Justice, Office of the Prosecutor	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Annual
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	By sex	<b>Definitions</b>	Prosecution: to bring legal action against for redress or punishment of a crime or violation of law



<b>Component</b>	1.1 Bribery of national public officials and persons working in the private sector (UNCAC Art. 15 and Art. 21)		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	RESPONSE – DE FACTO	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	1.1.h.3 Bribery conviction		
<b>Tier</b>	1. The methodology to estimate the indicator exists and countries are already producing estimates		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measure the rate of persons convicted for bribery.			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Total number of persons convicted for bribery recorded in a given year divided by the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000.			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Ministry of Justice, Prison System	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Annual
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	By sex	<b>Definitions</b>	Conviction: The punishment the competent authority decides should be given to someone who has been convicted of a crime

<b>Component</b>	1.1 Bribery of national public officials and persons working in the private sector (UNCAC Art. 15 and Art. 21)		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	RESPONSE – DE FACTO	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	1.1.h.4 Assets recovered from bribery		
<b>Tier</b>	3. Many countries have some information, but it is necessary to improve or complement it to produce the indicator		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Quantify the amount of assets recovered from bribery convictions.			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
If case records are available, the individual amounts of assets recovered are summed to obtain the total amount of assets recovered from bribery convictions in a given year.			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Ministry of Justice, Office of the Prosecutor	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Annual
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	type of institution	<b>Definitions</b>	Asset recovery: the return of illicitly obtained goods and assets for the purpose of redressing the impact of corruption. For further reference on asset recovery, see the United Nations Convention against Corruption Chapter V

## 1.2 Trading in influence

<b>Component</b>	1.2 Trading in influence		
<b>Type of measure</b>	DIRECT		
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	1.2.a Use of personal connections to obtain public employment		
<b>Tier</b>	4. Some countries may have some information but do not publish it regularly		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measure the proportion of successful applicants for public sector positions who used nepotism or bribery or both to secure a public sector job			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
The percentage of successful applicants for public sector positions who used nepotism, bribery or both to secure public sector jobs in the past calendar year or 12 months is obtained by dividing the number of successful applicants for public sector positions who used nepotism, bribery, or both to secure public sector jobs in the past calendar year or 12 months by the total number of successful applicants for public sector positions in the past calendar year or 12 months, and multiplying by 100			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	National Statistical Office	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Survey amongst public sector employees	<b>Frequency</b>	Annual per calendar year
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	By sex By type of institution	<b>Definitions</b>	Trading in influence: The promise, offering or giving to a public official or any other person, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage in order that the public official or the person abuse his or her real or supposed influence with a view to obtaining from an administration or public authority of the State Party an undue advantage for the original instigator of the act or for any other person. The solicitation or acceptance by a public official or any other person, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage for himself or herself or for another person in order that the public official or the person abuse his or her real or supposed influence with a view to obtaining from an administration or public authority of the State Party an undue advantage. Undue advantage: this is a form of favoritism based on friends, family and familiar acquaintances and relationships whereby someone in an official position exploits his or her power and authority to provide a job or a special favor to a family member or friend, even though he or she may not be qualified or deserving

<b>Component</b>	1.2 Trading in influence		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	PERCEPTION	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	1.2.b Perception of the use of personal connection to obtain public employment		
<b>Tier</b>	N/A		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measure the opinions of public officials about how frequent public officials influence hiring processes to recruit friends or relatives in the public sector			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
The number of public officials who consider that the hiring of friends or relatives in the public sector is frequent, divided by the total number of public officials interviewed, multiplied by 100 and weighted in line with the sampling scheme.			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	National Statistical Office	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Survey amongst public sector employees	<b>Frequency</b>	Annual
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	By sex By type of institution	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

<b>Component</b>	1.2 Trading in influence		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	RISK	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	1.2.c Conflict of Interest regulation		
<b>Tier</b>	N/A		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Verify the existence of a control body to monitor and enforce financial and Conflict of Interest disclosures.			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Is there is a control body in the country to monitor and enforce financial and Conflict of Interest disclosures?			
<b>Options:</b> Yes or No			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Department of Public Administration, Ministry of Civil Service; Internal Affairs office	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Check list	<b>Frequency</b>	Annual
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	N/A	<b>Definitions</b>	Conflict of interest: a conflict between the public duty and private interests of a public official, in which the public official has private-capacity interests that could improperly influence the performance of their official duties and responsibilities

<b>Component</b>	1.2 Trading in influence		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	RESPONSE – DE JURE	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	1.2.d.1 Criminalization of trading in influence		
<b>Tier</b>	N/A		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Verify the criminalization of trading in influence or related conduct in the national legislation as per Article 18 of UNCAC			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Does the country comply with the criminalization of trading in influence in accordance with Article 18 of the UNCAC?			
<b>Options:</b> Yes or No			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	National prosecutor's office, Ministry of Public Administration / Civil Service; Anti-Corruption Agency	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Check list	<b>Frequency</b>	Annual
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	N/A	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

<b>Component</b>	1.2 Trading in influence		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	RESPONSE DE FACTO	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	1.2.d.2 Cool-off regulation		
<b>Tier</b>	N /A		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Verify the existence of gap periods for public officials moving to the private sector.			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Is there a cool-off period for public officials moving to the private sector in the country?			
<b>Options:</b> Yes or No			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	National prosecutor's office, Department of Public Administration, Ministry of Civil Service; Internal Affairs office	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Check list	<b>Frequency</b>	Annual
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	N/A	<b>Definitions</b>	Gap period: A limitation for hiring of a person who has been a public servant during a certain amount of time, who possesses privileged information directly acquired by reason of his employment, position or commission in the public service and allows the contracting party to benefit in the market or place himself/herself in an advantageous situation compared to his competitors

<b>Component</b>	1.2 Trading in influence		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	RESPONSE DE FACTO	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	1.2.e.1 Trading in influence investigations		
<b>Tier</b>	1. The methodology to estimate the indicator exists and countries are already producing estimates		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measure the rate of persons under investigation for engaging in trading in influence			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Total number of persons under investigation for engaging in trading in influence recorded in a given year divided by the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000.			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Ministry of Public / Civil Service, National Anti-Corruption and/or Transparency Agency, Ministry of Justice, Office of the Prosecutor	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative Records	<b>Frequency</b>	Annual
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	By sex	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A



<b>Component</b>	1.2 Trading in influence		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	RESPONSE DE FACTO	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	1.2.e.2 Trading in influence prosecution		
<b>Tier</b>	1. The indicator is not produced regularly but it can be produced with existing information sources		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measure the rate of persons formally presented with a charge of trading in influence			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Total number of persons against whom a prosecution for trading in influence was initiated in a given year divided by the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000.			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Ministry of Justice, Office of the Prosecutor	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative Records	<b>Frequency</b>	Annual
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	By sex	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

<b>Component</b>	1.2 Trading in influence		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	RESPONSE DE FACTO	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	1.2.e.3 Trading in influence conviction		
<b>Tier</b>	1. The methodology to estimate the indicator exists and countries are already producing estimates		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measure the rate of persons convicted for trading in influence			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Total number of persons convicted for engaging in trading in influence recorded in a given year divided by the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000.			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Ministry of Justice, Prison System	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative Records	<b>Frequency</b>	Annual
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	By sex	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

<b>Component</b>	1.2 Trading in influence		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	RESPONSE DE FACTO	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	1.2.e.4 Assets recovered from trading in influence		
<b>Tier</b>	3. Many countries have some information, but it is necessary to improve or complement it to produce the indicator		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Quantify the amount of assets recovered from trading in influence convictions.			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
If case records are available, the individual amounts of assets recovered are summed to obtain the total amount of assets recovered from trading in influence convictions in a given year.			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Ministry of Justice, Office of the Prosecutor	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative Records	<b>Frequency</b>	Annual
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	N/A	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

## 1.3 Illicit enrichment

<b>Component</b>	1.3 Illicit enrichment		
<b>Type of measure</b>	DIRECT MEASURE		
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	1.3.a Income declaration discrepancies among public officials		
<b>Tier</b>	1. The indicator is not produced regularly but it can be produced with existing information sources		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measure the proportion of public officials whose reported income differs from their disclosed assets			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Number of public officials whose reported income in the past calendar year differs from their disclosed assets, divided by total number of public officials, and multiplied by 100			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	National Statistical Office, Anti-corruption Agency, Ministry of Finance/Treasury	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Annual
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	Sex of public officials	<b>Definitions</b>	<p>Statistical definition of Illicit enrichment: The significant increase in the assets of a public official with respect to his or her legitimate income that cannot be reasonably justified, nor is of legitimate origin</p> <p>Note: This indicator is measurable only in jurisdictions where there is a system for income declaration</p>

<b>Component</b>	1.3 Illicit enrichment		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	PERCEPTION	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	1.3.b Perception of public officials for illicit gains or income beyond salary		
<b>Tier</b>	N/A		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measure the opinion of public officials regarding illicit gains or income beyond their salary			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Number of public officials that perceive that public officials use their office to obtain illicit gains or income beyond their alleged salary, divided by the total of public officials who responded, multiplied by 100 and weighted in line with the sampling scheme.			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	National Statistical Office or Anti-corruption Unit	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Surveys	<b>Frequency</b>	Calendar year or 12 months
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	Sex of public officials	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

<b>Component</b>	1.3 Illicit enrichment		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	RISK – CONSTRAINTS	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	1.3.c Control body to regulate asset/wealth evolution		
<b>Tier</b>	N/A		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Identify the existence a control body to monitor and enforce assets/wealth disclosures of public officials.			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Does the country have a control body to monitor and enforce patrimonial wealth disclosures of public officials?			
<b>Options:</b> Yes or No			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	National Statistical Office or Anti-corruption Agency	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Checklist	<b>Frequency</b>	Annual
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	N/A	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

<b>Component</b>	1.3 Illicit enrichment		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	RISK – CONSTRAINTS	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	1.3.d Wealth disclosure by public officials		
<b>Tier</b>	1. The indicator is not produced regularly but it can be produced with existing information sources		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measure the percentage of public officials who disclose their wealth out of the total number of public officials as more public officials declaring their wealth, provides corruption disincentives			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
The number of public officials who disclose their wealth, divided by the total number of public officials and multiplied by 100			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	National Statistical Office or Anti-corruption Agency	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Annual
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	Sex of public officials	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

<b>Component</b>	1.3 Illicit enrichment		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	RESPONSE – DE JURE	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	1.3.e Criminalization of illicit enrichment as per the UNCAC		
<b>Tier</b>	N/A		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Assess if illicit enrichment or related conduct is criminalized in the national legislation as per Article 20 of UNCAC			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Is illicit enrichment or related conduct criminalized in the national legislation as per Article 20 of UNCAC?			
<b>Options:</b> Yes or No			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	National prosecutor's office, Ministry of Public Administration / Civil Service; Anti-Corruption Agency	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Annual
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	N/A	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A



<b>Component</b>	1.3 Illicit enrichment		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	RESPONSE – DE JURE	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	1.3.f Financial disclosure regime		
<b>Tier</b>	N/A		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Assess the existence of regulation on wealth disclosure for public officials in the national legislation as per Article 8 of UNCAC			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Is the disclosure of wealth by public officials regulated as per Article 8 of UNCAC?			
<b>Options:</b> Yes or No			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	National prosecutor's office, Ministry of Public Administration / Civil Service; Anti-Corruption Agency	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Annual
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	N/A	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

<b>Component</b>	1.3 Illicit enrichment		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	RESPONSE – DE FACTO	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	1.3.g.1 Illicit enrichment investigations		
<b>Tier</b>	1. The methodology to estimate the indicator exists and countries are already producing estimates		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measure the rate of persons under investigation of illicit enrichment			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Total number of persons under investigation for engaging in illicit enrichment recorded in a given year divided by the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000.			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Ministry of Public / Civil Service, National Anti-Corruption and/or Transparency Agency, Ministry of Justice, Office of the Prosecutor	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Annual
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	By sex	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

<b>Component</b>	1.3 Illicit enrichment		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	RESPONSE – DE FACTO	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	1.3.g.2 Prosecutions for illicit enrichment		
<b>Tier</b>	2. The indicator is not produced regularly but it can be produced with existing information sources		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measure the rate of persons formally presented with a charge of illicit enrichment			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Total number of persons against whom prosecution for illicit enrichment was initiated in a given year, divided by the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000.			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Ministry of Justice, Office of the Prosecutor	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Annual
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	By sex	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

<b>Component</b>	1.3 Illicit enrichment		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	RESPONSE – DE FACTO	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	1.3.g.3 Illicit enrichment conviction		
<b>Tier</b>	1. The methodology to estimate the indicator exists and countries are already producing estimates		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measure the rate of persons convicted for illicit enrichment			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Number of public officials convicted for engaging in illicit enrichment divided by the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000, disaggregated by sex.			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Ministry of Justice, Prison System	<b>Institution type(s)</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Annual
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	By sex	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

<b>Component</b>	1.3 Illicit enrichment		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	RESPONSE – DE FACTO	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	1.3.g.4 Assets recovered from illicit enrichment		
<b>Tier</b>	3. Many countries have some information, but it is necessary to improve or complement it to produce the indicator		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Quantify the amount of assets recovered from illicit enrichment convictions.			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
If case records are available, the individual amounts of assets recovered are summed to obtain the total amount of assets recovered from illicit enrichment convictions.			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Ministry of Justice, Office of the Prosecutor	<b>Institution type(s)</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Annual
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	N/A	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

## 1.4 Embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion of property or public funds

<b>Component</b>	1.4 Embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion of property or public funds		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	RISK	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	1.4.a Discretionary allocation		
<b>Tier</b>	2. The indicator is not produced regularly but it can be produced with existing information sources		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measure the proportion of government budget allocated outside the formal budget approval process.			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Total government budget allocated outside the formal budget approval process divided by the total budget approved, multiplied by 100.			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Ministry of Finance, Secretary of the Treasury, Public budget offices	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative record	<b>Frequency</b>	Annual per calendar year
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	N/A	<b>Definitions</b>	If the proportion of budget that can be allocated outside the budget approval process is high, the level of opacity and the risk for budget mismanagement increases.

<b>Component</b>	1.4 Embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion of property or public funds		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	RISK	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	1.4.b Misused public funds		
<b>Tier</b>	1. The indicator is not produced regularly but it can be produced with existing information sources.		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Estimate the monetary value of irregularities ruled by the Supreme Audit Institution as a share of the total audited public budget			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
The total monetary value of irregularities ruled by the Supreme Audit Institution divided by the total monetary value of the audited public budget, multiplied by 100.			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Supreme Audit Institution	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Annual per calendar year
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	By type of institution	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

<b>Component</b>	1.4 Embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion of property or public funds		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	RESPONSE – DE JURE	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	1.4.c Criminalization of embezzlement, misappropriation or diversion of property or public funds		
<b>Tier</b>	N/A		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Assess criminalization of embezzlement, misappropriation or diversion of property or public funds or related conduct in the national legislation as per Articles 17 and 22 of UNCAC			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Does the country criminalize embezzlement, misappropriation or diversion of public property or funds or related conduct in national legislation under UNCAC Articles 17 and 22? <b>Options:</b> Yes or No			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Attorney General's Office, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of the Interior	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Annual per calendar year
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	N/A	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A



<b>Component</b>	1.4 Embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion of property or public funds		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	RESPONSE – DE FACTO	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	1.4.d.1 Embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion investigation		
<b>Tier</b>	1. The methodology to estimate the indicator exists and countries are already producing estimates		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measure investigations regarding embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Total number of persons under investigation for engaging in embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion recorded in a given year divided by the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000.			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Attorney General's Office, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of the Interior, Internal Affairs office	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Annual per calendar year
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	By sex	<b>Definitions</b>	

<b>Component</b>	1.4 Embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion of property or public funds		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	RESPONSE – DE FACTO	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	1.4.d.2 Embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion prosecution		
<b>Tier</b>	1. The indicator is not produced regularly but it can be produced with existing information sources		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measure prosecutions regarding embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Total number of persons against whom prosecution for embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion was initiated in a given year, divided by the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000.			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Attorney General's Office, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of the Interior, Internal Affairs office	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Annual per calendar year
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	By sex,	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

<b>Component</b>	1.4 Embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion of property or public funds		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	RESPONSE – DE FACTO	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	1.4.d.3 Embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion convictions		
<b>Tier</b>	1. The methodology to estimate the indicator exists and countries are already producing estimates		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measure the rate of persons convicted for embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Number of persons convicted of engaging in embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion recorded in a given year, divided by the total population in the same year and multiplied by 100,000.			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Attorney General's Office, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of the Interior, Internal Affairs office	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Annual per calendar year
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	By sex	<b>Definitions</b>	

<b>Component</b>	1.4 Embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion of property or public funds		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	RESPONSE - DE FACTO	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	1.4.d.4 Assets recovered from embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion		
<b>Tier</b>	3. Many countries have some information but it is necessary to improve or complement it to produce the indicator		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Estimate the amount of assets recovered from embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion convictions.			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
If case records are available, the individual amounts of assets recovered from embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion convictions are summed to obtain the total amount.			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Ministry of Justice, Office of the Prosecutor	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Annual per calendar year
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	By type of institution	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

## 1.5 Abuse of functions

<b>Component</b>	1.5 Abuse of functions		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	PERCEPTION	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	1.5.a Perception of public officials regarding abuse of functions		
<b>Tier</b>	N/A		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measure the opinion of public officials regarding abuse of functions.			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Number of public officials that perceive that public officials abuse their functions to obtain undue advantage, divided by the total of public officials who responded, multiplied by 100 and weighted in line with the sampling scheme.			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	National Statistical Office or Anti-corruption Unit	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Surveys	<b>Frequency</b>	Calendar year or 12 months
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	Sex of public officials	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

<b>Component</b>	1.5 Abuse of functions		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT MEASURE	RESPONSE – DE JURE	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	1.5.b Criminalization of abuse of functions		
<b>Tier</b>	N/A		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Assess if abuse of functions or related conduct is criminalized in the national legislation as per Article 19 of UNCAC			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Is abuse of functions or related conduct criminalized in the national legislation as per Article 19 of UNCAC?			
<b>Options:</b> Yes or No			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	National Statistical Office or Anti-corruption Unit	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Calendar year or 12 months
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	N/A	<b>Definitions</b>	Abuse of functions: the performance of or failure to perform an act, in violation of laws, by a public official in the discharge of his or her functions, for the purpose of obtaining an undue advantage for himself or herself or for another person or entity

<b>Component</b>	1.5 Abuse of functions		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT MEASURE	RESPONSE – DE FACTO	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	1.5.c.1 Investigations for abuse of functions		
<b>Tier</b>	1. The methodology to estimate the indicator exists and countries are already producing estimates		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measure investigations regarding abuse of functions			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Total number of persons under investigation for abuse of functions recorded in a given year divided by the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Ministry of Public / Civil Service, National Anti-Corruption and/or Transparency Agency, Ministry of Justice, Office of the Prosecutor	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Calendar year or 12 months
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	By sex	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

<b>Component</b>	1.5 Abuse of functions		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT MEASURE	RESPONSE – DE FACTO	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	1.5.c.2 Abuse of functions prosecution		
<b>Tier</b>	2. The indicator is not produced regularly but it can be produced with existing information sources		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measure prosecutions regarding abuse of functions			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Total number of persons against whom prosecution for abuse of functions was initiated in a given year, divided by the total population in the same year and multiplied by 100,000.			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Ministry of Justice, Office of the Prosecutor	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Calendar year or 12 months
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	By sex	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A



<b>Component</b>	1.5 Abuse of functions		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT MEASURE	RESPONSE – DE FACTO	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	1.5.c.3 Abuse of functions convictions		
<b>Tier</b>	1. The methodology to estimate the indicator exists and countries are already producing estimates		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measures the rate of persons convicted for abuse of functions			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Total number of persons convicted for abuse of functions recorded in a given year divided by the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000.			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Ministry of Justice, Prison System	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Calendar year or 12 months
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	By sex	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

<b>Component</b>	1.5 Abuse of functions		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT MEASURE	RESPONSE – DE FACTO	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	1.5.c.4 Assets recovered from abuse of functions		
<b>Tier</b>	3. Many countries have some information, but it is necessary to improve or complement it to produce the indicator		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Estimate the amount of assets recovered from abuse of functions convictions.			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
If case records are available, the individual amounts of assets recovered are summed to obtain the total amount of assets recovered from convictions of abuse of functions.			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Ministry of Justice, Office of the Prosecutor	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Calendar year or 12 months
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	N/A	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

## 1.6 Obstruction of Justice

<b>Component</b>	1.6 Obstruction of Justice		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	RESPONSE – DE JURE	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	1.6.a Criminalization of obstruction of justice		
<b>Tier</b>	N/A		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Assessing if criminalization of obstruction of justice or related conduct in the national legislation is aligned to Article 20 of UNCAC			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Does the country criminalize obstruction of justice or related conduct in national legislation under Article 20 of the UNCAC?			
Options: Yes or No			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Judicature, Judicial branch, Internal Affairs office, National judiciary, Department of Public Administration, Ministry of Civil Service, Internal Affairs office	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Annual per calendar year
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	N/A	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

<b>Component</b>	1.6 Obstruction of Justice		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	RESPONSE – DE FACTO	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	1.6.b.1 Obstruction of justice investigations		
<b>Tier</b>	1. The methodology to estimate the indicator exists and countries are already producing estimates		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measure the rate of persons under investigation for engaging in obstruction of justice			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Total number of persons under investigation for engaging in obstruction of justice recorded in a given year divided by the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000.			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Judicature, Judicial branch, National judiciary, Internal Affairs office, Department of Public Administration, Ministry of Civil Service; Oversight Office	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative Records	<b>Frequency</b>	Annual per calendar year
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	By sex	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

<b>Component</b>	1.6 Obstruction of Justice		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	RESPONSE – DE FACTO	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	1.6.b.2 Obstruction of justice prosecutions		
<b>Tier</b>	1. The indicator is not produced regularly but it can be produced with existing information sources		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measure the rate of persons formally presented with a charge for engaging in obstruction of justice			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Total number of persons against whom prosecution for obstruction of justice was initiated in a given year, divided by the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000.			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Ministry of Justice, Office of the Prosecutor	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative Records	<b>Frequency</b>	Annual per calendar year
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	By sex	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

<b>Component</b>	1.6 Obstruction of Justice		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	RESPONSE – DE FACTO	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	1.6.b.3 Obstruction of justice conviction		
<b>Tier</b>	1. The methodology to estimate the indicator exists and countries are already producing estimates		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measure the rate of public officials convicted for engaging in obstruction of justice			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Total number of persons convicted for engaging in obstruction of justice recorded in a given year divided by the total population in the same year, multiplied by 100,000.			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Ministry of Justice, Prison System	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative Records	<b>Frequency</b>	Annual per calendar year
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	By sex	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

<b>Component</b>	1.6 Obstruction of Justice		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	RESPONSE – DE FACTO	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	1.6.b.4 Assets recovered from obstruction of justice		
<b>Tier</b>	3. Many countries have some information, but it is necessary to improve or complement it to produce the indicator		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Estimate the amount of assets recovered from obstruction of justice convictions.			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
If case records are available, the individual amounts of assets recovered are summed to obtain the total amount of assets recovered from obstruction of justice convictions.			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Attorney General's Office, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of the Interior, Internal Affairs office	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Annual per calendar year
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	By type of institution	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

## 2.1 Merit-based public hiring

<b>Component</b>	2.1 Merit-based public hiring		
<b>Type of measure</b>	DIRECT MEASURE		
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	2.1.a Non-open-recruitment appointments		
<b>Tier</b>	2. The indicator is not produced regularly but it can be produced with existing information		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Estimate the proportion of public officials appointed without an open recruitment process in the past 12 months			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Total number of public officials appointed without an open recruitment process in the past calendar year divided by the total number of public officials appointed in the past calendar year, multiplied by 100			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	National Statistical Office or Anti-corruption Unit	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Calendar year or 12 months
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	By sex	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A



<b>Component</b>	2.1 Merit-based public hiring		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	RISK - OPPORTUNITIES	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	2.1.b Uncompetitive recruitment		
<b>Tier</b>	2. The indicator is not produced regularly but it can be produced with existing information		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measure the proportion of open recruitments for public sector positions with just one candidate			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Total number of open recruitment processes with just one candidate in the past calendar year divided by the total number of open recruitment processes in the past calendar year, multiplied by 100.			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	National Statistical Office or Anti-corruption Unit	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Calendar year or 12 months
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	Sex of candidate	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

<b>Component</b>	2.1 Merit-based public hiring		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	RISK – CONSTRAINTS	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	2.1.c Complaints against the government for abusive dismissal		
<b>Tier</b>	2. The indicator is not produced regularly but it can be produced with existing information		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Estimate the number of complaints of civil servants against the government settled on grounds of abusive dismissal.			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Total number of complaints of civil servants against the government settled on grounds of abusive dismissal.			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	National Statistical Office or Anti-corruption Unit	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Calendar year or 12 months
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	Sex of complainant	<b>Definitions</b>	Abusive dismissal: UNCAC Article 19 reads that Each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, when committed intentionally, the abuse of functions or position, that is, the performance of or failure to perform an act, in violation of laws, by a public official in the discharge of his or her functions, for the purpose of obtaining an undue advantage for himself or herself or for another person or entity. Abuse dismissal refers to the discharge of functions of a public official for the purpose of obtaining undue advantage.

<b>Component</b>	2.1 Merit-based public hiring		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	RESPONSE – DE JURE	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	2.1.d Guidelines for merit-based recruitment		
<b>Tier</b>	N/A		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Assess if there are guidelines for merit-based recruitment in the public sector			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Are there guidelines for merit-based recruitment in the public sector?			
<b>Options:</b> Yes or No			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Anti-corruption Unit	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Calendar year or 12 months
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	N/A	<b>Definitions</b>	Public service: Comprises persons employed by public authorities at central, regional, and local levels and include both civil servants and public officials

<b>Component</b>	2.1 Merit-based public hiring		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	RESPONSE – DE FACTO	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	2.1.e Public sector appointments reverted		
<b>Tier</b>	3. Many countries have some information, but it is necessary to improve or complement it to produce the indicator		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measure the share of public sector appointments reverted due to irregularities in the recruitment processes.			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Number of public sector appointments reverted due to irregularities in the recruitment processes in a given year, divided by the number of public sector appointments in that year, and multiplied by 100			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	National Statistical Office or Anti-corruption Unit	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Calendar year or 12 months
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	N/A	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

## 2.2 Independence and integrity of the judiciary and law enforcement agencies

<b>Component</b>	2.2 Independence and integrity of the judiciary and law enforcement agencies		
<b>Type of measure</b>	DIRECT		
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	2.2.a Judicial ethics		
<b>Tier</b>	2. The indicator is not produced regularly but it can be produced with existing information		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Determine the number of admonishments for magistrates on ethical grounds the previous year.			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Number of admonishments for magistrates on ethical grounds the previous year			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Judicature, Judicial branch, National judiciary	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Annual per calendar year
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	By sex of magistrates	<b>Definitions</b>	Ethics: the attempt to understand the nature of human values, of how we ought to live and of what constitutes the right conduct

<b>Component</b>	2.2 Independence and integrity of the judiciary and law enforcement agencies		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	PERCEPTION	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	2.2.b.1 Perception of corruption in the judiciary		
<b>Tier</b>	1. The methodology to estimate the indicator exists and countries are already producing estimates.		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measure the perception of corruption in the judiciary among the general population.			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Number of persons who answered that they perceive the judiciary is corrupt, divided by the total number of respondents, multiplied by 100 and weighted in line with the sampling scheme.			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	National Statistics Office, Judicature, Judicial branch, National judiciary	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Survey	<b>Frequency</b>	Annual per calendar year
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	By sex By age By sector in the judiciary	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

<b>Component</b>	2.2 Independence and integrity of the judiciary and law enforcement agencies		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	PERCEPTION	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	2.2.b.2 Perception of corruption in law enforcement agencies		
<b>Tier</b>	1. The methodology to estimate the indicator exists and countries are already producing estimates.		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measure the perception of corruption in law enforcement agencies. Proportion of persons who perceive that law enforcement agencies are corrupt			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Number of persons who answered that they perceive law enforcement agencies as corrupt, divided by the total number of respondents, multiplied by 100 and weighted in line with the sampling scheme			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	National Statistics Office, Judicature, Judicial branch, National judiciary	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Survey	<b>Frequency</b>	Annual per calendar year
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	By sex By age By sector in law enforcement agencies	<b>Definitions</b>	

<b>Component</b>	2.2 Independence and integrity of the judiciary and law enforcement agencies		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	RESPONSE – DE FACTO	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	2.2.c Institutional reporting		
<b>Tier</b>	1. The methodology to estimate the indicator exists and countries are already producing estimates.		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Assess the existence of annual public report on integrity problems in the judiciary.			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Is there an annual public report on integrity problems in the judiciary? Yes or No N/A			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Judicature, Judicial branch	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Annual per calendar year
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	N/A	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A



<b>Component</b>	2.2 Independence and integrity of the judiciary and law enforcement agencies		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	RESPONSE – DE FACTO	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	2.2.d Ethical and integrity-related dismissal		
<b>Tier</b>	4. Some countries may have some information but do not publish it regularly		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measure the rate of public officials dismissed for misconduct against ethics and integrity			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Number of public officials dismissed on the grounds of ethics and integrity misdemeanors in the past year, divided by total number of public officials, and multiplied by 100,000.			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Judicature, Judicial branch, Internal Affairs office, Department of Public Administration, Ministry of Civil Service	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Annual per calendar year
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	By sex of public officials	<b>Definitions</b>	Integrity: behaviors and actions consistent with a series of moral or ethical standards and principles, adopted by individuals as well as institutions, which operate as a barrier against corruption and in favor of the Rule of Law. Strict adherence to a moral code, reflected in honesty, transparency, and complete harmony in what one thinks, says and does

## 2.3 Conflict of interest

<b>Component</b>	2.3 Conflict of interest		
<b>Type of measure</b>	DIRECT MEASURE		
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	2.3.a Conflict of interests of public officials		
<b>Tier</b>	2. The indicator is not produced regularly but it can be produced with existing information sources		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measure share of public officials who disclosed their conflict-of-interest (COI)			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Number of public officials who made their conflict-of-interest (COI) disclosures in the past year, divided by total number of public officials in the past year, and multiplied by 100.			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Ministry of Public Service, National Anti-Corruption and Transparency Unit/Agency	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Calendar year or 12 months
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	By sex, type of institution, type of position	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

<b>Component</b>	2.3 Conflict of interest		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT MEASURE	RISK - CONSTRAINTS	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	2.3.b Control body to monitor and enforce COI disclosures.		
<b>Tier</b>	N/A		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Identify if a given country has a control body to monitor and enforce COI disclosures			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Does the country have a control body to monitor and enforce COI disclosures?			
<b>Options:</b> Yes or No			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Ministry of Public Service, National Anti-Corruption and Transparency Unit/Agency	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Calendar year or 12 months
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	By sex, type of institution, type of position	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

<b>Component</b>	2.3 Conflict of interest		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT MEASURE	RESPONSE – DE JURE	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	2.3.c Existence of COI regulation		
<b>Tier</b>	N/A		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Assess the existence of regulation on Conflict of Interest N/A			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Is there regulation on conflict of interest for public officials? <b>Options:</b> Yes or No N/A			
Resp. Institution	Ministry of Public Service, National Anti-Corruption and Transparency Unit/Agency	Type of institution	Public sector
Type of data Source	Administrative records	Frequency	Calendar year or 12 months
Disaggregation(s)	NA	Definitions	N/A

<b>Component</b>	2.3 Conflict of interest		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT MEASURE	RESPONSE – DE FACTO	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	2.3.d Share of public officials sanctioned for not filling in timely, accurately or at all COI disclosures the previous year according to national legislation		
<b>Tier</b>	2. The indicator is not produced regularly but it can be produced with existing information sources		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measure the share of public officials not disclosing their COI as per national legislation who were sanctioned			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Number of public officials sanctioned for not filling in COI disclosures the previous year, divided by total number of public officials who submitted their COI disclosure in the previous year, and multiplied by 100			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Ministry of Public Service, National Anti-Corruption and Transparency Unit/Agency	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Calendar year or 12 months
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	By sex, type of institution, type of position	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

## 2.4 Management of public finances

<b>Component</b>	2.4 Management of public finances		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	RISK - OPPORTUNITIES	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	2.4.a Disclosure and accessibility of budgetary information		
<b>Tier</b>	2. The indicator is not produced regularly but it can be produced with existing information sources		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measure the extent of budgetary information that is made available to the public, as well as its degree of accessibility. Disclosure and accessibility of budgetary information.			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Is budgetary information made available to the public? <b>Options:</b> Yes or No			
Is budgetary information that is made available to the public comprehensive? <b>Options:</b> Yes or No			
Is there proactive disclosure of information on websites on budgetary information? <b>Options:</b> Yes or No			
Is there proactive disclosure of datasets on websites on budgetary information? <b>Options:</b> Yes or No			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	National statistical office or Anti-corruption Unit	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Calendar year or 12 months
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	N/A	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

<b>Component</b>	2.4 Management of public finances		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	RISK - OPPORTUNITIES	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	2.4.b Confidentiality of government budget		
<b>Tier</b>	2. The indicator is not produced regularly but it can be produced with existing information sources		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measure the share of total government budget not subject to public disclosure due to confidentiality			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Government budget not subject to public disclosure due to confidentiality in the past year, divided by total government budget in the past year, and multiplied by 100.			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Anti-Corruption Unit or Supreme Audit Institution	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Calendar year or 12 months
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	N/A	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

<b>Component</b>	2.4 Management of public finances		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT MEASURE	CONTRAINS	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	2.4.c Existence of regulation on the direct patrimonial responsibility of public servants, return of misappropriated funds and resources, and compensation for damages caused by their misuse to the injured parties.		
<b>Tier</b>	1. The methodology to estimate the indicator exists and countries are already producing estimates.		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Assess the existence of regulation on the direct patrimonial responsibility of public servants, return of misappropriated funds and resources, and compensation for damages caused by their misuse to the injured parties. N/A			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Is there regulation in place on the direct patrimonial responsibility of public servants, return of misappropriated funds and resources, and compensation for damages caused by their misuse to the injured parties? <b>Options:</b> Yes or No N/A			
Resp. Institution	Anti-corruption Unit or Supreme Audit Institution	Type of institution	Public sector
Type of data Source	Administrative records	Frequency	
Disaggregation(s)	N/A	Definitions	



<b>Component</b>	2.4 Management of public finances		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT MEASURE	RESPONSE – DE JURE	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	2.4.d Comprehensiveness of budget disclosure requirements		
<b>Tier</b>	2. The indicator is not produced regularly but it can be produced with existing information sources		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Assess the extent to which national laws, regulations, policies, and guidelines provide a basis for collecting and publishing data on public finances.			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Are there national laws that provide a basis for collecting and publishing data on public finances? <b>Options:</b> Yes or No			
Are regulations that provide a basis for collecting and publishing data on public finances? <b>Options:</b> Yes or No			
Are there policies that provide a basis for collecting and publishing data on public finances? <b>Options:</b> Yes or No			
Are there guidelines that provide a basis for collecting and publishing data on public finances? <b>Options:</b> Yes or No N/A			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	National Statistical Office, Anti-corruption Unit or Supreme Audit Institution	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Calendar year or 12 months
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	N/A	<b>Definitions</b>	Identify national laws, regulations, policies, and guidelines by name, and paragraph or section, which indicate the basis for collecting and publishing public finance data.

<b>Component</b>	2.4 Management of public finances		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	RESPONSE – DE FACTO	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	2.4.e Sanctions against public officials		
<b>Tier</b>	2. The indicator is not produced regularly but it can be produced with existing information sources		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measure the number of public officials and civil servants fined, sanctioned, or imprisoned for embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion of public funds per 1,000,000 population			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
$RPoF^t = \frac{PoF^t}{Apo^t} * 1,000,000$ $RPoS^t = \frac{Pos^t}{Apo^t} * 1,000,000$ $RPoI^t = \frac{PoI^t}{Apo^t} * 1,000,000$ <p>R= Rate  <i>PoF<sup>t</sup></i>= public officials and civil servants fined for embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion of public funds in the past t year  <i>Pos<sup>t</sup></i>= public officials and civil servants sanctioned for embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion of public funds in the past t year  <i>PoI<sup>t</sup></i> = public officials and civil servants imprisoned for embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion of public funds in the past t year  <i>Apo<sup>t</sup></i>= Total number of public officials and civil servants in the past t year</p>			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	National Statistical Office, Anti-corruption Unit or Supreme Audit Institution	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Calendar year or 12 months
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	N/A	<b>Definitions</b>	Misconduct: Contravention of the provisions of the law, which might be classified at least as: serious, non-serious Sanctions: UNCAC Article 30 para. 1 provides that “each State Party shall make the commission of [corruption] offences [...] liable to sanctions that take into account the gravity of that offence.” Moreover, The OSCE Handbook on Combating Corruption issues the following recommendation regarding sanctions: “The level of conviction must consider the gravity of the offence and be ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’; the sanctions must address the natural and legal person and the range of conviction options

## 2.5 Public Procurement

<b>Component</b>	2.5 Public Procurement		
<b>Type of measure</b>	DIRECT		
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	2.5.a Public contracts awarded without competition		
<b>Tier</b>	2. Many countries have some information, but it is necessary to improve or complement it to produce the indicator		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measure the percentage of public contracts awarded without competition (without another bidder) in numbers and % volume total			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
$PObN^t = \frac{ObN^t}{PcaN^t} * 100$ $PObV^t = \frac{ObV^t}{PcaV^t} * 100$		<p>P= Percentage  <math>ObN^t</math> = Number of public contracts awarded where just one bidder participated in the past t year  <math>PcaN^t</math> = Total number of public contracts awarded in the past t year  <math>ObV^t</math> = Total volume of public contracts awarded where just one bidder participated in the past t year  <math>PcaV^t</math> = Total volume of public contracts awarded in the past t year</p>	
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Supreme Audit Institution or Anti-corruption Unit	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Calendar year or 12 months
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	N/A	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

<b>Component</b>	2.5 Public Procurement		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	RISK - OPPORTUNITIES	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	2.5.b Publishing of public tenders		
<b>Tier</b>	1. Many countries have some information, but it is necessary to improve or complement it to produce the indicator		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measure the percentage of public tenders for which information was published (open call/invitation, selection criteria, selection process, award information, appeal process).			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
$PPtip^t = \frac{Ptip^t}{Pt^t} * 100$			
P= Percentage $Ptip^t$ = Number of public tenders for which information was published $Pt^t$ = Total number of public tenders			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Supreme Audit Institution or Anti-corruption Unit	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Calendar year or 12 months
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	By stage (open call/invitation, selection criteria, selection process, award information, appeal process)	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

<b>Component</b>	2.5 Public Procurement		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	RISK - CONSTRAINTS	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	2.5.c Online Public Procurement advertisement		
<b>Tier</b>	3. Many countries have some information, but it is necessary to improve or complement it to produce the indicator		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Estimate the share of procurement cases and procurement volume that were advertised online		Procurement advertisement online	
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
$P = \frac{PaON^t}{PaN^t} * 100$ $P = \frac{PaOV^t}{PaV^t} * 100$		P= Proportion $PaoN^t$ = Procurement cases that were advertised online in the past t year $PaN^t$ = Procurement cases awarded in the past t year $PaoV^t$ = Total volume of procurement cases that were advertised online in the past t year $PaV^t$ = Total volume of procurement cases awarded in the past t year	
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Supreme Audit Institution or Anti-corruption Unit	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Calendar year or 12 months
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	N/A	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

<b>Component</b>	2.5 Public Procurement		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	RESPONSE – DE JURE	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	2.5.d Compliance with public procurement regulation		
<b>Tier</b>	N/A		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Assess if the country complies with public procurement regulation as per UNCAC article 9.			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Does the country comply with public procurement regulation as per UNCAC article 9 – paragraph 1, items a-e? <b>Options:</b> Yes or No			
Does the country comply with public procurement regulation as per UNCAC article 9 – paragraph 2, items a-e? <b>Options:</b> Yes or No			
Does the country comply with public procurement regulation as per UNCAC article 9 – paragraph 3? <b>Options:</b> Yes or No			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Supreme Audit Institution or Anti-corruption Unit	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Calendar year or 12 months
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	Per paragraph, Per item	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

<b>Component</b>	2.5 Public Procurement		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	RESPONSE – DE FACTO	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	2.5.e Ratio of convictions related to irregularities in public procurement		
<b>Tier</b>	2. The indicator is not produced regularly but it can be produced with existing information sources		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measure the rate of criminal convictions related to irregularities in procurement processes.			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Ratio of criminal convictions related to irregularities in procurement processes to number of procurements processes			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Supreme Audit Institution or Anti-corruption Unit	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Calendar year or 12 months
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	N/A	<b>Definitions</b>	Conviction: Adjudication of a criminal defendant's guilt

## 2.6 Candidature for election to public office

<b>Component</b>	2.6 Candidature for election to public office		
<b>Type of measure</b>	DIRECT MEASURE		
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	2.6.a Campaign spending per candidate		
<b>Tier</b>	N/A		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Compare the total campaign spending per candidate with the total campaign funds allocated per candidate			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Total campaign spending per candidate (number) divided by the total campaign funds allocated per candidate (number), multiplied by 100			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Electoral Commission, Electoral Systems	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	The past election
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	By sex	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A



<b>Component</b>	2.6 Candidature for election to public office		
<b>Type of measure</b>	DIRECT MEASURE		
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	2.6.b Campaign spending per political party		
<b>Tier</b>	N/A		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Compare the total campaign spending per political party vs. total campaign funds allocated per political party			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Total campaign spending per political party (amount) divided by the total campaign funds allocated per political party (amount) x 100			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Electoral Commission, Electoral Systems	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	The past election
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	N/A	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

<b>Component</b>	2.6 Candidature for election to public office		
<b>Type of measure</b>	DIRECT MEASURE		
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	2.6.c Vote buying during the past election		
<b>Tier</b>	N/A		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Estimate the proportion of population who experienced vote buying during the past election			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Number of respondents who experienced vote buying during the past election, divided by total respondents who voted during the past election, multiplied by 100 and weighted in line with sampling scheme.			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Electoral Commission, Electoral Systems, National Statistical Offices	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Surveys	<b>Frequency</b>	The past election
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	N/A	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

<b>Component</b>	2.6 Candidature for election to public office		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT MEASURE	PERCEPTION	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	2.6.d.1 Citizens' perception of corruption in the processes of election to public office		
<b>Tier</b>	N/A		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Estimate the perception of corruption in the processes of election to public office			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Number of respondents who perceived corruption in the processes of election to public office during the past election, divided by number of respondents, multiplied by 100 and weighted in line with sampling scheme.			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Electoral Commission, Electoral Systems, National Statistical Offices	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Surveys	<b>Frequency</b>	The past election
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	N/A	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

<b>Component</b>	2.6 Candidature for election to public office		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT MEASURE	PERCEPTION	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	2.6.d.2 Citizens' perception of corruption within political parties		
<b>Tier</b>	N/A		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measure the general perceived corruption within political parties (and not related to specific parties)			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Number of respondents who perceived corruption within political parties in the past year, divided by the number of respondents, multiplied by 100 and weighted in line with sampling scheme.			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Electoral Commission, Electoral Systems, National Statistical Offices	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Surveys	<b>Frequency</b>	Calendar year or 12 months
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	N/A	<b>Definitions</b>	

<b>Component</b>	2.6 Candidature for election to public office		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT MEASURE	RISK - OPPORTUNITIES	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	2.6.e.1 Autonomous electoral body		
<b>Tier</b>	N/A		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Assess whether the country have or not an autonomous electoral body			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Does the country have an autonomous electoral body? <b>Options:</b> Yes or No			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Electoral Commission, Electoral Systems	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Regulatory framework on the electoral institution	<b>Frequency</b>	Calendar year or 12 months
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	N/A	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

<b>Component</b>	2.6 Candidature for election to public office		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT MEASURE	RISK - OPPORTUNITIES	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	2.6.e.2 Accessibility and availability of political party funding data/information		
<b>Tier</b>	4. Some countries may have some information but do not publish it regularly		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measure whether there is or not accessibility and availability of political party funding data/information			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Is political party funding data/information available and easily accessible online? <b>Options:</b> Yes or No			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Electoral Commission, Electoral Systems	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Regulatory framework on the electoral system	<b>Frequency</b>	Calendar year or 12 months
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	N/A	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

<b>Component</b>	2.6 Candidature for election to public office		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT MEASURE	RESPONSE – DE JURE	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	2.6.f.1 Regulatory measures that sanction acts of corruption in elections		
<b>Tier</b>	N/A		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Assess whether there are regulatory measures that sanction corruption during elections			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Are there regulatory measures that sanction acts of corruption in elections? <b>Options:</b> Yes or No			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Electoral Commission, Electoral Systems	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Regulatory framework on the electoral system	<b>Frequency</b>	Calendar year or 12 months
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	N/A	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

<b>Component</b>	2.6 Candidature for election to public office		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT MEASURE	RESPONSE – DE JURE	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	2.6.f.2 Comprehensiveness of political finance legislation: evaluation of existing prohibitions, regulations, and restrictions on financing for political campaigns		
<b>Tier</b>	N/A		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Assess whether the political finance legislation is comprehensive: evaluation of existing prohibitions, regulations, and restrictions on financing for political campaigns			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Is there comprehensiveness of political finance legislation: evaluation of existing prohibitions, regulations, and restrictions on financing for political campaigns? <b>Options:</b> Yes or No			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Electoral Commission, Electoral Systems	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Regulatory framework on the electoral system	<b>Frequency</b>	Calendar year or 12 months
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	N/A	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A



<b>Component</b>	2.6 Candidature for election to public office		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT MEASURE	RESPONSE – DE FACTO	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	2.6.g.1 Public officials sanctioned for failing to disclose required information on campaign public financing		
<b>Tier</b>	N/A		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Assess whether the public officials are sanctioned for failing to disclose required information on campaign public financing			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
$PPosDi^t = \frac{PosDi^t}{TPo^t} \times 100$ <p> PPosDi<sup>t</sup>= Proportion of public officials sanctioned for failing to disclose required information on campaign public financing  PosDi<sup>t</sup>= Total number of public officials sanctioned for failing to disclose required information on campaign public financing  TPo<sup>t</sup>= Total of public officials who disclosed the required information on campaign public financing in the past election </p>			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Electoral Commission, Electoral System, Ministry of Public Service, Ministry of Civil Service, National Anti-Corruption and Transparency Agencies/Institution	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	In the past election
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	N/A	<b>Definitions</b>	Sanctions: UNCAC Article 30 para. 1 provides that “each State Party shall make the commission of [corruption] offences [...] liable to sanctions that take into account the gravity of that offence.” Moreover, The OSCE Handbook on Combating Corruption issues the following recommendation regarding sanctions: “The level of sentencing must consider the gravity of the offence and be ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’; the sanctions must address the natural and legal person and the range of sentencing options should include imprisonment, monetary and non-monetary penalties, confiscation, suspension, removal or disqualification from public office and debarment as well as disciplinary measures.”

<b>Component</b>	2.6 Candidature for election to public office		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT MEASURE	RESPONSE – DE FACTO	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	2.6.g.2 Criminal proceedings initiated and terminated in relation to electoral offenses		
<b>Tier</b>	N/A		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Assess whether the electoral offenses initiate and terminate criminal proceedings			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
$PCpit^t = \frac{Cpit^t}{TEo^t} \times 100$ <p>PCpit<sup>t</sup>= Proportion of criminal proceedings initiated and terminated in relation to electoral offenses  Cpit<sup>t</sup>= Number of criminal proceedings initiated and terminated in relation to electoral offenses in the last election  TEo<sup>t</sup>= Number of criminal proceedings in relation to electoral offenses in the last election</p>			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Ministry of Public Service, Ministry of Civil Service, National Anti-Corruption and Transparency Agencies/Institution, Department of Justice, Office of the Prosecutor	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	The past election
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	N/A	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

## 2.7 Public reporting

<b>Component</b>	2.7 Public reporting of illegal or questionable actions of public officials		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT MEASURE		
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	2.7.a Existence of administrative procedures to report illegal or questionable actions of public officials		
<b>Tier</b>	4. Some countries may have some information but do not publish it regularly		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Assess the existence of administrative instances to report illegal or questionable actions of public officials			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
<b>Do administrative procedures exist to report illegal or questionable actions of public officials?</b>			
Options: Yes or No N/A			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	National Statistical Office or Anti-corruption Unit	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>		<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

<b>Component</b>	2.7 Public reporting		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT MEASURE		DE FACTO (Implementation)
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	2.7.b Number of reports as a result of illegal or questionable actions of public officials		
<b>Tier</b>	4. Some countries may have some information but do not publish it regularly		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measure the number of reports as a result of illegal or questionable actions of public officials			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Number of reports of illegal or questionable actions of public officials in the last 12 month			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	National Statistical Office or Anti-corruption Unit	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public Sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Calendar year or 12 months
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	N/A	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

## 2.8 Preventive measures for the private sector and state-owned enterprises

<b>Component</b>	2.8 Preventive measures for the private sector and state-owned enterprises		
<b>Type of measure</b>	DIRECT MEASURE		
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	2.8.a Internal controls and auditing		
<b>Tier</b>	N/A		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measure the number of audits performed in processes vulnerable to corruption			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Number of audits performed in processes vulnerable to corruption in the last year			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	National Statistical Office or Anti-corruption Unit	<b>Type of institution</b>	Private sector and public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Internal control framework	<b>Frequency</b>	Calendar year or 12 months
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	Type of company	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

<b>Component</b>	2.8 Preventive measures for the private sector and state-owned enterprises		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT MEASURE	PERCEPTION	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	2.8.b Perception of corruption in private sector companies		
<b>Tier</b>	N/A		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Estimate the levels of perceived corruption private sector companies			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Total of persons who perceive private sector companies are corrupt in the last calendar year divided by the total respondents, multiplied by 100 and weighted in line with sampling scheme.			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	National Statistical Office or Anti-corruption Unit	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Surveys	<b>Frequency</b>	Calendar year or 12 months
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	N/A	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

<b>Component</b>	2.8 Preventive measures for the private sector and state-owned enterprises		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT MEASURE	PERCEPTION	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	2.8.c Perception of corruption in state-owned enterprises		
<b>Tier</b>	N/A		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Estimate the levels of perceived corruption state-owned enterprises			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Total of persons who perceive state-owned enterprises are corrupt in the last calendar year, divided by the total number of respondents, multiplied by 100 and weighted in line with the sampling scheme.			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	National Statistical Office or Anti-corruption Unit	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Surveys	<b>Frequency</b>	Calendar year or 12 months
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	N/A	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

<b>Component</b>	2.8 Preventive measures for the private sector and state-owned enterprises		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT MEASURE	RESPONSE – DE JURE	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	2.8.d Private sector and state-owned enterprises regulatory normative framework		
<b>Tier</b>	N/A		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Assess if the private sector has a regulatory normative framework			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Does the private sector have a regulatory normative framework? <b>Options:</b> Yes or No			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Internal Control, National Statistical Office or Anti-corruption Unit	<b>Type of institution</b>	Private sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Alternative data source, survey, Internal Control Framework	<b>Frequency</b>	Calendar year or 12 months
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	N/A	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A



<b>Component</b>	2.8 Preventive measures for the private sector and state-owned enterprises		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT MEASURE	RESPONSE – DE FACTO	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	2.8.e.1 Sanctions as a result of an auditing process where irregularities were found.		
<b>Tier</b>	1. Some countries may have some information but do not publish it regularly.		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measures the number of sanctions as a result of an auditing process where irregularities were found.			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
How many sanction result from an auditing process where irregularities were found?			
N/A			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Internal Control, National Statistical Office or Anti-corruption Unit	<b>Type of institution</b>	Private sector/Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Alternative data source, survey, Internal Control Framework	<b>Frequency</b>	Calendar year or 12 months
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	N/A	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

<b>Component</b>	2.8 Preventive measures for the private sector and state-owned enterprises		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT MEASURE	RESPONSE – DE FACTO	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	2.8.e.2 Dismissals as a result of an auditing process where irregularities were found.		
<b>Tier</b>	4. Some countries may have some information but do not publish it regularly		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Estimate the number of dismissals as a result of an auditing process where irregularities were found.			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
The number of dismissals as a result of an auditing process where irregularities were found.			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Internal Control, National Statistical Office, or Anti-corruption Unit	<b>Type of institution</b>	Private sector/Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Alternative data source, survey, Internal Control Framework	<b>Frequency</b>	Calendar year or 12 months
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	N/A	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

<b>Component</b>	2.8 Preventive measures for the private sector and state-owned enterprises		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT MEASURE	RESPONSE – DE FACTO	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	2.8.e.3 Reports to law enforcement authorities as a result of an auditing process where irregularities were found.		
<b>Tier</b>	2. The indicator is not produced regularly but it can be produced with existing information sources		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Estimate the number of reports to law enforcement authorities as a result of an auditing process where irregularities were found			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
The number of reports to law enforcement authorities as a result of an auditing process where irregularities were found.			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Internal Control, National Statistical Office or Anti-corruption Unit	<b>Type of institution</b>	Private sector/Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Alternative data source, survey, Internal Control Framework	<b>Frequency</b>	Calendar year or 12 months
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	N/A	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

## 2.9 Preventive measures for the private sector

<b>Component</b>	2.9 Preventive measures for the private sector and state-owned enterprises		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT MEASURE	PERCEPTION	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	2.9.a Employees that perceive a corruption culture in the enterprise/ and state-owned enterprises		
<b>Tier</b>	N/A		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measure the perception of a corrupted culture within an enterprise/ and state-owned enterprises			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Number of employees who reported they perceive corruption within the entity which employs them in the past t year, divided by total employees who responded, multiplied by 100 and weighted in line with sampling scheme			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Internal Control, National Statistical Office or Anti-corruption Unit	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Internal survey	<b>Frequency</b>	Calendar year or 12 months
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	N/A	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

<b>Component</b>	2.9 Preventive measures for the private sector and state-owned enterprises		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT MEASURE	RESPONSE – DE JURE	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	2.9.b Compliance unit		
<b>Tier</b>	3. Some countries may have some information but do not publish it regularly		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Proportion of medium and large private enterprises that have a compliance unit			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Total number of medium and large private enterprises that have a compliance unit in the last calendar year divided by the total number of medium and large private enterprises in the same calendar year, multiplied by 100			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Internal Control, National Statistical Office or Anti-corruption Unit	<b>Type of institution</b>	Private sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Alternative data source, survey, Internal Control Framework	<b>Frequency</b>	Calendar year or 12 months
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	N/A	<b>Definitions</b>	Compliance framework: A compliance framework is the process through which companies demonstrate that they have conformed to specific requirements in laws, regulations, contracts, strategies and policies.

<b>Component</b>	2.9 Preventive measures for the private sector and state-owned enterprises		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT MEASURE	RESPONSE – DE JURE	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	2.9.c Compliance unit		
<b>Tier</b>	3. Some countries may have some information but do not publish it regularly		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Proportion of state-owned enterprises that have a compliance unit			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Total number of state-owned enterprises that have a compliance unit in the last calendar year, divided by the total number of state-owned enterprises in the same calendar year and multiplied by 100.			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Internal Control, National Statistical Office or Anti-corruption Unit	<b>Type of institution</b>	Private sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Alternative data source, survey, Internal Control Framework	<b>Frequency</b>	Calendar year or 12 months
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	N/A	<b>Definitions</b>	Compliance framework: A compliance framework is the process through which companies demonstrate that they have conformed to specific requirements in laws, regulations, contracts, strategies and policies.

## 2.10 Training programs

<b>Component</b>	2.10 Training programs		
<b>Type of measure</b>	DIRECT		
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	2.10.a Proportion of public officials that completed anticorruption training programs out of the total number of public officials in a given year		
<b>Tier</b>	2. The indicator is not produced regularly but it can be produced with existing information sources		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measure the proportion of public officials that completed anticorruption training programs in the last 12 months			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
$PErf^t = \frac{Erf^t}{Ers^t} * 100$			
<p>P= Proportion  <math>Erf^t</math> = Total number of public officials that completed anticorruption training programs in the past t year  <math>Ers^t</math> = Total number of public officials in the past t year</p>			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Anti-corruption Unit,	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Calendar year or 12 months
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	N/A	<b>Definitions</b>	

<b>Component</b>	2.10 Training programs		
<b>Type of measure</b>	DIRECT	RESPONSE – DE JURE	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	2.10.b Existence of compulsory anticorruption education		
<b>Tier</b>	N/A		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Assess if public sector institutions have compulsory anticorruption education			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Do public institutions have compulsory anticorruption education? <b>Options:</b> Yes or No			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	National Statistical Office or Anti-corruption Unit	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Calendar year or 12 months
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	N/A	<b>Definitions</b>	



### 3.1 International cooperation

<b>Component</b>	3.1 International cooperation		
<b>Type of measure</b>	DIRECT		
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	3.1.a Proportion of extradition requests fulfilled out of the total number of extradition requests received in the last 12 months		
<b>Tier</b>	2. The indicator is not produced regularly but it can be produced with existing information sources		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measure the proportion of extradition requests fulfilled in the last 12 months			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
$PErf^t = \frac{Erf^t}{Ers^t} * 100$			
P= Percentage $Erf^t$ = Extradition requests fulfilled in the past t year $Ers^t$ = Extradition requests submitted in the past t year			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Anti-corruption Unit, Attorney General's Office	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Calendar year or 12 months
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	N/A	<b>Definitions</b>	Extradition: The formal process whereby a State requests from the requested State the return of a person accused or convicted of a crime to stand trial or serve a sentence in the requesting State

<b>Component</b>	3.1 International cooperation		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	RESPONSE - DE FACTO	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	3.1.b Mutual legal assistance requests		
<b>Tier</b>	2. The indicator is not produced regularly but it can be produced with existing information sources		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Proportion of mutual legal assistance requests fulfilled out of the total number of mutual legal assistance requests received in the last 12 months			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
$PMlaf^t = \frac{Mlaf^t}{Mlar^t} * 100$			
<p>P= Percentage  <i>Mlaf<sup>t</sup></i> = Mutual legal assistance requests fulfilled in the past t year  <i>Mlar<sup>t</sup></i> = mutual legal assistance requests received in the past t year</p>			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Anti-corruption Unit, Attorney General's Office	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Calendar year or 12 months
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	N/A	<b>Definitions</b>	<p>Mutual legal assistance (MLA): in criminal matters is a process by which States seek for and provide assistance to other States in servicing of judicial document and gathering evidence for use in criminal cases.</p> <p>The granting of mutual legal assistance depends on a series of factors, such as the criminalization of the offence in the receiving State, or that the person subject of the request has not been yet convicted or acquitted for the same offence.</p>

### 3.2 Resources allocated to fight corruption.

<b>Component</b>	3.2 Resources allocated to fight corruption		
<b>Type of measure</b>	DIRECT		
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	3.2.a Resources allocated to fight corruption		
<b>Tier</b>	4. Some countries may have some information but do not publish it regularly		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Estimate the share of funds in the annual budget allocated to programs to fight corruption reported by the Ministry of Finance or another ministry designated to report public spending.			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
$PFCorr^t = \frac{FCorr^t}{ABug^t} \times 100$			
<p>PFCorr<sup>t</sup>= Percentage of funds in the annual budget allocated to programs to fight corruption reported by the Ministry of Finance or another ministry designated to report public spending</p> <p>FCorr<sup>t</sup>= Funds in the annual budget allocated to programs to fight corruption reported by the Ministry of Finance or another ministry designated to report public spending in the past t year</p> <p>ABug<sup>t</sup>=Total annual budget in the past t year</p>			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	National Budget Office, Finance National Office, Ministry of Finance or another ministry designated to report public spending	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative Records	<b>Frequency</b>	Annual per calendar year
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	By sector	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

<b>Component</b>	3.2 Resources allocated to fight corruption		
<b>Type of measure</b>	DIRECT	RESPONSE – DE JURE	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	3.2.b.1 Existence of a cross-cutting policy at the different levels of government related to the fight against corruption		
<b>Tier</b>	N/A		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Assess if there is a cross-cutting policy at the different levels of government related to the fight against corruption.			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Is there a cross-cutting policy at the different levels of government related to the fight against corruption?			
<b>Options:</b> Yes or No			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	National Statistical Office or Anti-corruption Unit	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Calendar year or 12 months
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	N/A	<b>Definitions</b>	

<b>Component</b>	3.2 Resources allocated to fight corruption		
<b>Type of measure</b>	DIRECT	RESPONSE – DE JURE	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	3.2.b.2 Existence of an entity, internal department, or institutional or intersectoral level focused on the fight against corruption.		
<b>Tier</b>	N/A		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Assess if there is an entity, internal department, or institutional or intersectoral level focused on the fight against corruption.			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Is there an entity, internal department, or institutional or intersectoral level focused on the fight against corruption.			
<b>Options:</b> Yes or No			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	National Statistical Office or Anti-corruption Unit	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Calendar year or 12 months
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	N/A	<b>Definitions</b>	

<b>Component</b>	3.2 Resources allocated to fight corruption		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	RESPONSE	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	3.2.c Staff assigned to institutions dedicated to fight corruption		
<b>Tier</b>	2. Many countries have some information, but it is necessary to improve or complement it to produce the indicator		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Assess the institutional capacities in terms of human resources dedicated to fight corruption reported by the National relevant institution by estimating its proportion			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Total number of public officials dedicated to fight corruption divided by the total number of public officials in a given year, multiplied by 100.			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Civil Service, National Budget Office, Finance National Office, Ministry of Finance	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative Records	<b>Frequency</b>	Annual per calendar year
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	By sex By sector	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

### 3.3 Transparency

<b>Component</b>	3.3 Transparency		
<b>Type of measure</b>	DIRECT MEASURE		
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	3.3.a Number of killings of journalist		
<b>Tier</b>	N/A		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measure killings of journalists			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Number of verified cases of killings of journalists.			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	OHCHR, UNESCO, ILO	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Global, regional and national mandated bodies, mechanisms and institutions	<b>Frequency</b>	Calendar year or 12 months
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	N/A	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

<b>Component</b>	3.3 Transparency		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT MEASURE	RISK - CONSTRAINT	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	3.3.b Availability of comprehensive information online		
<b>Tier</b>	N/A		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
<p>Assess whether there is or not availability of information online on:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Number of awarded tenders with the most economically advantageous offers,</li> <li>-number of unopened tenders.</li> <li>-Number of tenders with single solicitation (only one offer allowed against only one offer submitted)</li> </ul>			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
<p>Is there availability of information online?  <b>Options:</b> Yes or No</p>			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	National Statistical Office, Anti-corruption and Transparency Agency/Unit,	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Calendar year or 12 months
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	N/A	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A



<b>Component</b>	3.3 Transparency		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT MEASURE	RESPONSE – DE JURE	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	3.3.c Comprehensive freedom of information (FOI) regulation, full scale, and benchmarks		
<b>Tier</b>	N/A		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Assess the comprehensiveness of the freedom of information (FOI) in a given country			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Is there is comprehensive freedom of information (FOI) regulation, full scale, and benchmarks.			
<b>Options:</b> Yes or No			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	National Statistical Office, Anti-corruption and Transparency Agency/Unit, government department	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Regulatory framework on freedom of information	<b>Frequency</b>	Calendar year or 12 months
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	N/A	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

### 3.4 Protection of reporting persons

<b>Component</b>	3.4 Protection of reporting persons regulation		
<b>Type of measure</b>	DIRECT		
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	3.4.a Investigations opened due to whistleblowing mechanisms		
<b>Tier</b>	4. Some countries may have some information but do not publish it regularly		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measure the proportion of corruption-related investigations opened due to whistleblowing mechanisms			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Total number of corruption-related investigations opened due to whistleblowing mechanism, divided by the total number of corruption-related investigations multiplied by 100			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Anti-corruption Unit	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Calendar year or 12 months
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	Sex of the reporting person Sex of the alleged perpetrator Type of crime/conduct	<b>Definitions</b>	Whistleblower: Person who reports in good faith and on reasonable grounds to the competent authorities any facts concerning offences established in accordance with the UNCAC

<b>Component</b>	3.4 Protection of reporting persons regulation		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	PERCEPTION	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	3.4.b Whistleblowing perception		
<b>Tier</b>	N/A		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measure the perception of the population that has a negative opinion of whistleblowing reporting.			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Total number of persons that have a negative opinion about whistleblower mechanisms divided by the total number of persons who responded, multiplied by 100 and weighted in line with sampling scheme.			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Anti-corruption Unit / National Statistical office	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Household surveys	<b>Frequency</b>	Calendar year or 12 months
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	By sex	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

<b>Component</b>	3.4 Protection of reporting persons regulation		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	PERCEPTION	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	3.4.c Proportion of public officials that perceive that they experienced retaliation after reporting		
<b>Tier</b>	N/A		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measure the perception of public officials after reporting			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Total number of public officials that reported a corruption-related through a whistleblower mechanism and perceived that they experienced retaliation after reporting, divided by the total number of public officials that reported a corruption-related through a whistleblower mechanism, multiplied by 100 and weighted in line with sampling scheme			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Anti-corruption Unit / National Statistical office	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Public Official Surveys	<b>Frequency</b>	Calendar year or 12 months
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	By sex	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A

<b>Component</b>	3.4 Protection of reporting persons regulation		
<b>Type of measure</b>	INDIRECT	RESPONSE - DE JURE	
<b>Name of the indicator</b>	3.4.d Mechanisms for protecting witnesses and experts		
<b>Tier</b>	4. Some countries may have some information but do not publish it regularly		
<b>Objective of the indicator</b>			
Measure how many mechanisms the country has against potential retaliation or intimidation for witnesses and experts who give testimony concerning corruption-related offences			
<b>Method of Computation</b>			
Number of mechanisms the country has against potential retaliation or intimidation for witnesses and experts who give testimony concerning corruption-related offences			
<b>Resp. Institution</b>	Anti-corruption Unit	<b>Type of institution</b>	Public sector
<b>Type of data Source</b>	Administrative records	<b>Frequency</b>	Calendar year or 12 months
<b>Disaggregation(s)</b>	N/A	<b>Definitions</b>	N/A