

*Report of the Secretary-General*

**Implementation of General Assembly Resolution  
71/243 on the quadrennial comprehensive  
policy review of operational activities for  
development of the United Nations system  
(QCPR): 2018**

**Advance unedited version**

**Development Cooperation Policy Branch  
Department of Economic and Social Affairs  
United Nations**

**9 January 2018**

*Summary*

The present report is submitted in response to General Assembly resolution 71/243 as the first annual overview of the progress achieved and challenges encountered in the implementation of the resolution.

The report was prepared in consultation with the UNDS, based on the strategic plans, annual reports and other documents made available by the system. It also benefited substantially from four surveys administered by DESA and the Information Management System administered by UNDG. Financial data was primarily sourced from the database and reporting system managed by the UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination.

## **DRAFT SGR 2018**

### **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

#### **INTRODUCTION**

##### **I. Aligning the UN development system to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development**

##### **II. Funding of UN operational activities for development**

- A. Context of UN operational activities for development
- B. Funding to UN entities
  - 1. Sources of funding
  - 2. Review of non-core funding modalities
  - 3. Cost recovery
- C. Allocation of funds
  - 1. General distribution of funds in 2016
  - 2. Fragmentation of resources
  - 3. Distribution of expenditures by country groups
- D. Select Funding Issues
  - 1. Increasing impact of UN-OAD resources
  - 2. Progress in strengthening transparency and accountability of funding

##### **III. Enabling programme countries to achieve the SDGs**

- A. Eradicating poverty and Leaving No One Behind
- B. Supporting capacity development
- C. Providing integrated policy advice;
- D. Assisting countries through normative support
- E. Reinforcing assistance to LDCs, LLDCs, SIDS
- F. Supporting MICS to address continuing and emerging challenges
- G. Partnerships
  - 1. Global and institutional level partnerships
  - 2. Country-level partnerships
  - 3. Support to South-South Cooperation
- H. Enhancing complementarity among humanitarian, development and sustaining peace efforts
- I. Securing gender equality and women's empowerment

##### **IV. Improving the functioning of the UN development system**

- A. Presence and division of labour
- B. The Resident coordinator function
- C. Integrated support to maximize results
- D. Harmonization and simplification of business practices
- E. The regional dimension

##### **V. Enhancing effectiveness of the UN development system**

- A. Managing for Results
- B. Follow-up and monitoring

#### **VI. CONCLUSION**

#### **ANNEX I: QCPR MONITORING AND REPORTING FRAMEWORK**

## Introduction

The landmark agreements reached in 2015 — the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development — with their call for a revitalized global and multi-stakeholder partnership for people, planet and prosperity, are unprecedented in scope and significance. They imply a fundamental shift in the development cooperation paradigm. This paradigm shift, coupled with the profound changes in the development cooperation landscape, demand a bold rethinking of the UN development system (UNDS) to ensure that it is fit to support Member States' efforts in pursuit of sustainable development.

To that end, Member States debated the implications of the interlinkages between the alignment of functions, funding practices, governance structures, organizational arrangements, partnership approaches, capacity and impact of the UNDS during the eighteen month ECOSOC dialogue on the repositioning of the system. In late 2016, the General Assembly provided guidance through quadrennial comprehensive policy review of operational activities for development (QCPR).<sup>1</sup> The QCPR aims at enhancing the system's coherence, effectiveness and efficiency to address the full range of development challenges of our time, as set out in the 2030 Agenda. To move towards the system-wide response needed to deliver the shared results that the Agenda demands, Member States broadened the scope of the QCPR by calling upon all UNDS entities with operational activities for development (OAD), to fully implement the resolution in consistency with their mandate, role and expertise, and requested the Secretary-General to put forward his proposal on a set of key areas by December 2017.

In response, in June 2017<sup>2</sup>, the Secretary-General presented his vision for a system that is a catalyst for action, an innovator, a convener, and a champion of what works. The vision highlights a system that is more strategic, accountable, transparent, collaborative, efficient, and effective in delivering results at the country-level. The Secretary-General's vision is further detailed in his December 2017 report<sup>3</sup>, where he presents his proposals on immediate shifts in the way that the system operates, as well as adjustments to the long-term course for Member States' consideration in 2018.

The present document is intended as a report on the steps taken so far regarding the QCPR mandates for which Member States have already charted the way forward. On the basis of facts and accounts from the ground, it assesses how the system is shifting vis-à-vis the new mandates, to better support the implementation of the Agenda at national, regional and global levels.

The evidence suggests a mixed picture in terms of progress. Alignment of the system's planning and activities with the QCPR is still in its initial stages, partly due to the sequencing of internal planning and management alternatives, which need to follow from forthcoming Member States' decisions. A common chapter across four UN entities strategic plans for 2018-2021 that commits to working better together with stronger coherence and collaboration is a first step. However, the specifics of decisions on a whole-of-system-response, including the UN Resident Coordinator's leadership and authority, differentiated models of presence, a common back-office, and the new skill sets required to support the delivery of the new agenda are essential determinants that remain to be addressed.

---

<sup>1</sup> A/RES/71/243

<sup>2</sup> "Repositioning the UNDS to deliver on the 2030 Agenda: ensuring a better future for all" (A/72/124 - E/2018/3).

<sup>3</sup> "Repositioning the UNDS to deliver on the 2030 Agenda: our promise for dignity, prosperity and peace on a healthy planet" (A/72/xxx). <https://www.un.org/ecosoc/en/node/3553102>

Another key challenge evidenced by the data in this report is the continuing fragmented nature of the system's funding and how it is inconsistent with the principles of integration and coordination. Additionally, the data from the ground suggest that the UNDS continues to struggle to deliver a coherent response around collective results. This is explained by organizational cultures and arrangements that are not conducive to a whole-of-system-response, including slow progress in harmonization and simplification of business practices, as well as a disconnect between the practical implementation of joint operations in the field and gaps in efforts at the headquarter level. The Secretary-General's proposals in his December 2017 report aim to systematically address these challenges and gaps.

The full shift needed to move from an MDG to an SDG mind set, skills-sets, architecture and organizational arrangements is still in progress, partly as it awaits Member States' decisions on critical elements. Yet, a broad range of actions is underway towards a more cohesive approach to key functions, such as support to capacity development and policy advice, supported by a significant effort to generate the guidelines and instruments to better equip UN country teams to deliver on the ground.

The present report serves as the evidence-base of where we stand now, in relation to mandates for immediate implementation.

## I. Aligning UNDS to the 2030 development agenda

The 2016 QCPR (A/RES/71/243) requires the system to step up to the ambition of the 2030 Agenda. Alignment with the Agenda begins with a repositioning of the work of the United Nations so that it is able to deliver shared results through a system-wide approach. To that end, resolution A/71/243 broadens the scope of the QCPR to include “*all entities of the UNDS carrying out operational activities for development (OAD)*” and instructs that they “*should align their planning and activities, including through their governing bodies where applicable ... for the full implementation of the present resolution*”.

This means that, in addition to the funds, programmes and other UN entities that are already mandated by the QCPR, 13 UN specialized agencies (shown in blue font in Box 1) could potentially become part of the full implementation of the QCPR of a UN development system consisting of 44 entities which receive funding for operational activities for development (UN-OAD)<sup>4</sup>.

### Box 1: The UN development system

▪ 9 Funds & Programmes:	UNDP (including UNCDF, UNV), UNEP, UNFPA, UN Habitat, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNRWA, UN-Women, WFP;
▪ 12 Secretariat Departments:	DESA, ECA, ECE, ECLAC, ESCAP, ESCWA, OCHA, OHCHR, UNCTAD, UNDP, UNISDR, UNPBSO;
▪ 13 Specialized Agencies:	<b>FAO, ICAO, IFAD, ILO, IMO, ITU, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNWTO, UPU, WHO, WIPO, WMO;</b>
▪ 6 research & training institution:	UNICRI, UNIDIR, UNITAR, UNRISD, UNSSC, UNU;
▪ 4 other entities:	ITC, UNAIDS, UNODC and UNOPS.

Alignment of the strategic planning and budgetary cycles is a first step towards coordinated and coherent action. Excluding Secretariat Departments and the regional commissions which have a different planning and budgetary cycle, **14 entities are now fully aligned** (such as WFP and UNHCR) **with the QCPR, 5 were in progress, and 8 were not aligned.**

<sup>4</sup> There is no commonly agreed definition of the terms “United Nations development system” and “operational activities for development”. For the purposes of the funding analysis, the definitions include those entities and activities linked to contributions in line with the definition of official development assistance provided by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. This is not intended to imply that entities listed as part of the United Nations development system for the funding analysis are part of it for other purposes. For example, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) is not part of the UNDS for purposes other than those for the funding analysis.

**Table 1. Alignment of strategic planning cycles with the QCPR cycle**

Entity <sup>5</sup>	Strategic Planning Cycle		QCPR alignment		
	Timeframe	# of years	2016	2018	
<b>Funds and Programmes</b>					
UNDP (including UNV & UNCDF)	2018-2021	4	Yes	Yes	
UNEP	2018-2021	4	Yes	Yes	
UNFPA	2018-2021	4	Yes	Yes	
UN-Habitat	2014-2019	6	No	No	
UNHCR	2018-2020	2	Yes <sup>6</sup>	Yes	
UNICEF	2018-2021	4	Yes	Yes	
UNWRA	2016-2021	6	In progress	In progress <sup>7</sup>	
UN-Women	2018-2021	4	Yes	Yes	
WFP	2017-2021	5	Yes	In progress <sup>8</sup>	
<b>Specialized Agencies</b>					
FAO	2018-2019	2020-2021	2	Yes	Yes
ICAO	2017-2019		3	No	No
IFAD	2018-2021		4	Yes	Yes <sup>9</sup>
ILO	2018-2021		4	Yes	Yes
IMO	2016-2021		6	No	No
ITU	2016-2019		4	No	No
UNESCO	2018-2021		4	Yes	Yes
UNIDO	2018-2021 <sup>10</sup>		4	In progress	In progress
UNWTO	-		-	-	No
UPU	2017-2020		4	No	No
WHO	2014-2019		6	No	No
WIPO	2017-2021		5	In progress	In progress <sup>11</sup>
WMO	2016-2019		4	No	No
<b>Research and Training Institutions</b>					
UNICRI	-		-	-	No
UNIDIR	2017-2020		4	No	No
UNITAR	2018-2021		4	Yes	Yes
UNRISD	2016-2020		5	No	No
UNSSC	-		-	-	No
UNU	2015-2019		4	No	No
<b>Other entities</b>					
ITC	2016-2017		2	In progress	Yes
UNAIDS	2016-2021		6	In progress	In progress <sup>12</sup>
UNODC	2018-2019		2	Yes <sup>6</sup>	Yes
UNOPS	2018-2021		4	Yes	Yes

<sup>5</sup> For a full list of entities covered by the 2016 QCPR, see Box 1.

<sup>6</sup> Considered fully aligned with the QCPR given the two-year cycle is consistent with the QCPR.

<sup>7</sup> UNRWA operates within a 6-year strategic planning cycle and GA-approved biennial programme plans, UNRWA plans to align its next cycle with the QCPR in 2021.

<sup>8</sup> WFP submitted the 2017-2021 Strategic Plan one year early as an exception, with a five-year duration that would enable return to the four-year strategic plan duration foreseen by General Rule VI.1 in 2018.

<sup>9</sup> IFAD has 3 year medium term plans aligned to the 3 year replenishment cycles, as it is an IFI with funding determined through replenishment exercises.

<sup>10</sup> UNIDO's strategic plan (initially MTPF 2016-2019) was extended to 2018-2021 to align it to the QCPR cycle. The budgetary cycle is still biannual (current 2018-2019).

<sup>11</sup> WIPO's Medium Term Strategic Plan is for 6 years (2016-2021), and its budget covers a period of 2 years (2018-2019 and 2020-2021).

<sup>12</sup> UNAIDS joint budgets are prepared and presented on a biennial basis. The Unified Budget, Results and Accountability Framework extends for a six-year period, and is synchronized with the planning cycles of the Co-sponsors.

The degree to which entities are aligning their planning and activities with the QCPR varies.

In response to their governing boards' requests to work in a more integrated and coherent manner, **UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, and UN-Women** have developed a common chapter for their Strategic Plans which identify and elaborate on specific areas of collaborative advantage. The entities propose to use the Mainstreaming, Acceleration and Policy Support (MAPS) system<sup>13</sup> as a key entry point to build the case for prioritization of and investment in activities to ensure no-one is left behind. This new approach should be viewed as a first step towards creating a more collective approach to the strategic planning of the UNDS.

**Figure I. The UN's integrated country level response to achieve the SDGs**



Source: 2017 UNDAF Guidelines

The **UNDG** has updated guidelines and instruments to better support UNCTs in helping governments accelerate progress towards the 2030 Agenda, and to ensure that the UN plans, strategies and tools strengthen national ownership and respond coherently to national development needs. These include an updated Mainstreaming Reference Guide to UNCTs and the creation of a searchable online compendium<sup>14</sup> to support diagnostics, methodologies and risk-informed planning; guidelines to trigger system-wide support for national statistical institutions and reporting on the SDGs; revised UNDAF guidelines with companion pieces to inform a strategic response to the 2030 Agenda<sup>15</sup>, and policy and operational support for UNCTs on human rights.<sup>16</sup>

An important achievement is that **85% of programme country governments (henceforth 'Governments')** reported that the UN system's activities are 'very closely' or 'closely' aligned with their development needs and priorities, while 15% indicated 'somewhat aligned' activities. Respondents explained that this was achieved by aligning the UNDAF with national development plans; by focusing on achieving the SDGs; by using coordination mechanisms such as governments chairing results' groups; and through effective monitoring and evaluation. Constraints included a lack of a national plan or strategy, insufficient availability or use of data in programming, UN staff located outside the country, fragmentation of UN activities, and misalignment of projects funded through non-core resources.

<sup>13</sup> <https://undg.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/MAPS-Concept-Note-Oct-2015-ENDORSED-BY-UNDG-on-26.10.15.pdf>

<sup>14</sup> <https://undg.org/2030-agenda/sdg-acceleration-toolkit/>

<sup>15</sup> <https://undg.org/programme/undaf-companion-guidances/>

<sup>16</sup> <https://undg.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Policy-Operational-Support-to-UNCTs-on-HR-in-SDG-Implementation-FINAL...-1-1.pdf>



**The UNDS is adjusting to the 2030 Agenda at country level, though clearly, this needs to be fast-tracked.** This is evidenced by 36% of governments that stated that the UN has contributed ‘to a great extent’ to the implementation of the SDGs in the past two years, and 45% who reported ‘to a moderate extent’.

Table 2 below shows the types of requests for support with the SDGs, with the least requested type being “on specific SDGs”. Lower-income countries are generally more likely to request support across all four types. Notably, three out of the ten countries with the largest programme expenditures did not request any kind of support, likely explained by these countries’ ongoing humanitarian situation.

The largest number of requests are around ‘general orientations and mainstreaming the SDGs, showing that programme countries are beginning to adjust to the new agenda.

**Table 2. Requests for UN support on SDGs**

Has your government requested support on their national response to SDGs?	SDG measurement and reporting	Requests on specific SDGs	General orientation on SDGs	Mainstreaming SDGs in National Development Plans	TOTAL
Low income (31)	15	4	22	20	61
Low-middle income (49)	24	7	28	33	92
Upper-middle income (43)	22	7	20	21	70
High income (8)	5	3	6	3	17
Total (131)	<b>66</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>240</b>
<i>As above</i>					
AFR-E&S (21)	10	5	14	12	41
AFR-W&C (24)	9	5	16	19	49
RAB (18)	9	2	5	7	23
AP (24)	16	4	16	14	50
ECIS (18)	8	3	11	12	34
LAC (26)	14	2	14	13	49
Total (131)	<b>66</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>240</b>

*Source: UNDG IMS*

## II. Funding of UN OAD

The quality and quantity of funding deeply affects the ability of the UNDS to respond in a cohesive manner to deliver collective results. This section provides a detailed overview of the current funding of UN-OAD, and provides evidence to inform changes that could better enable the system to support the delivery of the 2030 Agenda.


### A. Context and Overview of UN operational activities for development

UN operational activities for development [UN-OAD] are activities that UN entities carry out towards the promotion of development and the welfare of developing countries. UN-OAD cover both longer-term development-related activities as well as those with a shorter-term humanitarian assistance

focus. The online technical annex<sup>17</sup> contains further information related to funding definitions and classifications.


**Expenditure on UN-OAD activities totaled \$30.4bn<sup>18</sup> in 2016. This represented about two-thirds of the \$45.8bn in expenditure on all UN system-wide activities.** Peacekeeping operations accounted for one-fifth of total expenditures; while global norm- and standard-setting, policy, advocacy, and other functions of the UN system made up the remaining 14%.

**Figure II: Financing of UN system-wide activities: 2016**



**Funding for UN-OAD accounted for 19.7% of total Official Development Assistance (ODA) in 2016.<sup>19</sup>** Since 2002, growth in funding for UN-OAD has led a steady pace, following a similar trend to ODA, as shown in figure III. At the same time, funding for UN humanitarian activities has increased rapidly compared to that for development activities, and overall ODA. This is particularly the case in recent years, with funding for humanitarian assistance increasing by 80% between 2012 and 2016, in real terms, owing primarily to the crises in Iraq, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen.

**Figure III: Growth in ODA and funding for UN-OAD, 2002-2016**



Notwithstanding the rapid increase in humanitarian funding, UN entities focusing primarily on **humanitarian assistance activities** (such as WFP, UNHCR, UNRWA and OCHA), are reporting

<sup>17</sup> [http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/newfuncnt/qcpr\\_implement.shtml](http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/newfuncnt/qcpr_implement.shtml)


<sup>18</sup> This amount differs slightly from the \$29.5bn in contributions received by the UNDS in 2016 since contributions are not necessarily expended in the same calendar year as they are received.

<sup>19</sup> Local resources (\$1.9bn) channelled through the UNDS are excluded as they do not fall within the definition of 'ODA'.

**record-high gaps between budgetary requirements and funds received.**<sup>20</sup> These gaps underscore the need to ensure that development and humanitarian activities are mutually reinforcing. This could help reduce humanitarian needs and vulnerability and manage the risks of future humanitarian crises, ultimately reducing over time the gaps and long-term funding requirements

**The UNDS remains the largest single channel of multilateral aid** for DAC donors when core and non-core flows are combined. As shown below, it accounts for nearly one-third of all disbursements to multilateral organizations. The total use of the multilateral system declined in 2015 by 11%, to \$55.7bn.

**Figure IV: Channels of multilateral aid: 2015**



Out of the major multilateral channels of aid, the UNDS is the only one that relies heavily on non-core resources. In fact, excluding the UNDS, 84% of the resources channelled to multilateral organizations are core while **the UNDS accounts for only 16% of all core flows** (Figure IV).


**Total contributions for UN-OAD reached \$29.5bn in 2016, representing an increase of nearly 8% compared to 2015. This includes a 5% increase in core contributions**, which ended two consecutive years of decline in core funding. Core contributions grew to \$6.4bn, i.e. 21.7% of total funding in 2016.

The longer-term trend shows that **real growth of funding for UN-OAD has more than doubled since 2002**<sup>21</sup>. Yet, despite a heavy emphasis in QCPR resolutions on the importance of core funding, **growth in core resources has been small compared to growth in non-core resources.**

<sup>20</sup> See <https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/overview/2016>

<sup>21</sup> In this report, comparisons and trend analyses in “real terms” are based on amounts expressed in constant 2015 US dollars. Due to the minimal effect of deflators since 2015, comparisons will be stated in nominal terms unless otherwise stated.

Figure V: Real change over time of funding for UN-OAD, 2002-2016



Since 2002, the core share of total funding has dropped from 37% to 22% and the core share of funding for development-related activities dropped from 41% to 28%. Only 18% of total voluntary contributions for UN-OAD in 2016 were core.

The current nature of funding received by the UNDS significantly limits the system's degree of flexibility to deploy funding. The proposed Funding Compact aims to build trust and transparency with Member States and other prospective partners. This strengthened trust is essential to make the case for adequate quality and quantity of funding, including predictable levels of core funding.

Structured dialogues have been taking place within a number of UN entities in an effort to address funding-related issues. Since mid-2016, **17 out of 29 entities indicated that their governing body has held such dialogues to discuss how to finance the development results agreed in their strategic plan.** Some of the common themes in the dialogues across the system include: incentivizing donors to shift away from highly earmarked resources; strengthening transparency and accountability; exploring new partnership modalities towards resource mobilization; and, incentivizing multi-year funding commitments.

The dialogues held by UNDP, UNFPA and UNICEF indicate that achieving these objectives would require strengthening the quality of regular reporting on the use of core and flexible resources, including clarity on the functions being financed through these funds. During the dialogues held at FAO, the topic of increasing assessed contributions was considered but did not gain much traction. In contrast, the decision-making body of WHO approved a 3% increase in Member States' assessed contribution for 2018-19.

## B. Funding to UN entities


**Funding is concentrated in a relatively small number of UN entities**, with the top eight (WFP, UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR, WHO, UNRWA, FAO, and UNFPA) accounting for 84% of all contributions in 2016.

Figure VI shows the core and non-core contributions received by the eight largest entities in 2016 (green bubbles) and in 2012 (blue bubbles). **For the five largest entities, the non-core component exceeded the core component by a significant margin in 2016.** In addition, for six

of the eight entities shown, core resources were lower in 2016 compared to four years earlier. The two exceptions – UNHCR and UNRWA – are primarily focussed on humanitarian assistance activities.

For the UNDS as-a-whole, the core share of total funding has dropped from 27.2% to 21.7% since 2012, indicating that the longer-term trend presented in Figure V has continued in the shorter term.

**Figure VI: Contributions received by UN entities: 2016**




Note: Size of bubbles correspond to relative total contributions (core and non-core);

### 1. Sources of funding

A total of 78% of contributions in 2016 were made by Governments directly (see figure VII), including contributions provided to inter-agency pooled funds administered by a UN entity on behalf of the UNDS.


**Figure VII: Main groups of funding sources: 2016**



A record high \$2.6bn was channelled to the UNDS through the European Commission in 2016, more than any Government donor apart from the USA, marking an increase of 66% compared to 2015. The remaining 13% is accounted for by NGOs, private partnerships and other multilateral institutions, including global vertical funds.

Figure VIII shows the core and non-core contributions by the top government donors and groups of contributors. Together, the sources of funding presented accounted for 91% of total funding in 2016. Among the top 10 government contributors, only Sweden and the Netherlands provide more core funding than non-core funding.

**Figure VIII: Main contributors: 2016**




QCPR resolutions have repeatedly urged the UNDS to explore options to broaden and diversify its donor base. Out of 29 UN entities, 24 indicated reporting annually to their governing body on concrete measures to broaden their donor base. **However, the UNDS still relies heavily on a few donors.** In 2016, three donors – USA, UK and Germany – accounted for 45% of contributions received from Governments and 35% of total contributions to the UNDS (see Figure VII above).

The donor base for core funding also depends on a small number of donors. Five countries—the USA, Sweden, the UK, Japan, and the Netherlands—accounted for nearly 50% of all core contributions from Governments in 2016, the same share for the top five core contributors as five years ago. Such reliance on a limited number of donors makes the UN susceptible to a sudden shift in overall funding, should any of its top donors have a policy change.

**Programme countries contributed over \$1.38bn to the UNDS in 2016** (excluding local resources)—a moderate decrease from the \$1.55bn in contributions in 2015. Saudi Arabia accounted for about one-quarter of this funding, through sizable non-core contributions to humanitarian projects in Yemen and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Contributions from other programme countries were evenly split between core and non-core funding.

In addition, programme countries provided \$1.9bn in local resources to finance UN activities in their own countries. This represents 8% of total non-core resources to the UNDS. This modality is most commonly used in LAC, where it accounted for over half of all local resources provided in 2016.


Figure IX: Local resources contributions, by region: 2016



## 2. Review of non-core funding modalities

Figure X shows the different forms of non-core resources received by the UNDS in 2016 and their relative volumes. **Ninety-one percent of total non-core resources continue to be restrictively earmarked to single entity projects.** Such high levels of earmarked funding discourage integrated approaches, often leading to increased transaction costs and fragmentation of resources.

Figure X: Non-core funding modalities for UN-OAD: : 2016



**The high level of tightly earmarked contributions is often associated with persistent competition for resources, overlaps and duplication.** It is clear that, under certain circumstances, competition among UN entities can be healthy. The 2015 DAC report on multilateral aid<sup>22</sup>, for instance, notes that competing sources of multilateral finance can stimulate the focus on institution-specific comparative advantages, thereby improving the efficiency of the multilateral system as a whole. However as the 2017 survey revealed that most Governments view competition among UN entities as unproductive. Among the possible disadvantages, 57% of Governments stated that competition among UN entities creates confusion for the Government, and 55% indicated it increases the workload of Government officials and diverts the UN attention away from the main tasks of providing support to the country.

<sup>22</sup> Multilateral Aid 2015: Better partnerships for a post-2015 world.




The indivisible and interconnected nature of the SDGs has reinforced the need for more flexible, predictable and integrated multi-partner financing. To improve predictability and quality of resources, several funding modalities have been developed such that non-core funding from different sources is pooled at the level of individual entities and/or among entities. These modalities are a result of efforts by the UNDS to promote coherence, alignment and aid effectiveness, counterbalancing fragmentation.

### *Inter-agency pooled funds*

An inter-agency pooled fund is a multi-entity funding mechanism designed to support clearly defined programmatic scope and results by contributions that are co-mingled, not earmarked to a specific UN entity and held by a UN fund administrator. In these, the UN takes a lead role in making fund allocation decisions as well as fund implementation, making these funds a more flexible form of non-core contributions.

Figure XI provides an overview of the trend in contributions made to inter-agency pooled funds, including a breakdown by theme. **There has been no noteworthy growth in funding for inter-agency pooled funds since 2009.**

**Figure XI: Deposits made to UN-administered multi-donor trust funds, by fund category: 2009-2016<sup>23</sup>**




One reason for the limited growth in funding to UN inter-agency pooled funds is the small number of donors that support this type of funding. In 2016, just three Government donors – UK, Sweden and Norway - accounted for over half of all contributions to these funds, and the top eight accounted for nearly 80% (Figure XII).<sup>24</sup> The other 20% of contributions came from 53 Government donors, IFI's and the private sector. Viewed another way, 17 donors provided over 10% of their 2016 non-core contributions to the UN to inter-agency pooled funds.

<sup>23</sup> Source: UN database on inter-agency pooled funds

<sup>24</sup> UK, Sweden, Norway, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland




Figure XII: Top contributors to inter-agency pooled funds: 2016



Well-designed inter-agency pooled funds, which attract a significant volume of resources, can counteract some of the less positive effects of tightly-earmarked non-core contributions. However, there is a risk of high transaction costs related to coordination and reporting if these funds are poorly capitalized. If there are too many such funds and they do not attract resources to generate adequate economies of scale, these funds can actually contribute to decreased efficiency and further fragmentation of resources, defeating one of their primary purposes.

In this context, **the \$1.7bn in contributions in 2016 was distributed across 112 different inter-agency pooled funds**. The four largest funds accounted for over 40% of the total volume of flows to inter-agency pooled funds. On the other end of the scale, 62 funds accounted for just 5% per cent of contributions, or an average of \$1.4mn each. Of these relatively small funds, 41 were Joint Programmes, which tend to have a more narrow scope than other types of inter-agency pooled funds.

Figure XIII shows the relative contributions to the 112 inter-agency pooled funds in 2016, grouped by theme. Over half of these funds have a development focus, which together attracted \$168mn in resources, or 12% of the total flows to inter-agency pooled funds. On the other hand, 21 humanitarian funds attracted more than \$1.1bn in resources in 2016. Transition funds, which include the Peacebuilding Fund as well as other recovery and post-conflict funds, accounted for 16% of all contributions made to inter-agency pooled funds in 2016.

Figure XIII: Contributions to inter-agency pooled funds, by theme: 2016<sup>25</sup>

The fact that development-focused pooled funds are relatively small is associated with a number of factors. First, One UN Funds, which were established to support system-wide coherence and coordination at the country-level by filling funding gaps in One UN Programmes, have not been scaled-up. Second, the majority of development-related pooled funds are Joint Programmes, which have a more limited programmatic scope compared to One Funds or many of the humanitarian pooled funds. Third, the UN did not have a large global pooled fund on the development side operational in 2016, as the development equivalent of the CERF.

#### *Entity-specific thematic funds*

Another mechanism for pooling of funding used by the UNDS is the agency-specific thematic fund which receives contributions softly earmarked to outcome levels of an entity's strategic plan. This type of funding allows for multi-year spending in support of improved planning and sustainability.

Contributions through thematic funds have declined in recent years. A total of **\$407mn was provided to UN thematic funds in 2016 compared to \$726mn in 2014**. This significant drop is concerning as it negatively affects the availability of flexible non-core resources for development-related UN activities.

#### *Joint Programmes*

Joint programmes support a common goal across two or more UN entities and include a joint budget. In countries that have at least one UN joint programme, 85% of respondents to the survey indicated that these programmes have promoted greater coherence, 79% said they led to greater effectiveness, while 70% noted that they led to greater efficiency.

In 2016, there were on average 2.8 joint programmes per UNCT and 79% of UNCTs had at least one joint programme, according to the UNDG IMS. The **joint programmes are concentrated on a small number of SDGs**. For instance, 109 joint programmes target SDG 4 on gender equality and 1 joint programme targets SDG 14 on oceans. Noting that a single Joint Programme can target multiple SDGs, Table 3 shows the goals that are targeted by the most and the fewest UN joint programmes. An increase in the number of JPs is not a significant measure of progress as they are cumulative [i.e. some

<sup>25</sup> Source: UN database on inter agency pooled funds

may have started several years earlier and may have very little expenditure at this point in time]. Rather, the amount of annual expenditures deployed through that modality would better capture the extent of joint work. This information, however, is currently not collected, and therefore cannot be reported on meaningfully.

**Table 3: Number and Percentage of Joint Programmes targeting SDGs**


	Number	%		Number	%
SDG4: Gender Equality	109	29.4	SDG14: Life Below Water	1	0.3
SDG3: Good Health and Well - being	95	25.6	SDG7: Affordable and Clean Energy	11	3.0
SDG16: Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions	94	25.3	SDG12: Responsible Consumption and Production	11	3.0
SDG8: Decent Work and Economic Growth	76	20.5	SDG9: Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure	12	3.2
SDG2: Zero Hunger	63	17.0	SDG17: Partnership for the Goals	15	4.0

### *Global vertical funds*

Over the last decade, global vertical funds have become a significant resource channel to the UNDS. These funds focus 'vertically' on specific issues or themes just like global UN MDTFs, but are not directly administered by a UN entity and do not demand a UN lead role in the fund allocation process. Thus, while global funds are a form of pooled funding, from the UN's perspective the funds are often tightly earmarked to particular projects, with the UN's role solely as an implementing organization. Global vertical funds also tend to have a thematic focus and, therefore, focus on a smaller number of SDGs.

**In 2016, an estimated \$1.63bn, or 7% of all non-core contributions in 2016 were channeled through global funds.** About 57% of this amount came from either the GFATM or the GEF. Contributions received through global funds have more than doubled since 2010.

**Figure XIV: Funding from Global Vertical Funds: 2010-2016**



### 3. Cost recovery

The QCPR resolution reiterated the importance for UN entities to achieve full cost recovery. That is, to avoid subsidizing non-core funded projects through core resources, as this reduces the amount of core resources available for programming.

The 2017 HQ survey revealed that all except two UN entities<sup>26</sup> have adopted a cost recovery framework aiming to recollect the costs of non-core projects that are financed by core resources. The two exceptions indicated that steps were being taken in this regard.

As part of the HQ survey, entities were also asked to present a high-level breakdown of their expenditures in 2016 between what they classify as programme and non-programme expenses. This exercise aims to see whether entities' efforts in recent years have resulted in progress towards achieving full cost recovery. Table 4, below, contains the cumulative data collected from 16 entities<sup>27</sup> that represent some 70% of total UN-OAD funding.

**The analysis reveals that a higher proportion of core resources are used to finance non-programme costs as compared to non-core resources.** Specifically, 65% of core resources were spent on programme activities in 2016 compared to 89% of non-core resources spent on programme activities. Overall, 84% of funding is spent on programme activities.

**Table 4: High-level breakdown of funding flows for 16 entities in: 2016**

Type of funding flow	Programme activities	Programme support and management	Other	Total
Core resources (\$ million)	3,248	1,450	324	5,022
Percentage of total core	64.7%	28.9%	6.5%	100.0%
Non-core resources (\$ million)	14,310	1,343	357	16,010
Percentage of total non-core	89.4%	8.4%	2.2%	100.0%
Total resources (\$ million)	17,557	2,794	681	21,032
Percentage of total flows	83.5%	13.3%	3.2%	100.0%

There are several factors that cause full cost recovery to remain unfulfilled even though most UN entities have adopted a cost recovery framework.

First, not all types of non-programme costs are subject to cost recovery. For example, in the harmonized UNDP-UNFPA-UNICEF-UN WOMEN framework, functions mandated to benefit the broader UNDS as well as those related to establishing and implementing norms and standards across entities' programmatic and institutional areas of work, were excluded from cost recovery and thereby funded entirely from core resources.

Second, "waivers" are granted for some contributions, meaning that the donor does not have to comply with the regular cost recovery rate. For example, contributions made to the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan.

Third, discounted cost recovery rates are charged to certain types of non-core funding, such as contributions to government cost-sharing activities, or to loosely earmarked thematic funds. Reduced cost recovery rates can give donors an incentive to provide certain types of contributions

<sup>26</sup> Though not exempt from the cost recovery mandate, this survey question excludes Secretariat departments since their cost recovery policies are defined centrally and approved by the GA for the entire Secretariat.

<sup>27</sup> UNDP (including UNCDF and UNV), UNFPA, UNICEF, UNOPS, UN-WOMEN, WFP, UNRWA, UN-HABITAT, UNAIDS, ITC, FAO, ILO, UNESCO, ECE, ESCAP, UNISDR

over others. Applying reduced cost recovery rates can give donors an incentive to provide certain types of contributions over others. While the logic behind these reduced rates seems sensible, it nonetheless leads to additional core resources subsidizing non-core financed projects unless there is a corresponding increase in the basic cost recovery rate applied to other types of non-core contributions.

These factors can lead to an effective cost recovery rate that is lower than the agreed rate. For instance, in 2013, the Executive Boards of UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA and UN-Women endorsed a general, harmonized cost-recovery rate of 8% for non-core contributions. Table 5 shows that between 2014-16, the effective rates were consistently lower than 8%, leading to less recovered costs, which would have gone to supplement the core budget of these entities.

**Table 5: Effective cost recovery rates 2014-2016**

Entity	2014	2015	2016	Variance versus standard 8% rate (\$ million)
UNDP	6.1%	6.3%	6.4%	\$167.20
UNFPA	7.1%	7.1%	7.3%	\$12.10
UNICEF	6.3%	6.5%	6.7%	\$155.10
UN-Women	7.1%	7.0%	7.1%	\$4.50

*Note: the variance versus the standard rate represents the difference between the effective cost recovery amount received and the cost recovery amount that would have been earned using the approved rate of 8%.*

A key obstacle to achieving full cost recovery appears to be the existence of an inherent conflict between the desire to avoid cross-subsidization to meet Member States requirements, and the need to remain competitive with donors to attract voluntary funding. This further provides evidence of the need for the UNDS to better demonstrate its unique advantages, its value for money, and to strengthen accountability through transparent reporting.


## C. Allocation of funds

### 1. General distribution of funds in 2016

**In 2016, total expenditures on UN-OAD amounted to \$30.4bn; of which \$22.2bn, or 73%, were used for programme activities at the country level.** 27% of total expenditures are related to (or were classified as): (i) programme activities at the regional and global levels; (ii) programme support and management/administration; and (iii) activities not attributed to any of the above categories.

About 44% of UN expenditures at the country level, \$9.8bn, took place in Africa. Western Asia is the second-largest region in terms of expenditures, with 25% of the share. Compared with five years earlier, in 2011, countries in Western Asia accounted for just 8% of UN country-level expenditures. It should be noted that, in absolute terms, UN expenditure in Africa has continued to steadily increase from \$8.5bn in 2011 to \$9.8bn in 2016, despite the significant increase in expenditures in Western Asia.

**Figure XV: Illustrative distribution of expenditures: 2016**



Figures XVIa, XVIb and XVIc, below, show the distribution and degree of concentration of 2016 country-level expenditures in the 151 programme countries, separated into large, medium and small programme expenditures, respectively.

Regarding countries with large programme expenditures, there were 27 programme countries with over \$200mn. Together these countries accounted for 71% of total country-level expenditures. Figure XVIa shows that humanitarian assistance dominated the activities in eight of the nine largest programme countries (Afghanistan, the third-largest programme country, being the exception). These eight countries accounted for 58% of all humanitarian expenditure at the country level.

**Figure XVIa: 2016 Expenditures in countries with large expenditures (over \$200mn)**






Figure XVIb shows the 45 programme countries that had between \$50 and \$200 million in expenditures in 2016. In contrast to countries with large expenditures, there were more expenditures on development-related activities than humanitarian-related activities in all except 3 medium-size programme countries.

Figure XVib: 2016 Expenditures in countries with medium expenditures (between \$50 and \$200mn)




Finally, Figure XVic shows the 79 programme countries that had under \$50mn in UN country-level expenditures in 2016. This includes 43 countries with under \$20mn in expenditures, which together account for 1.3% of total expenditures.

Figure XVic: 2016 Expenditures in countries with small expenditures (under \$50mn)







## 2. Fragmentation of resources

The Secretary-General's June 2017 report<sup>28</sup> highlighted that fragmentation and volatility are the norm and that an effective repositioning of the development system will depend, to a significant extent, on changes to current funding practices.

Figure XVI in the previous section showed that 71 % of country-level expenditures are concentrated in 27 countries, with an average expenditure of \$34 million per entity per country. Furthermore, in 79 programme countries, expenditures are below \$50 million. Of these, 57 countries have a RC and a UNCT<sup>29</sup>, an average between 9 and 10 entities physically present<sup>30</sup> and expenditures of \$2.7mn per entity per country.

The combination of many entities with limited amounts of resources in more than half of all programme countries along the fact that most of these resources are restrictively earmarked shines a light on the urgency to address the fragmentation of funding.

The low predictability and donor-driven aspects of tightly earmarked funding make it difficult to plan and allocate resources strategically in order to strengthen coordination and coherence of activities on the ground. This is particularly concerning in the SDG-era where the integrated nature of the Agenda calls for flexible funding that facilitates partnerships and enables a strategic deployment of resources across programmes.

A combination of scaling-up some of the existing funding mechanisms and creating new initiatives could be considered to alleviate some of this fragmentation. The Secretary-General is identifying mechanisms — pooled funds or other innovative funding sources — to do so. The proposed Funding Compact also aims at improving the quantity of high quality, less earmarked non-core resources.

<sup>28</sup> A/72/124 OP112


<sup>29</sup> The other 22 programme countries are represented by a RC in a MCO.

<sup>30</sup> These countries also have, on average, 4.5 non-resident entities that are members of the UNCT.



At least 15% of non-core expenditures should be channeled through inter-agency pooled funds to reap the benefits of economies of scale, as estimated by the UNDG.<sup>31</sup> In 2016, 31 programme countries reached the 15% threshold (see Figure XVII). This marks a notable improvement compared to 2015, when this threshold was reached for just 22 countries. In over two-thirds of programme countries, less than 5% of non-core expenditures were channeled through inter-agency pooled funds.

**Figure XVII: Countries with over 10% of Expenditures channeled through inter-agency pooled funds: 2016**



### *New pooled funding initiatives*

The nature of the 2030 Agenda requires more than ever that the funding for UN-OAD enables collective results at the country level as well as integrated approaches across multiple sectors and goals. This has resulted in new initiatives around pooled funds.

In 2017, the UNDG completed design of a Joint Fund for the 2030 Agenda that aims to provide catalytic grants for UNCTs, together with partners, to unblock key bottlenecks and enhance whole-of-government approaches for coherent SDG national policies. In addition, the UN along with the European Union launched the global Spotlight initiative, an inter-agency pooled fund focused on eliminating all forms of violence against women and girls. It is expected that an initial investment of €500mn will be made, with the EU as the main contributor.


### **3. Distribution of expenditures by country groups**

**Expenditures in LDCs totaled \$10.3bn in 2016, which represent 46% of total expenditures at the country-level.** Until 2014, this share had been at over 50% as shown in Figure XVIII below. The decline in share is largely attributed to increasing humanitarian expenditures in MICs resulting from

<sup>31</sup> UNDG Discussion paper: The role of UN pooled financing mechanisms to deliver the 2030 Agenda (endorsed by UNDG on 28 March 2016)

the crises in Iraq and Syria. Out of total development-related expenditures, 49% were in LDCs in 2016.

**Figure XVIII: Expenditures in LDCs: 2008-2016**



The average UN expenditure in the 47 LDCs was \$218mn in 2016. Table 6 below provides an overview of how expenditures are distributed among different country groupings. The 32 landlocked developing countries received the highest expenditures per capita.

**Table 6: Expenditures in country groups<sup>32</sup>**

Country Group	Number of countries	Share of total country-level expenditure	Average expenditure per country (million)	Expenditures per capita
LDCs	47	46.2%	\$218.3	\$12.03
MICs	110	59.7%	\$120.7	\$2.52
SIDS	58	2.6%	\$11.5	\$9.66
LLDCs	32	28.8%	\$200.1	\$14.74
Africa	57	44.2%	\$172.5	\$9.41

Table 7 below presents an overview of and the number of entities physically present in different country groups. The average UN-OAD expenditure per entity varies considerably across the different country groups, from \$18mn in LDCs to \$1.3mn in SIDS. Section III. D, below, provides further analysis on UN assistance by different country groups.

<sup>32</sup> Note the country groups in the table are not mutually exclusive

**Table 7: Expenditures and physical presence across country groups (2016)**

Country Group	Average number of resident UN entities per country	Average expenditure per entity per country (million)
LDCs	12.1	\$18.0
MICs	10.7	\$11.3
SIDS	8.7	\$1.3
LLDCs	12.1	\$16.5
Africa	11.9	\$14.5

## D. Select Funding Issues

### 1. Increasing Impact of UN-OAD resources

Discussions at the global level have stressed that financing needs for meeting the SDGs are in the order of \$5 to \$7 trillion yearly.<sup>33</sup> While small in volume, compared to these requirements, the funding channeled through the UNDS can have significant impact as these flows tend to be more targeted to development objectives and to direct aid to the poorest and most vulnerable than other resources flowing to and within developing countries. Furthermore, the UNDS can use its funding as a catalyst towards additional resources, including domestic resources.

Fulfilling this potential requires a shift in mindset and approaches to country-level programming by UNCTs, in close collaboration with national governments, as well as new skills-sets and capacities for the UNDS, including UNCTs. With the development landscape becoming increasingly complex, national coordination of resources at country level must improve significantly. The UNDS has a key role to play in supporting Member States' efforts in this regard, undertaking development finance assessments that comprehensively scan a country's financing landscape — both flows and policies. Such assessments can serve as a baseline for integrated national financing frameworks that take into consideration all financing sources and policies that support the broader sustainable development strategy of the country, as called for in the Addis Ababa Action Agenda and QCPR.

UNCTs can also support governments with options on how to direct more financial flows towards national development priorities anchored in the SDGs. While the UN is not a financing institution, it can support governments by identifying potential entry points and sources to leverage larger financing flows, in collaboration with different partners and actors, to support the implementation of national plans.

As the UNDS engages in innovative efforts aimed at raising additional resources, the system should develop ways that accurately measure the amount of resources it is able to leverage in support of the SDGs, beyond just the funding that is channeled through the system. Entities would thus be able to share knowledge and best practices on innovative practices that succeeded as well as those that did not.

As domestic public resources are the largest source of financing in most developing countries, their mobilization and effective use will be critical to achieving the SDGs. The Platform for Collaboration on Tax – a joint initiative of the UN, the IMF, OECD, and the World Bank Group – was recently established to strengthen tax capacities in developing countries and provide joint guidance on a range of tax issues so that Governments can better address the tax challenges they face. This includes helping developing countries reduce the amount of money that they lose through illicit financial flows

<sup>33</sup> UNCTAD World Investment Report 2014: Investing in the SDGs.

and to raise domestic resources in fair and effective ways. This is one of the many areas that can help in increasing the flow of financing, including through high domestic investments.

## 2. Progress in strengthening transparency and accountability of funding

The high proportion of earmarked funding to the UNDS is partly a by-product of the funding patterns established during the MDG era. Earmarking resources can also be an attractive option to donors as it can offer them more oversight and visibility over how their aid money is being spent, helping to justify aid spending to their constituency.

Nevertheless, the decline in the core share of funding also points to other issues, ranging from changes in the development landscape with the rise of many new development actors, to emphasis on value for money, and impact of interventions. Reversing the decline in core funding requires significant efforts, including moving towards a whole-of-system approach that targets collective results, measures to improve effectiveness and efficiencies in terms of presence and operations, and increased transparency and accountability of the system.

A key element for this objective is reinforcing transparency at entity- and system-wide levels, on budgets, expenditures and results, including through accurate and comprehensive financial reporting to the CEB as well as through enrolment into the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI).

Currently 14 UNDS entities<sup>34</sup> are publishing in the IATI Standard, and the SG has recently called for “reinforced transparency on entity-specific expenditures and results through system-wide enrolment into IATI.”<sup>35</sup> A 2017 JIU survey<sup>36</sup> indicates that several large Government contributors are starting to make compliance with IATI a prerequisite for their continued funding.

One of the benefits of IATI is that it can serve as an enabler for other data visualization platforms that help ensure Member States (and other stakeholders) have a clear picture of where and how the UNDS is spending its resources and for what purposes. UN DOCO — with support from UNDP in its capacity as the secretariat of IATI — managed the development of the UNDG’s first open data platform<sup>37</sup>. This platform promotes a common approach to the application of transparency standards by consolidating in one place and in real time, the financial and activity data of all 14 UN entities currently publishing data as per the IATI standard. The number of UN activities published in IATI totaled 39,000 in 2016, an increase of 50% compared to 2014.

The UNDG data portal complements entity-specific ones that were developed in recent years which present details of an entity’s activities and financing in a timely and user-friendly manner. The same JIU survey, however, revealed that a number of donors felt that some reports and data provided by entities lacked robustness and evidence. It is clear that entities need to further improve the monitoring and reporting used to feed information into their data portals, ensuring contributors and recipients receive higher quality data on the results and outcomes achieved, rather than general descriptions of activities and actions.

There still remains under-reporting of UN expenditures at the country level in CEB’s financial statistics, which is the main platform on system-wide funding flows, and the basis for the funding analysis in the present report. In 2017, eight entities<sup>38</sup>, which together account for 10% of total OAD

<sup>34</sup> 15 UN entities if UNCDF and UNDP are counted separately. 18 UN entities if CERF, the World Bank and UNITAID are also counted, however these entities are not among those listed in Box 1 above.

<sup>35</sup> A/72/124-E/2018/3

<sup>36</sup> [https://www.unjiu.org/en/reports-notes/JIU%20Products/JIU\\_REP\\_2017\\_2\\_English.pdf](https://www.unjiu.org/en/reports-notes/JIU%20Products/JIU_REP_2017_2_English.pdf)

<sup>37</sup> [open.undg.org](http://open.undg.org)

<sup>38</sup> IFAD, ITC, UNEP, UNITAR, UNESCO, UNODC, UNWTO and PAHO (WHO’s Regional Office for the Americas)

expenditures, did not report to the CEB on their country-level expenditures. This represents a modest improvement compared to 2016, when 12 entities accounting for 11% of expenditures did not report country-level breakdown of expenditures to CEB.

The mapping exercise on the functions and capacities of the UNDS commissioned by the Secretary-General in response to the QCPR mandate revealed similar weaknesses, including a lack of granular information from many UN entities on the use and geographical allocation of their expenditures. A number of measures are required to improve data, which are expected to be launched in 2018 as a result of the repositioning exercise.

An ad-hoc UN inter-agency team co-chaired by the CEB and MPTFO of UNDP began work in late-2017 to improve reporting at entity-level to the CEB and through the IATI standard to be made more complete and accurate to meet current information needs. This was in response to the above and to the QCPR mandate “to continue to strengthen the analytical quality of system-wide reporting on funding, performance and programme results for UN-OAD”. The team will work on defining the specific actions to be undertaken to produce financial data on funding flows across five dimensions: 1) the UN entity, 2) the function provided, 3) the geographical location, 4) the financing instrument used, and 5) for which integrated set of SDGs and targets.

#### *Integrated results and resources framework*

At headquarters level, Integrated results and resources frameworks (IRRFs) are intended to hold entities accountable for the funding entrusted to them by linking the resources of entities to strategic plan results. Out of 29 UN entities responding to the HQ survey, 27 indicated that they consolidate all projected resources of their organization within an integrated results and resources framework based on priorities determined in the respective strategic plan. The other two entities indicated that this will be done starting in 2018.

Feedback received through the HQ survey shows that nearly every entity is implementing an IRRF. It also revealed, however, that actual contributions regularly fall short of the estimates provided in the approved IRRF. One large entity indicated that they present aspirational rather than realistic estimates in their IRRF, also ensuring that their budgets would not be exceeded. Such practices should be avoided as they reduce transparency and accountability.

#### *Common budgetary framework*

At country level, the Common Budgetary Framework (CBF) is an integral part of the UNDAF (or similar planning instrument) and enables UNCTs to present all planned and costed UN programme activities in one place, in support of a better coordinated delivery by UNCTs. An annual CBF is an annualized version of the medium-term CBF and provides a more realistic projection of financial needs, funding availability and funding gaps.

As called for in the QPCR, a medium-term CBF in every programme country should be viewed as a minimum requirement.

According to the UNDG IMS, 59% of UNCTs currently have a medium-term CBF while 30% of have an annual CBF, indicating that there is still significant room for improvement. UN Info – a new open data platform being developed by UNDG – will begin digitizing the UNDAFs and their associated CBFs beginning in 2018, which could make these frameworks more streamlined and transparent.

The proposed system-wide strategic document may help in addressing some of these aforementioned issues.

### III. Enabling programme countries to achieve the SDGs

The primary role of the UNDS is to support governments to achieve the 2030 Agenda, of which poverty eradication is the overarching objective. To that end the QCPR calls on the UNDS to perform some critical functions, including integrated policy and normative support, capacity development, leveraging partnership and supporting South-South and triangular cooperation. The QCPR calls for a whole-of-system response based on stronger cross-pillar work, particularly with greater cooperation and complementarity across development, humanitarian and sustaining peace activities. The resolution also calls upon all entities of the UNDS to continue to promote women's empowerment and gender equality.

**The UN remains the Member States' preferred partner of choice to deliver on its key functions.** As table 8 shows, governments were asked to assess the performance of the UN system compared to other development partners, and respondents selected the top two partners that best satisfied their country's needs in terms of select performance factors. The UN comes on top of each of the seven following areas, with progress on key functions outlined below.

**Table 8. Countries' preferred providers of external support, by type of support**

*Question: Select UP TO TWO partners that you consider to be the preferred provider of each type of support.*

Ranked 1 <sup>st</sup>	UN system (AFP)	Bretton Woods Institutions	Other multilateral & regional institutions not part of the UN	OECD/ DAC partners	Southern partners	Thematic or alliance-based partners (e.g. The Global Fund)
Ranked 2 <sup>nd</sup>	#	#	#	#	#	#
Strengthening national capacities	74	42	27	19	7	5
Providing evidence-based and, where appropriate, integrated policy advice	68	45	17	18	8	2
Assisting countries through support with norms and standards	42	41	24	23	10	6
Sectoral programming advice and technical assistance	65	41	19	18	17	9
Direct support and service delivery	51	38	16	23	0	0
Peace & security	67	6	28	17	9	4
Humanitarian assistance	65	13	22	17	7	11

*Source: 2017 DESA Survey of Programme Country Governments*

#### A. Eradicating poverty and Leaving No One Behind

As expressed in the 2012 QCPR (A/RES/67/226) and reaffirmed in the 2016 QCPR, eradicating poverty is the greatest global challenge and an indispensable requirement for sustainable development. Member States recognize poverty eradication as the top priority and objective of the UN-OAD, and that no one should be left behind. Reaching those who are furthest behind first is about prioritizing human beings' dignity, and ensuring that every individual has the opportunity to realize the rights underpinning the SDGs.


Many UN entities consider the 2030 Agenda's overarching principle of poverty eradication and the pledge to "reach those furthest behind first" as already within the scope of their entity's

mandate, and have not articulated any new policies in this regard. Entities without explicit mandates on poverty eradication, such as OHCHR, UNHCR and UNISDR, are responding by applying the principle of “leaving no-one behind” in ways that are relevant to their mandates.

The DESA 2015 and 2017 surveys asked both governments and RCs the extent to which they agreed that “the UN ensures adequate attention and resources are given to the development needs of the poorest and most vulnerable segments of society”. As shown in figure XIX, RCs tended to indicate significantly stronger agreement than governments.

**Figure XIX. Ensuring focus towards the most vulnerable**


Question: The UN ensures adequate attention and resources are given to the development needs of the poorest and most vulnerable segments of society:



Source: 2017 DESA Survey of Programme Countries and Survey of Resident Coordinators

**Evidence suggests that the UN is successful in assisting governments to identify the furthest behind, and to a lesser degree in helping governments to actually reach this population with material support or programmatic interventions.** While 37% of governments indicated that the UN system supports them to identify those farthest behind “to a great extent”, only 24% report that the system is effective “to a great extent” in reaching them. Commenting on why this is the case, some governments indicated that the UN is unable to reach the furthest behind due to scarcity of resources or because they failed to consult with grassroots civil society groups. One respondent government with a large humanitarian crisis explained that the UN was not reaching the poorest populations in more peaceful parts of the country because it was devoting the majority of its resources to stabilizing conflict zones. Another government reported that it was not able to assess the UN’s performance in this area because the UNCT did not share their budgets or operational expenditures.

**Figure XX. UN support in identifying & reaching those furthest behind**




Source: 2017 DESA Survey of Programme Country Governments



**Low-income countries are more likely to respond that the UN system assisted in reaching the furthest behind first “to a great extent” than countries with higher incomes.** Around a quarter of all countries replied “to a small extent”, “not at all” or “don’t know” on these questions. However, this share falls notably in the group of countries which are further advanced in SOPs implementation, possibly indicating that integrated ways of working support Governments to reach those furthest behind. .

**Figure XXI. UN support to reaching those furthest behind, by income groups**

Question: Please indicate the extent to which the UN has assisted your country to reach the furthest behind first



Source: 2017 DESA Survey of Programme Country Governments

**86% of RCs agreed that the UNDAF or its equivalent framework<sup>39</sup> “addresses how the UNCT will reach the furthest behind first”.** However, when asked to highlight innovative strategies being used to that effect, they were limited to traditional and broad-based actions (see Box 2), indicating further thinking is needed to strengthen the system’s reach to those left furthest behind. This speaks of the importance to strengthen capacities and skill sets of the system to be fit to deliver on the 2030 Agenda. Furthermore, addressing data gaps will be central to reaching those left behind.

#### Box 2: Innovative strategies to reach those furthest behind

RCs were invited to highlight any innovative strategies in the UNDAF that the UNCT is pursuing in order to reach the furthest behind first. Responses included:

- enhancing community involvement in the definition of target groups;
- focusing on the poorest regions of a country;
- ‘social inclusion’ being an important theme of the UNDAF;
- improving data collection to plan and measure progress;
- improving public access to such data;
- taking a human -rights based approach;
- conducting a ‘Public Perception Survey’ around the SDGs;
- establishing a UN office in the most disadvantaged region;
- addressing youth unemployment;
- including a specific UNDAF outcome focusing on indigenous people, women and youth;
- focusing on ethnic minorities;
- involving a very wide range of stakeholders in the CCA;
- undertaking vulnerability assessments; and
- strengthening linkages between development and humanitarian actions

<sup>39</sup> Hereafter all references to the UNDAF are inclusive of their equivalent frameworks





The Government survey asked respondents to select the five most important areas, organised by the 17 SDGs, where i) UN contribution over the *past two years* has been especially significant; and ii) UN assistance will be required over the *next four years*. Analysis of the data by income grouping and country typology is provided in Chapter III.E and III.F.

**The five goals where the UNDS has made the most contributions over the past two years are primarily the unfinished business of the MDGs.** Health is the topmost area according to both the 2015 and the 2017 surveys. It is followed by food security, nutrition and eradicating hunger; poverty eradication; gender equality; and education—which were also among the top 10 areas in previous surveys. Results are shown in the adjacent figure.

**Looking forward, in order of priority for UN assistance over the next four years, governments identified poverty (Goal 1), health (Goal 3), productive employment and sustainable economic growth (Goal 8), combating climate change and its impacts (Goal 13), and affordable and clean energy (Goal 7).**

The latter five goals were not among the most mentioned areas regarding past performance. This suggests that the UN system may need to boost its capacities in the areas that go beyond the unfinished business of the MDGs.

No Government selected responsible consumption and production (Goal 12) as an area where the UN contribution over the past two years has been especially significant, which may reflect the lack of a natural institutional ‘home’ for this goal.


Source: 2017 DESA Survey of Programme Country Governments

## B. Supporting capacity development

Through the QCPR, Member States have consistently reaffirmed that capacity development is a core function of the United Nations<sup>40</sup>. Most governments agree that the UNDS has been effective in developing national capacities. As shown in Figure XXII, 18% of governments 'strongly agree' and 71% 'agree' to that statement, which is consistent with results from previous years' surveys.

**Figure XXII - Effectiveness in building national capacities**

*Question: All things considered, the UN has been effective in developing national capacities:*



*Source: DESA 2017 Survey of Programme Country Governments*

**UNDS support to strengthening national capacities is particularly strong in the area of 'planning', but less so regarding 'management' and 'evaluation'.** As shown in Table 9, most governments agree that the UN has contributed overall to strengthen national capacities regarding planning, management, evaluation and statistics. Yet, 20% of governments disagreed that the system has contributed to strengthening national capacities in management, 23% in evaluation and 11% in statistics.

**Table 9 Strengthening National Capacities**


The UN has contributed to the strengthening of national capacities in :	Planning	Management	Evaluation	Statistics
	%	%	%	%
Strongly agree	17	12	6	13
Agree	72	64	69	67
Disagree	9	20	22	10
Strongly disagree	0	0	1	1
Don't know	3	4	2	9
	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

*Source: 2017 DESA Survey of Programme Country Governments*

**The UN is viewed by programme countries as both contributing to building national capacities to engage in partnerships, as well as in playing a catalytic role to facilitate them.** However, as shown below, countries view the UN as more active in directly facilitating partnerships (where 87% of countries agree to a moderate or large extent) than in building national capacities for partnerships (where 78% agree), thus possibly indicating the need for strengthened skills sets of UNCTs in that regard.

<sup>40</sup> A/RES/67/226 and A/RES/71/243

**Figure XXIII. UN support towards partnership building**



Source: 2017 DESA Survey of Programme Country Governments


Source: 2017 DESA Survey of Programme Country Governments

### Use of national institutions and systems

**There is scope for progress on the use of national systems and institutions by the UNDS.** Though using national systems and institutions is a key element to bolstering national capacities, it is still not the default approach, where appropriate, of UN entities in implementing country-level activities. As illustrated in figure XXIII, few governments ‘strongly agreed’ that the UN uses national capacities as much as possible, compared with nearly half of RCs who ‘strongly agreed’. In other areas such as procurement, financial systems, monitoring and reporting, and evaluation, there was even less agreement that national capacities were being used as much as possible. Feedback from governments suggests that *using* national systems and institutions is a significant aspect of *strengthening* them. In this regard, the data suggest there is significant scope for improvement across the board.

**Figure XXIV. UNDS’ utilization of national systems and institutions**

Question: To what extent does your country agree or disagree that the UN has used each of the following as much as possible:



Source: DESA 2017 Survey of Programme Country Governments and DESA 2017 Survey of Resident Coordinators

## Coordinated approaches to capacity development

**Achieving the 2030 Agenda requires a more systematic, coordinated and comprehensive approach to capacity development.** The 2012 QCPR called for the development of a UNDS joint approach to capacity development, based on common methodology and standards; the request remains pending action.

The findings of two recent JIU studies indicate that a coordinated approach across the UNDS on capacity development does not exist. The first<sup>41</sup>, which assessed 36 UNDAF evaluations conducted between 2009-2014<sup>42</sup> found that, despite being a programming principle, **capacity development is seldom mentioned in UNDAF evaluations, and “insufficiently articulated” in UNDAF activities, resulting in a significant programmatic gap.** The second, more specifically on strengthening national statistical capacities, found that there is no overarching plan on these efforts to clarify the respective roles and division of labour among the various UN entities.


To ensure that efforts to develop national capacities are systematic and coordinated, UNCTs need to engage in joint analyses and needs assessments. The 2017 UNDAF Guidelines set out as a minimum requirement the development of a high-quality, evidence based Common Country Analysis (CCA), part of which includes an assessment of governments’ and other relevant stakeholders’ capacities. In the same vein, **governments see the need for a more thorough analysis of needs, improved coordination among UN entities, and an approach to national capacity development that is more comprehensive and has strong national ownership .**

**In the context of leaving no-one behind, a joint approach for capacity building is vital, especially in terms of data collection and analysis.**

**Surveys indicate that data disaggregation around the dimensions of racial diversity, religion and disability remains limited.** As shown in Figure XXIV, most RCs find official data disaggregated by income, sex and age to be adequate or partially adequate, while data on persons with disabilities, ethnicity, race and religion less so, and in many countries, unavailable.

**Figure XXV. Degree of access to (different categories) of official data**

Question: Please indicate whether the UNCT has access to official government data on:



Source: DESA 2017 Survey of Resident Coordinators


<sup>41</sup> JIU/REP/2016/5 <https://undocs.org/JIU/REP/2016/5>

<sup>42</sup> JIU/REP/2016/6 <https://undocs.org/JIU/REP/2016/6>

**While the UN has improved integrated work for capacity building around data, much more needs to be done on this front.** As shown below, 78% of RCs agree that UN entities are working more or much more closely together, compared to four years ago, to support capacity building on disaggregated data collection and analysis. The share of governments who agree with this statement, remains however lower (66%). The fact that 28% of governments fail to note any change provides further evidence that more remains to be done in many countries.

**Figure XXVI. Collaboration towards capacity building around data**

*Question: Compared to four years ago, how closely have UN agencies worked together to support capacity-building on disaggregated data collection and analysis:*



*Source: DESA 2017 Survey of Programme Country Governments and Survey of Resident Coordinators*

**The UNDS is improving its own capacity for data literacy, technology, collection and analysis at disaggregated levels, in alignment with the SDGs.** A 2017 UN-DOCO desk review of 23 UNDAFs signed between 2015 and 2017, found that **20 UNDAFs planned capacity development support to national statistics institutions for evidence based policy making and programme design.** The study does not indicate whether the capacity development support indicated in these Frameworks was part of a coordinated UNCT effort or an entity-specific activity. In February 2017, the UNDG launched guidelines to support country reporting on the SDGs. Additionally, the UNDG joined forces with UN Global Pulse and its Privacy Advisory Group to design common principles for data privacy and protection to optimize the use of “big data” towards the 2030 Agenda.

Additionally, many Governments requested support from the UNDS in preparing a Voluntary National Review (VNR). Since 2016, 65 countries have presented a VNR. Of these, 40 responded to the DESA surveys stating they had presented a VNR, **35 of which reported having received UN support.**

### C. Providing integrated policy advice

**The QCPR calls upon the UNDS to provide high quality, evidence-based, integrated policy advice.**

As illustrated in Table 11, while governments largely agree that UN policy advice is evidence-based and tailored to the country’s needs and priorities, **there is scope to improve on the policy advice being provided in an integrated fashion where appropriate.**

**Table 11 - Provision of policy advice**


The UN provides policy advice, tailored to national needs and priorities, that is:	Evidence-based	Provided jointly
	%	%
Strongly agree	25	17
Agree	68	63
Disagree	2	10
Strongly disagree	0	0
Don't know	5	11
	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: 2017 DESA Survey of Programme Country Governments

**There are varying degrees of policy advice coordination across different UN entities.** As shown, 65% of RCs agreed that the UNCT generally provides policy advice through coordinated process, while 22% referred to single entity processes, and 13% to joint ones. RCs noted that the degree of coordination varied with topic. Cross-cutting issues such as gender-based violence are more likely to be well-coordinated. Several RCs also noted that UNCT results groups were helpful to ensure coordinated, and where needed, integrated approaches to policy advice.

**Figure XXVII - Coordination and/or Integration of policy advice**

Question: The UNCT generally provides policy advice developed through process that is:



Source: 2017 DESA Survey of Resident Coordinators

The Secretary-General's June 2017 report identifies strengthening the UNDS "policy backbone" to be an urgent undertaking, and recognizes that providing integrated policy advice will require the system to function in a new way, with UNDS entities delivering multi-disciplinary advice with one voice, as well as strengthened capacities for data management and innovative solutions at country-level.

#### **D. Assisting countries through normative support**

The QCPR calls on the UNDS to assist countries through normative support. This involves supporting the development of global norms and standards, assisting Member States to integrate and align national legislation and policies to agreed norms and standards, and the provision of monitoring and review mechanism to encourage compliance. For many entities, particularly the specialized agencies, this type of work constitutes the core of their mandate.

Most organizations within the UNDS are involved in normative work to varying extents, including funds, programmes, specialized agencies and affiliated organizations.

The UN's normative work in promoting global norms and standards is one of its key comparative advantages. It sets universally applicable norms and standards for peace and security, economic and socio-cultural development, human rights, the rule of law, health, and environmental sustainability, among others. The scope of normative work follows a wide range, from developing protocols, establishing norms and guidelines, monitoring and reporting on implementation of conventions, doing advocacy, to disseminating normative products, among many others.

At country level, a desk review by UN-DOCO which analyzed 23 UNDAFs signed between November 2015 and September 2017 revealed that all 23 UNDAFs made efforts to employ a human rights-based approach and to define specific contributions to the realization of human rights. The solid performance of the UNDS is confirmed by governments (Table 8), as **the UNDS was selected as one of two preferred providers by 42 programme countries governments to assist through support with norms and standards. Somewhat unexpectedly**, the BWIs, follow as a close second preferred provider.


According to the UNDG IMS, in 2016, **61 percent of UNCTs** have engaged in the preparation, reporting or follow-up of the Universal Periodic Reviews, **73 percent** have facilitated government follow-up of recommendations of treaty bodies, and **38 percent** have facilitated government follow-up of Special Procedures recommendations.

A recent study<sup>43</sup> found that while considerable efforts had been made by UNCTs to apply a human rights based approach and promote gender equality, there was less clarity as how to these principles were being integrated into UNDAF programming, and recommended a systematic approach to address this gap. At corporate level, the UNDG has supported engagement with, reporting to and follow-up on international human rights mechanisms including through: the publication and launch of a Web-Based Guide to Engaging with the International Human Rights Machinery<sup>44</sup>, and annual letters to Resident Coordinators on Upcoming Opportunities to Engage with UN Human Rights Mechanisms.

As communications are key to support better linkages between the normative and operational aspects of the UNCTs' work, RCs were asked about the extent to which the UNCT Joint communication strategy (where it exists), contributed to that objective.

**Figure XXVIII. Promoting linkages between the UN's normative and operational activities<sup>45</sup>**

*Question: In your opinion, to what extent does the Joint Communications Strategy promote adequate linkages between the UN's normative and operational activities:*



*Source: DESA 2017 Survey of Resident Coordinators*

<sup>43</sup> JIU/REP/2016/6

<sup>44</sup> <https://undg.org/human-rights/strengthening-engagement-with-the-international-human-rights-mechanism/>

<sup>45</sup> 87 RCs responded to this question. The remaining RCs stated that the UNCT does not have a joint communications strategy.




While the 2017 UNDAF Desk Review shows that there was progress in terms of applying an HRBA to common country analysis, there is ample scope to better link the normative and operational dimensions by further strengthening integration of human rights standards and principles in the CCA, feeding HRBA into the UNCTs' programming work on the ground<sup>46</sup>, and to do so jointly, in a manner that cuts across traditional sectoral and thematic siloes, in view of the integrated nature of the SDGs.

## E. Reinforcing assistance to LDCs, LLDCs and SIDS

The 2016 QCPR calls on the UNDS to address the special challenges facing the most vulnerable countries in implementing the 2030 Agenda, in particular, LDCs, LLDCs and SIDS. These include, inter alia, limited institutional capacity, low accumulation of human assets, ODA dependence, climate change and high vulnerability to external shocks.<sup>47</sup> These countries combined account for a sixth of the world's population living in 91 Member States.

**Figure XXIX. Alignment with national needs, priorities and plans**



The degree to which the UN system's activities are perceived by governments to be aligned with national needs and priorities varies across country groupings. Interestingly, survey data shows that LLDCs were more than three times as likely than SIDS to affirm that UNDS activities are 'very closely aligned' with national needs and priorities; and LLDCs were much more likely at 46% to 'strongly agree' that the UNDAF has assisted with alignment compared with SIDS (35%) and LDCs (37%).

### LDCs

With close to half of all country-level expenditure (see section II.C.3), LDCs benefit from special attention from the UNDS to face key challenges including low levels of human development and economic and structural vulnerabilities and handicaps to growth that limit resilience<sup>48</sup>.

The QCPR called for the UNDS to work in a coordinated manner in support of the Technology Bank, which is a new entity created by the General Assembly in December 2016 to improve the use of scientific and technological solutions in the poorest countries and promote their

<sup>46</sup> Summary Findings - Internal Desk Review New UNDAFs Commencing Implementation in 2017 (UN DOCO)

<sup>47</sup> <https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/least-developed-country-category/ldc-inclusion.html>


<sup>48</sup> A/CONF.219/3/Rev.1



integration into the knowledge-based economy. The Bank is being operationalized with the signing of the Host Country Agreement with the Government of Turkey. To date, Turkey has pledged a \$2mn annual contribution to the Bank, and four other countries pledged a combined amount of \$455,000.

**LDCs are far more positive in their assessment of UN assistance to identify those furthest behind, compared to LLDCs and particularly compared with SIDS.** That the system has devoted more attention to this topic in LDCs is likely a confluence of both greater needs and more readily available resources for this group of countries.

**Figure XXX. Identifying those that are furthest behind**



Source: DESA 2017 Survey of Programme Country Governments

**Some UNDS entities are yet to start using the LDC category in their allocation of development assistance and support measures.** The Committee for Development Policy surveyed entities in the UNDS regarding recognition of the LDC category. The answers indicate that entities recognize the category, and all entities make contributions to their development in various degrees. Yet, the recognition of the category does not appear to translate into a consistent application of priorities and budget allocation. **Most entities do not have operational guidelines with clear budget targets, nor rules for budget allocations to LDCs.** This may result in unpredictable resource flows to LDCs. Furthermore, most UNDS entities group the LDCs alongside other country groupings to assign similar priority status and special priority treatment. Additionally, there are large variations in the type and level of LDC-specific assistance—often based on the entities’ own policies, priorities and criteria, which may not necessarily relate to LDC status.

The 2016 QCPR requested the UNDS to improve its support to graduating countries in the formulation and implementation of their national transition strategies. One country, Equatorial Guinea, graduated in 2017, and more than a dozen may meet the criteria for graduation by 2021. The Government survey included six countries that had graduated (or scheduled to graduate) from LDC status in the last four years. Responses suggest that **the effectiveness of UN support in the formulation of national transition strategies was broadly positive**: two countries ‘strongly agreed’ that the support had been effective, three ‘agreed’, and one ‘disagreed’. The Secretariat of the CDP, is building a web-based tool to help prospective LDC graduates better understand the graduation process, and support them in developing graduation strategies to address the end of their access to the special international support measures.

## LLDCs

In recognition of the specific challenges that LLDCs face, the GA urged the UNDS to continue to enhance its support including through the Vienna Programme of Action for LLDCs. By definition, LLDCs lack access to the sea, but are also typically affected by infrastructure deficiencies and poor trade facilitation, which results in high transit and trade costs, typically leading to weak economic growth and limited overall socio-economic development<sup>49</sup>.

Of the 32 LLDCs, half (16) are in Africa, 10 in Asia, 2 in Latin America and 4 in Europe. More than half (17) of all LLDCs, are also LDCs, of which 13 are in Africa. Among the least developed countries, those that are also LLDCs generally perform less well, reflecting more limited productive capacities and competitiveness, and higher reliance on the economic and political situations of neighbouring countries.<sup>50</sup>

The government survey enquired about the degree of alignment between UN activities and national priorities. Figure XXVII shows that **LLDCs were the most satisfied with the degree of alignment between UN activities and national priorities, with 58% indicating ‘very closely alignment’, while SIDS were the least satisfied (at 18%)**. For LLDCs, the degree of perceived alignment is similar to that of programme countries as a whole.

## SIDS

In view of their specific social, economic, and environmental vulnerabilities, the 2016 QCPR also urges the UNDS to enhance its support to Small Islands Developing States (SIDS) including for the implementation of the SAMOA Pathway. SIDS are mostly geographically dispersed, with small populations, small domestic markets and limited economies of scale, high costs for utilities and transport to access foreign markets due to distance. SIDS also suffer from limited resilience to natural disasters which frequently have catastrophic economic impacts, not only because of recovery costs, but also the impact on tourism, which is often one of the main economic sectors of SIDS<sup>51</sup>.

**SIDS have a markedly more negative view than other country groups on the alignment of UN activities to national needs and priorities, with only 18% of SIDS reporting these as closely aligned compared to a 37% total of all governments.** In a similar vein, only 10% of SIDS ‘strongly agree’ that the UN provides evidence-based policy advice that is tailored to national needs and priorities while for all other governments this was 30%. These differences indicate that there is room for improvement in tailoring the system’s support to the needs of SIDS.

**The UNDAF seems to be a tool that governments agree could assist in this regard.** While SIDS were less likely than LDCs and LLDCs to agree that the UNDAF can help to ensure alignment, 84% of SIDS either ‘strongly agreed’ or ‘agreed’ that the UNDAF has enabled the Government to ensure that the UN’s activities are closely aligned with your national plans and strategies including on the delivery of the SDGs.

**In response to where the UNDS has provided an especially significant contribution in the past two years, SIDS pointed to combatting climate change as the top area for support.**

<sup>49</sup> Accelerating Sustainable Energy for All in LLDCs, OHRLLS, 2017

<sup>50</sup> UNCTAD/LDC/2016/Corr.1

<sup>51</sup> A/CONF.223/10

In fact, SIDS were far more likely – at 72% - than other Member States (44%) to put combatting climate change down as a top area of support. The second top area of support in the past two years for SIDS was health and well-being (69%), followed by gender (62%), where SIDS came in at least 10 percentage points higher than the overall figures for all countries (see survey report for details).

In considering **where UN assistance will be most required in the coming four years, 66% of SIDS again pointed to combatting climate change**, as their top area where support will be needed, followed by productive employment and sustainable economic growth, and then by poverty eradication.

As highlighted in chapter IV on country presence, some 24 SIDS are provided with UN support through a Multi-Country Office (MCO) modality. The largest are the Fiji and Barbados MCOs, each of which covers 10 SIDS.

**In the Government survey, 79% of SIDS ‘agreed’ that UN presence is adequately tailored for meeting the specific challenges of the country.** This included 11% that ‘strongly agreed’. For non-SIDS, the level of agreement was 89%, including 15% that ‘strongly agreed’. The lower level of agreement among SIDS is not surprising given that only 18% of SIDS felt that the UNDS efforts were ‘very closely aligned’ with national needs and priorities, compared to 37% of non-SIDS.

## **F. Supporting MICs to address continuing and emerging challenges**

Middle Income Countries are a heterogeneous group, comprising of 54 lower-middle income countries (LMICs) and 56 upper-middle income countries (UMICs). There is considerable diversity within MICs in terms of ODA allocation criteria—with 18 LDCs, 18 LLDCs, and 28 SIDS— and regional diversity: 26 MICs are in Africa, 25 in the Americas, 36 in the Asia-Pacific region and 10 in Western Asia. Recognizing the MICs’ diversity is a critical aspect of providing effective support, tailored to both continuing and emerging challenges of these countries, as called for in the QCPR.

Given that the MICs group contains more than two-thirds of all programme countries, it is not surprising that this diverse group accounted for 60% of all country-level expenditure in 2016. Perhaps more interestingly, nearly half, or 48.5%, of core resources expenditures were spent in LMICs, a group which includes of 17 LDCs.

MICs confront complex and diverse realities. This is reflected in the top areas selected by MIC Governments as requiring the most UN assistance in the next four years (see the survey report for a full list of MIC top selected areas). Poverty eradication is reflected as the top area across all MICs. Combatting climate change and its impacts (SDG13) was regarded as a top area for UN assistance over the next four years by most MICs; this coincides with the needs for UN assistance of high-income programme countries, which also place combatting climate change towards the top of the list. Education (SDG4) is another top-five area identified by both low- and upper-middle income countries as key for UN assistance that is shared with high-income countries but not with low-income ones.

**RCs in MICs highlighted the steady move away from direct support and more into policy advice and innovative thinking around resource mobilization for the SDGs.** In this regard,

one RC also commented that expertise, approach, and financing are fragmented across many entities, impeding the UNCT from providing integrated high-level policy support on the SDGs.

The ambition of the 2030 Agenda needs to be met with bold changes in the way the UNDS operates. In the case of providing support to MICs, this implies a gradual shift from a traditional model of direct support and service provision towards greater emphasis on integrated high-quality policy advice, capacity development, and support with leveraging partnerships and financing.

## G. Partnerships

Critical to the success of the 2030 Agenda is an underlying vision where governments, the private sector, civil society and the UN work together to find new ways to leverage genuine partnerships for sustainable growth, including by mobilizing all available resources.

### 1. Global and institutional level partnerships

**The UN continues to engage in partnerships through a number of avenues across the system.** The UN Office for Partnerships, the Global Compact Office, WHO and DESA, amongst others, have a mandate to further global and multi-stakeholder partnerships. UNDS entities are also actively involved in pursuing jointly multi-stakeholder partnerships at the global level, such as *Every Woman, Every Child*, and *Sustainable Energy for All* and *the Global Initiative on Decent Jobs for Youth*.

**Individual UNDS entities also engage with a large number of partners.** UNHCR, for example, reports having 929 partners for implementation across all regions of the world, 310 Strategic Agreements signed with NGOs, UN, academia, private sector, governmental agencies, intergovernmental organizations, foundations, think tanks, and 60 private and corporate partnerships. Similarly, WFP noted having over 1,500 current partnership arrangements.

**However, few UN entities report tracking the status and results of partnerships, or share knowledge and best practices on their existing partnerships and strategies.** UNHCR conducts an annual independent survey on partnership while monitoring performance throughout the year. It has further established a partner portal which is being expanded for use by UNICEF and WFP. Additionally, UNICEF's monitoring and reporting platform annually tracks the status of its partnerships, including results. These initiatives could be a model to build on by other entities.

**Furthermore, the UNDS is mandated in the QCPR to assist Governments in leveraging their own partnerships, and to act as a convener of stakeholders across constituencies.** To effectively play this role, UNCTs need to develop the necessary skill sets and gain a better understanding of the available resources. Among other important areas including partnerships to mobilize technology, knowledge and expertise, the UNDS has a key role to play to support governments to take advantage of diversified and innovative funding sources that could complement traditional sources, and to align private financial flows with the 2030 Agenda. Aligning private financial flows with the 2030 Agenda requires that governments and markets build awareness and trust, align regulations and enable innovative instruments to foster risk-sharing and accountability. In this regard, UNDP created a tool called the Development Finance Assessment (DFA) which provides planning and finance ministries with data and analysis on

the changing picture of a country’s development finance. The DFA also contains recommendations on how development finance in a country can better support the achievement of national priorities and results including the SDGs (see Section II D 1).


**Despite notable examples, it is clear that much remains to be done to ensure that the UNDS has the right skill sets to assist Member States.** Overall, adequate system-wide policies, mechanisms and guidelines are required to both, i) address risks related to preserving the UN’s legitimacy, integrity and independence in the face of new partnerships, particularly with the private sector, and ii) maximize the effectiveness and efficiencies of partnerships.

## 2. Country-level partnerships

**At the country level, 76% of all UNCTs collaborated with external partners during 2016 on a range of areas,** in particular gender equality; education; health; peace, justice and strong institutions; and employment/ decent work. Of the 99 UNCTs that stated that they convene partners, most partnerships took place with civil society (87%), local governments (72%), parliamentarians (63%), the private sector (59%), and other actors (30%), which includes donors/development partners and academia, religious partners and international NGOs.<sup>52</sup> The considerably low level of collaboration with development partners, donors and academia is further substantiated by the findings of the 2017 UNDAF Desk Review, which suggest that the overall engagement of multi-lateral banks and international financial institutions with the UNDAF seems to concentrate narrowly in the financing stage, rather than throughout the UNDAF process. Furthermore, enhanced interaction with academia remains vital in keeping up-to-date with the evolving body of knowledge innovation, and policy research, which are fundamental to achieving the 2030 Agenda.

**Figure XXXI. Collaboration with external partners in 2016**

Of the 99 UNCTs that specified that they convene partners beyond the UN for specific policy activities, the following partners were identified (where multiple partners were selected by each UNCT)



Source: UNDG IMS


**There is room to intensify engagement, particularly with private sector actors.** Governments and RCs were asked whether UNCTs engage “as much as possible” with partners.

<sup>52</sup> UNDG

RCs tend to assess the current levels of engagement as quite high, particularly in terms of engaging with bilateral and multilateral actors, as shown below. RCs also judge engagement with civil society to be substantial, while that with the private sector is deemed considerably lower. Overall, Governments are of the view that there is much more scope for engagement by the system with all partners, in particular with the private sector. The review of the role of the Global Compact and its application in the context of country teams, including to enhance engagement with entrepreneurs and the private sector, may prove as one helpful measure in further advancing the engagement with the private sector on the ground.

**Figure XXXII. UNCT engagement in partnerships**

Question: The United Nations Country Team (UNCT) engages as much as possible with:



Source: DESA 2017 Survey of Programme Country Governments and DESA 2017 Survey of Resident Coordinators

**The UN remains largely the preferred partner of choice by programme country governments for support on global, regional and national issues.** Governments were invited to assess the performance of the UN system in relation to that of other types of development partners, by selecting the top two development partners that best support the country’s needs in different categories.

**Table 13. Countries’ preferred providers of external support, by support category**

Question: Select UP TO TWO partners that you consider to be the preferred provider of each type of support.

	UN system ( AFP)	Bretton Woods Institutions	Other multilateral & regional institutions not part of the UN	OECD/ DAC partners	Southern partners	Thematic or alliance-based partners (e.g. The Global Fund)
Ranked 1 <sup>st</sup>						
Ranked 2 <sup>nd</sup>						
	#	#	#	#	#	#
Global challenges requiring common action (e.g. climate change, water, migration)	<b>79</b>	32	24	19	9	17
Supporting regional or sub - regional cooperation	41	18	<b>46</b>	21	22	6
Supporting South -South and triangular c ooperation	<b>57</b>	7	29	14	<b>46</b>	4
Assisting Governments in leveraging partnerships	<b>65</b>	36	23	14	9	0
Mobilizing external resources for development	<b>57</b>	48	22	30	7	0
The Government has insufficient experience with this category of partner	9	7	11	18	30	24

Source: 2017 DESA Survey of Programme Country Governments

**Turning to performance factors, the UN system compares favourably in the areas of aligning with national priorities, trust, impartiality and accountability to beneficiaries.** While results are encouraging, room for progress remains. Indeed, other survey results highlight room for improvement both in terms of alignment and accountability.

**The areas where the UN is perceived to perform less well are ‘achieving planned results on time’ and ‘making decisions transparently’.** Regarding the timely achievement of results, there is no significant difference between how the UN and the BWIs are viewed. The UN system’s perceived weakness regarding transparency is consistent with feedback from programme countries, reported elsewhere in the survey, notably regarding reporting to national authorities. The survey results in 2017 closely mirror the pattern of 2015 results.

**Table 14. Countries’ preferred providers of external support, by performance factors**

Question: select UP TO TWO partners that best satisfy your Government's needs in respect of each of the performance factors:

Ranked 1 <sup>st</sup>	UN system (AFP)	Bretton Woods Institutions	Other multilateral & regional institutions not part of the UN	OECD/ DAC partners	Southern partners	Thematic or alliance -based partners (e.g. The Global Fund)
Ranked 2 <sup>nd</sup>	#	#	#	#	#	#
Is impartial	<u>44</u>	21	8	10	9	6
Is accountable to beneficiaries	<u>54</u>	28	13	13	4	3
Is trusted by national partners	<u>55</u>	29	12	13	8	9
Aligns assistance with national needs and priorities	<u>66</u>	33	17	16	7	4
Responds quickly to new development needs and priorities	<u>48</u>	33	14	13	8	7
Achieves planned results on time	<u>31</u>	30	9	13	2	2
Makes decisions transparently	<u>43</u>	28	12	10	6	4
Willingly collaborates with other external development partners at the country level	<u>50</u>	27	14	12	2	4
The Government has insufficient experience with this category of partner	17	6	9	13	26	18

Source: 2017 DESA Survey of Programme Country Governments

#### 4. Support to South-South Cooperation

While not a substitute for North-South cooperation, South-South cooperation (SSC) is having a positive development impact in developing countries. The 2030 and Addis Agendas require



stepped up support for South-South and triangular cooperation as differentiated forms of international development collaboration. This is an area where the UNDS can maximize its leveraging role for partnerships and resource mobilization for the SDGs.

SSC displays an increasing trend.<sup>53</sup> A growing number of countries have either created agencies dedicated to SSC or have boosted SSC capacities within their cooperation institutions. **The 2017 Programme Country Government survey shows 74% of survey respondents providing development cooperation to other countries** (Table 15). Of these countries, 84% exchange information and best practices on the use of science, technology and innovation to advance sustainable development.

**Table 15. Provision of SSC**

Activity	Yes		No		Don't know		Total	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
We provide development cooperation to other countries	81	74	22	20	7	6	110	100
We exchange information and best practices with South-South partners on science, technology, and innovation to help achieve the SDGs	68	84	6	7	7	9	81	100

*Source: 2017 DESA Survey of Programme Country Governments*

**Most UNDS entities have incorporated SSC into their strategic plans, but progress is more limited in terms of reporting on SSC.** For the past three reporting cycles, HQ Surveys have reported the extent to which SSC is incorporated in the planning instruments of UNDS entities, in their strategic plans, and in their annual reports. In 2017, SSC was integrated into the strategic plans of all but four UN entities (namely, OHCHR, UN Habitat, UNISDR and UNRWA). In addition, 72% of responding UN entities report on SSC in their annual reports (among those that do not are, ESCWA, UNCTAD, UNHCR and WHO).

**Table 16 Has your entity integrated SSC into its strategic plan?**

	2014	2015	2017
<b>Yes</b>	20	23	25
<b>No</b>	1	2	4
<b>Skipped</b>	1	0	0
	<b>22</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>29</b>

**Table 17 Does your agency report on SSC in its annual report?**

Response	2014	2015	2017
<b>Yes</b>	18	20	21
<b>No</b>	3	5	8
<b>Skipped</b>	1	0	0
	<b>22</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>29</b>

*Source: 2017 DESA Survey of Programme Country Governments*

<sup>53</sup> A/72/297.

UN entities outlined the key challenges faced to mainstream and enhance support for SSC. **Several entities mentioned a lack of procedures or systems for M&E and reporting;** including through which lessons could be learned. One entity noted that a number of South-South activities, rather than being designed as an integral part of a planned programme were often single-time, small-scale activities, the impact of which was difficult to assess. Some entities mentioned lack of resources to support SSC, while others indicated that this modality of cooperation called for unfamiliar operational procedures.

RCs were also asked about the challenges for the UNCT in providing the support requested for South-South and triangular cooperation. **Lack of resources and capacity remains the dominant challenge in the view of RCs.** The need for a corporate strategy and policy, which appeared less significant in 2015, emerges again as the second most important challenge in 2017.

**Table 18. Challenges for UNCTs in providing support for SSC, 2014-2017**

Type of challenge	2014	2014	2015	2015	2017	2017
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Lack of dedicated resources and capacity	65	81	55	61	39	64
Nature of the request	19	24	18	17	10	16
Business rules and procedures	17	21	15	20	10	16
Need for corporate strategy and policy	24	30	14	16	15	25
Other	13	16	22	24	14	23

*Source: 2017 DESA Survey of Resident Coordinators*

The responses of **governments confirm similar challenges regarding suitable implementation and monitoring procedures, and funding.** A leading Southern partner mentioned the difficulty that some UN entities seem to have in understanding SSC as a modality of multilateral cooperation, as well as in providing guidelines and practices on how to proceed on the ground.

Notwithstanding, at the country-level there is clear progress on UN support for SSC, with **84% of governments indicating that the UN has undertaken activities to support SSC and triangular cooperation,** and only 5% noting no such support. Based on the RC Survey, **support for knowledge sharing and mutual learning is the leading type of SSC assistance requested, while there has been increased demand for financial and capacity support for SSC management** (Table 19).

**Table 19. Types of support requested within SSC, 2014-2017**

Type of support	2014	2015	2017
	%	%	%
Provision of access to knowledge and expertise of other developing countries	84	86	88
Identification of cooperation partners	56	56	51
Delivery of cross -border or inter -regional projects or programmes	35	46	42
Support towards regional integration	38	46	47
Financial support	38	37	55
Capacity building on management of South -South cooperation	30	32	43
Support for negotiation capacity development	25	29	27
Serving as an administrative agent to manage cooperation projects	21	21	25
Others	6	1	9

*Source: 2017 DESA Survey of Resident Coordinators*

**There is scope for fostering collaborative approaches on SSC through the UNDAF.** While 87% of RC Survey respondents noted that governments had SSC activities, only 56% of RCs stated that UNDAFs “substantively address” South-South and Triangular cooperation.

**Table 20. Government activities on SSC / requests for UN support on the subject**

	Does government have activities in the area of SSC?		Has the government requested the UN system to support its cooperation with other developing countries?	
	#	%	#	%
<b>Yes</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>84</b>
<b>No</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>Don't know</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>109</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>100</b>

*Source: 2017 DESA Survey of Programme Country Governments*

**The UNDG aims to address this gap through its 2017 revision of the UNDAF guidelines,** which call for UNDAFs to consider the use of SSC as a cooperation modality in partnerships development.

**SSC support is typically not requested of the UN system as a whole but instead from individual UNCT members,** and addressed in some country programme documents. This is consistent with findings on collective approaches to UN support, which show entities functioning fairly independently of one another. Several RCs saw potential or referred to ongoing efforts to improve coordination in this area.

**Table 21. Collective approaches to UN support for SSC**

Existence of collective approaches to UN support for SSC	#	%
The UNCT has an agreed strategy to support joint activities in this area	4	4
Some entities carry out South-South activities jointly	28	26
South-South activities are carried out by entities independently	76	70
	<b>108</b>	<b>100</b>

*Source: 2017 DESA Survey of Resident Coordinators*

In July 2017, the Government of Honduras, the UNCT in Honduras, and the UNOSSC signed a first-of-its kind MoU, which brings together all three parties to promote and strengthen South-South and triangular cooperation. The MoU defines the commitments of each party, based on their comparative advantages. Under the MoU, the Government of Honduras will be both a recipient and provider of South-South and triangular cooperation. Since then, the Government of Panama has entered into a similar agreement. Such institutionalized and system-wide support by the UNCT to South-South cooperation can serve as a model for other countries.

Overall, it is clear that there is an increasing trend towards more SSC, and that Governments are increasingly requesting support from the UN in this area. However, much remains to be done to reorient the expertise and institutional arrangements to support Member States in such endeavours.

## H. Enhancing complementarity among humanitarian, development and sustaining peace efforts

The QCPR calls for “a *comprehensive whole-of-system response, including greater cooperation and complementarity among development, disaster risk reduction, humanitarian action, and sustaining peace*” stating it is “*fundamental to most efficiently and effectively addressing needs and attaining the Sustainable Development Goals.*”

**A number of efforts are underway at the institutional level to further coherence and coordination within and across development, humanitarian, human rights and peace-building action.** The UNDG established a Results Group, co-chaired by UNDP and PBSO, dedicated to policy and operational dialogue, bringing together key stakeholders from the development, and peacebuilding communities. The Group coordinates closely with other key counterparts, the UNDG Results Group on giving voice to common values and norms (co-chaired by OHCHR and UNESCO), the humanitarian Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and its Task Team on the Humanitarian-Development (HD) nexus, to promote a coherent approach, including through a joint set of messages and guidance products. New UNDG arrangements are currently being developed, which may result in changes to the set-up of this and other UNDG Results Groups. In addition, the Secretary-General has established a Steering Committee of Principals to foster synergy between development and humanitarian activities.

**A new partnership framework between the UN and the World Bank for Crisis Affected Situations was established in early 2017.** The framework expands collaboration to encompass situations at risk of violent conflict; ongoing conflict; high levels of forced displacement; and protracted and post-crisis situations. **The UN-World Bank Partnership Trust Fund established in early 2017 a Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus Initiative, which** funds activities in a small number of pilot countries, to identify collective outcomes and deliver integrated responses. In addition, in 2016 the UN, the WB and the EU collaborated to refine and apply a joint approach for recovery and peacebuilding needs assessments.

**At country level, partnership agreements to enhance collaboration are also emerging.** According to the UNDG Results Report, by 2016, 34% of UNCTs have formalized collaboration with key partners, including the WB, to deliver coordinated crisis assistance. Just under a third have undertaken joint risk management assessments with such partners. In addition, two best practices have emerged in the UN Strategic Frameworks of Somalia and Lebanon.. The Somalia Provisional UNSF<sup>54</sup> aims to provide development responses to humanitarian challenges—such as food insecurity—while also addressing concerns on peace and security. The Lebanon UNSF<sup>55</sup> serves as the reference document for the UN system presence in the country, combining support for security, development and humanitarian response.

**The need for greater cooperation is demonstrated by the variety of development, humanitarian and peace activities that are taking place at country level,** as shown in Table 22. In this context, 57% of Governments stated that they have national mechanisms to

<sup>54</sup> The Somalia Provisional UNSF can be found at: <https://ims.undg.org//downloadFile/d4f0bf65d752499a60d04e8bf4e82e26b63a6ac096f4907199b32742a320f0fd>

<sup>55</sup> Lebanon UNSF 2017 -2020: <https://ims.undg.org//downloadFile/cb89cd57a4afdc70256588a757670074aef2c9ac3296c240e53f0914e5756355>

coordinate development and peacebuilding efforts supported by the UNCT. And of these national mechanisms, 84% are institutionalized, and 81% are country-led.

**Table 22. Focus area of UN activities**

Which areas of activity apply in your location?	%
Development	92%
Disaster Risk Reduction	66%
Humanitarian action	39%
Sustaining peace	32%

Source: 2017 DESA Survey of Programme Country Governments

**Table 23. Degree of collaboration among UN agencies**

Assess the level of collaboration among the UN agencies engaged in more than one area:	%
Very close collaboration	18
Close collaboration	66
Not close collaboration	11
No collaboration at all	1
Don't know	2
Not applicable	2

Source: 2017 DESA Survey of Programme Country Governments


**From the perspective of governments, much more needs to be done to improve collaboration across sectors among UN agencies, especially in countries with large cross-sectoral programmes.** Overall, 18% of governments reported very close collaboration between UN agencies across sectors; 66% reported close collaboration; 11% deemed that collaboration between agencies across sectors was not close; and 1% indicated that there was no collaboration at all. Notably, four out of the ten largest UN programme countries, which together represent \$4.2bn in OAD (or 19% of total country-level expenditures) were among those that did not state there was close or very close collaboration. Overall, programme countries seem to perceive that there is room for the UN system to work better across sectors.

Programme country governments were asked to indicate whether the RC prepared a joint humanitarian and development needs assessment to inform strategic decisions. **While 53% of Governments had noted the need to address a situation with humanitarian consequences, only 41% indicated the availability of comprehensive joint assessment to inform strategic decisions.** Such assessment did not take place in 9% of cases, while 50% of Governments indicated ‘don’t know’ or ‘not applicable.’

**Yet the views of RCs on collaboration and coherence seem to contradict the perspective of governments.** 87% of RCs noted that, over the past two years, UN development and humanitarian actors have engaged in joint needs assessments and 82% of RCs stated that joint planning has taken place. At 70%, RCs reported a slightly lower rate of collaboration on joint M&E on progress and collective outcomes. In addition, 82% of RCs stated that UNCT members provide them with sufficient and timely information to ensure strong coherence of development and humanitarian activities. Out of the 27 programmes identified as “large”, just one RC disagreed with this statement.

**Figure XXXIII. Engagement between UN development and UN humanitarian actors**

Question: If applicable, in the past two years, have UN development actors and UN humanitarian actors engaged in:



Source: DESA 2017 Survey of Resident Coordinators

While RCs have a positive view of collaboration across the humanitarian, development and peacebuilding nexus, they report better collaboration between development and humanitarian action than between development and peacebuilding, though there remains room for improvement in both cases.

**Table 24 - Extent of collaboration between development & humanitarian action, and development and peacebuilding**

To what extent is development work in the following areas jointly undertaken with humanitarian [column 1] /peacebuilding [column 2] actors		Humanitarian %	Peacebuilding %
Collective and/or complementary results	To a large extent	51	26
	To a small extent	46	45
	Not at all	3	29
Joint analysis	To a large extent	48	34
	To a small extent	50	40
	Not at all	2	26
Joint planning	To a large extent	45	29
	To a small extent	52	42
	Not at all	3	28
Joint coordination mechanisms	To a large extent	44	32
	To a small extent	52	39
	Not at all	3	29

Source: 2017 DESA Survey of Resident Coordinators

**There have been repeated calls for the relevant UN entities to integrate DRR into their activities**, in addition to adopting a preventative approach to managing disaster risks and averting lapses into conflict, as expressed in A/RES/67/226, in A/RES/71/243, as well as through the Sendai Framework, and the New Urban Agenda, amongst others.

In response, at global level, in 2016, the “United Nations Plan of Action on Disaster Risk Reduction for Resilience”, was endorsed by the CEB as a system-wide instrument to enhance the coherence and quality of support provided on disaster risk reduction, and a monitoring system was developed to review and guide progress. In addition, the CEB endorsed an “Analytical Framework on Risk and Resilience” which seeks a harmonized understanding on the concepts of risk, prevention, and resilience, as a basis for coherent joint analysis and planning.

At country level, integration of DRR into planning frameworks is taking place. 89% of RC's stated that the UNDAF substantively addressed DRR, while 89% indicated that the UNDAF addressed the drivers of needs, risks and vulnerability. A further 48% noted that peacebuilding/sustaining peace actions were included in the UNDAF.<sup>56</sup> The experience of governments further validates the prioritization of DRR. Over half (**53%**) of **Governments indicated that their country had needed to address a situation with humanitarian consequences in the past four years.**


In the context of increasingly frequent, severe, and complex natural and human-induced threats, there is a growing concern that these crises will reverse hard-won gains towards achieving the SDGs unless the principles of risk, resilience and prevention are adequately prioritized.

## I. Securing gender equality and women's empowerment

The QCPR calls on the UNDS to improve efforts to promote women's empowerment and gender equality, including through the full implementation of the System-wide Action Plan on Gender Equality (SWAP); 'gender scorecards' to assess and strengthen country-level progress in mainstreaming gender; and continued efforts to achieve gender balance across the UNDS, including the RC system.

**The UN-SWAP has continued to make progress in gender mainstreaming.** Since its roll-out in 2012, system-wide performance has improved, with 64% of all 2016 ratings in the "meets" or "exceeds" categories.

Figure XXXIV - Comparative analysis of overall ratings for the UN System by year



Source: UN Women

UN Women has coordinated **an extensive system-wide consultative process to develop the next generation of the UN SWAP, to be rolled out in 2018.** The framework introduces new indicators to monitor system-wide contributions to gender results, strengthens existing requirements, and highlights key drivers of progress. The JIU review of the first generation UN-SWAP—a continuing mandate from the 2012 QCPR—has been deferred to 2018.

<sup>56</sup> 39% of the RCs reported that peacebuilding/sustaining peace is not applicable to their UNDAF



Promoting gender equality and the empowerment of women has multiplier effects towards sustainable development. In 2016, gender remained the number one area of concentration of UN joint programs, with 62% of UNDAFs featuring gender specific results at the outcome level. **The gender scorecard is also being updated in alignment with the UN- SWAP and the new UNDAF guidance.** The updated framework was piloted in six UNCTs (Ukraine, Egypt, Vietnam, Uganda, Iraq and India). Gender scorecards remain an instrumental tool in promoting improved performance by UNCTs.

As gender inequality and discrimination can result in women experiencing and being impacted by crises differently from men, **new system-wide approaches are being developed to ensure gender-responsive humanitarian action** in a way that strengthens linkages between relief, development and resilience.

**A UN system-wide gender parity strategy<sup>57</sup> was launched in September 2017**, aiming at achieving parity at senior levels by 2021, and across the board by 2028. The strategy, which complements the UN-SWAP, is intended to feed into entity-specific implementation plans and enable tracking and reporting on progress. In response, the UNDG has decided to hold a session of the RC Assessment Center exclusively dedicated to women candidates, to be convened in 2018.

## IV. Improving the functioning of the UN development system

### A. Presence and division of labour

The 2030 Agenda requires a new generation of UN country teams with a configuration in terms of composition, skillsets, functions and focus that is fit to deliver on the unique and increasingly diverse needs of countries.

The QCPR recognizes in particular that the presence of UNDS entities at country level should be tailored to meet the specific challenges and needs of countries. Yet UNDS presence is highly fragmented, with UN agencies operating in different locations, often in isolation from one another. Among other factors, this limits the ability of the UNDS to provide integrated efficient and effective support to countries.

**In the provision of tailored support, governments and RCs indicate there is room for further improvement, including in terms of staff's capacities and skills.** Both programme countries and RCs were asked whether the UN<sup>58</sup> presence of the UN was adequately tailored to meet countries' needs. One sixth of Governments and RCs (14% and 15%, respectively) “strongly agreed” that UN presence is ‘adequately tailored’, and just 14% of Governments expressed strong agreement to whether UN staff have the right mix of capacities and skills to support the country’s development.

<sup>57</sup> [https://www.un.int/sites/www.un.int/files/Permanent%20Missions/delegate/17-00102b\\_gender\\_strategy\\_report\\_13\\_sept\\_2017.pdf](https://www.un.int/sites/www.un.int/files/Permanent%20Missions/delegate/17-00102b_gender_strategy_report_13_sept_2017.pdf)

<sup>58</sup> For the purposes of the survey, “UN presence” refers to the number of entities, the number and location of offices, the number and expertise of staff, etc.

**Table 25. UN country presence: “tailoring to the needs” and “mix of capacities and skills”**

	The UN country presence is ‘adequately tailored’ to meet the country’s needs		The UN staff have the right mix of capacities and skills to support the country’s development
	Governments	RCs	Governments
	%	%	%
Strongly agree	14	15	14
Agree	72	60	62
Disagree	9	24	13
Strongly disagree	3	1	1
Don’t know	2	0	10
	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: 2017 DESA Survey of Programme Country Governments and Resident Coordinators

In terms of challenges to aligning UN presence to meet the specific needs of the country, some RCs mentioned limited RCO capacities; the weak authority that they hold over UN system activities; and the lack of influence over which entities are represented in the country. Others highlighted challenges on the government side, such as inadequate data, weak planning and coordination mechanisms, and limited administrative capacity.

In addition, RCs pointed to UNCTs’ skills gaps in various areas: economic analysis capabilities, and capacity for SDG implementation and integrated development. Having management structures based on results, which are flexible and oriented to upstream policy advice was also reported as lacking. The call for the UNDS to pay more attention to economic analysis was also echoed by several programme country governments.

As shown in table 26 below, Governments and RCs have similar views in terms of the cost-effectiveness and flexibility of the system, although governments appear to find the system to be slightly more cost-effective and flexible than RCs do. Elaborating on the latter, some RCs noted that the cost of maintaining separate entity representations, insufficient progress on business operations strategies, and entities’ presence being determined more by headquarters considerations than country needs to be among the principal causes for lack of cost-effectiveness and flexibility. All actors agree that presence should be based on a considered assessment of the country's current needs. One Government in the LAC region emphasised that it is “crucial that the UN prioritises consolidating technical and professional teams in the areas of competency of each of its programmes, funds and agencies. It also needs to simplify processes and optimise its administrative areas including re-sizing the administrative staff.”

**Table 26 - Perceptions on UNDS’ flexibility, cost-effectiveness and ability to collaborate**

The UN is:	Flexible		Cost-effective		Operates collaboratively	
	Governments	RCs	Governments	RCs	Governments	RCs
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Strongly agree	19	12	8	9	15	17
Agree	67	59	58	47	71	72
Disagree	12	26	18	38	12	10
Strongly disagree	1	3	2	3	1	1
Don’t Know	2	0	14	3	1	0
	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: 2017 DESA Survey of Programme Country Governments and Resident Coordinators

RCs report that while the UN generally operate collaboratively, there is room for improvement. **Joint programming, thematic funds and joint mobilization strategies were highlighted in this regard**, as well as the need to address the constraint of raising funds individually to sustain their programmes and office presence. . However, these improvements may not be sufficient to meet the demands of the 2030 Agenda.

**Ninety-four RCs commented on potential synergies that could improve the efficiency of human, financial and physical resources.** There were numerous calls for increased joint programming, or making it the ‘default mode’, and for establishing thematic funds with two or more participating entities to encourage dialogue and complementarity, joint resource mobilization strategies and practices, and increased joint work planning. **Many RCs provided proposals on how to improve presence on the ground.** Many suggested reviewing the number of representative offices, minimizing the number and scope of individual back offices, and coordinating decisions on office space to maximise co-location. They also suggested that staff of entities with minimal presence could be integrated into the management structures of larger organizations to ensure efficiency and resource maximization. NRAs, or those with a very small presence could work with the RC before embarking on new activities to explore whether entities that are already present would be able to undertake the planned activities. In maximizing entity-specific technical expertise, it was noted that OHCHR had provided specialists to some RCOs, which was judged to be “successful and cost-efficient”.

Given the integrated nature of the 2030 Agenda, demands on the RC system to leverage and mobilize UN expertise in response to national priorities are expected to increase in the coming years. Almost all RCOs (97%) supported NRAs, while 66% facilitated regional engagement in country programming and external representation<sup>59</sup>.

Part of rationalizing presence includes co-location of UN entities. As well as being a cost-saving measure, co-location can enhance synergies on the programming side. As currently defined by the UNDG,

- A **UN-House** entails the co-location of two or more resident UN entities as well as the office of the RC. The name UN House is conferred upon recommendation of the UNDG, and there can only be one in any given country
- **Common premises** refers specifically to the co-location of two or more resident UN entities. Common Premises can be established at national and sub-national level; and single-entity premises and common premises, are not mutually exclusive.

#### **Box 4 – Challenges to establishment of common premises**

The 2014 UNDG Task Team report, ‘Strategy for Establishing UN Common Premises 2014-2017’ highlights challenges to the establishment of common premises. The absence of a formal UN policy for capital funding of field office premises; as well as lack of sufficient technical capacity to manage real estate projects may pose barriers. Security concerns are another obstacle, where locating all UN agencies in common premises may not be advisable per country-specific Minimum Operation Security Standard requirements. The turnover of members of UNCTs, a change of focus, and lack of commitment may also sway away from the direction to establish common premises.

**A UNDG task team is reviewing system-wide databases to establish global data on premises in order to increase the number of common premises.** Data on UN presence, disaggregated by programme expenditure, is presented in the table below.

<sup>59</sup> UN DOCO

Table 27. Rationalization of UN presence on the ground<sup>60</sup>

	Source	All Countries	Countries with large expenditures	Countries with medium expenditures	Countries with small expenditures
Average # of resident UNCT members	DOCO	12.0	15.6	12.5	7.8
Average # of single-entity premises	DOCO	16.1	34.3	22.3	5.7
Average # of common premises	DOCO	3.0	7.2	4.0	1.0
Average # of UN entities in each common premises	DOCO	4.1	3.7	3.9	5.9
Proportion of premises that are common premises	DOCO	15.9%	17.4%	15.3%	14.4%
Fraction of UNCTs with UN House	TTCP	62/131	6/27	11/45	40/59

*Source: 2017 DESA OMT Survey, UN DOCO, Task Team on Common Premises*

Table 28 illustrates the degree of co-location of UN entities' premises. On average, countries with large expenditures have the highest number of single-entity premises (34.1), likely due to the size of each entity's portfolio and correlated larger number of personnel, which also may likely lead to difficulties finding large premises that meet security policy requirements. Countries with medium-size expenditures show the highest number of entities in each common premise, nearly one and a half more entities than the average. Entities that are present in countries with small expenditures are more likely, at 67%, than entities in large or medium expenditure countries - 22% and 24%, respectively - to be located in a UN House. Over time, a combination of i) fewer single entity office premises, ii) an increase in the number of common premises, and, iii) an increase in the average number of entities being housed within each common premise, would together significantly improve consolidation of office presence.

This data reinforces the proposals in the June report on the repositioning of the UNDS<sup>61</sup> that emphasized the need to establish objective criteria to rationalize physical presence on a country-by-country basis.

At present, the multi-country Office (MCO) modality is particularly used in contexts of programme countries with small populations where the volume of resources is also small (though resources per capita may still be high), which are often SIDS. The MCOs in Fiji and Barbados each work across ten SIDS in their respective region. Table 28 shows the expenditures on UN-OAD in each of the countries that the MCOs cover. The ten countries within the Fiji MCO have, combined, expenditures of US\$70mn, and the ten countries covered by the Barbados MCO, a total of US\$15mn.

<sup>60</sup> Data on premises represent 88% of the UNDSS figures as of November 2017.

**Table 28: Expenditures - Fiji and Barbados MCOs (2016)**  
(in thousand dollars)

Country (Fiji MCO)	Core	Non-core	Total	Country (Barbados MCO)	Core	Non-core	Total
Fiji	12,988	44,586	57,574	Barbados	7,830	3,308	11,138
Kiribati	463	95	558	Antigua and Barbuda	62	214	276
Marshall Islands	163	0	164	Anguilla	0	0	0
Micronesia	441	37	478	British Virgin Islands	0	0	0
Nauru	67	0	67	Dominica	482	66	548
Palau	41	0	41	Grenada	76	1,858	1,934
Solomon Islands	1,612	6,407	8,020	Montserrat	72	0	72
Tonga	626	413	1,039	Saint Lucia	133	186	319
Tuvalu	60	31	92	Saint Kitts and Nevis	118	463	582
Vanuatu	774	1,641	2,416	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	105	381	485
<b>Fiji MCO</b>	<b>17,237</b>	<b>53,210</b>	<b>70,447</b>	<b>Barbados MCO</b>	<b>8,878</b>	<b>6,476</b>	<b>15,354</b>

Source: UNDESA

There are 20 resident entities that are members of the Fiji MCO, meaning that the average expenditure among these entities in 2016 was \$3.5mn. For the 7 resident entities that are members of the Barbados MCO, the average expenditure was \$2.2mn, higher than the average expenditure per entity in all SIDS. In the case of the Fiji MCO, the average entity expenditure was also higher than the \$2.7mn average for small programme countries (see Table 7).

This shows that **MCOs can generate economies of scale** by having one UNCT responsible for several programme countries, which in turn results in programme benefits for those countries. Consideration should be given to conducting reviews of the potential benefits and disadvantages of implementing this approach in other programme countries with small expenditures, not necessarily SIDS, in order to ensure the best possible support is being provided.

On a related note, in the context of micro States as well as countries where resources are scarce, **the benefits of an MCO model lie in its potential to provide an integrated vision, leadership, decision-making power and greater reach and access.** Reach and access, in particular, refer not only to efficiencies, namely savings in terms of human and financial resources, but also access to regional and subregional institutions, networks, mechanisms and instruments, including at the intergovernmental level. In that regard, there are important findings and conclusion of the DESA mission to the Fiji and Samoa MCOs that may warrant reconsideration<sup>62</sup>.

As an organizational model, it is important not to equate “presence” with “physical” presence. There are a number of differentiated presence and programming arrangement models, and not all UN entities necessarily have a comparative advantage in each country setting. In addition, MCOs present the opportunity to effectively implement programmes that are designed to cover several countries<sup>63</sup>. As referenced in the Funding Chapter of present report, in 2016, the ten countries within the Fiji MCO have, combined, a total of core and non-core expenditures of US\$70mn, and the ten countries covered by the Barbados MCO, a combined total of US\$15mn

<sup>62</sup> A/71/63

<sup>63</sup> In 2015, the Fiji and Samoa MCOs, which combined, cover 14 countries and territories, 8 out of 15 agencies stated that over 75% of their initiatives cover more than one country, and 4 agencies said that about 50% of their initiatives are similarly organized. Twelve agencies cover more than 11 countries, but only 4 agencies reported a staff presence in more than 5 countries.

This highlights the need for a common understanding between all development partners that a MCO model does not imply that a reduction of physical representation equals a reduction in the engagement of the UNDS; that it actually has the ability to provide the best support possible through joint multi-country initiatives that capitalize on the advantages of reach and access and joint resources; and that as communicated by both Governments and the UNCTs, to do so requires a change in current donor practices, which often support single-country, single-entity projects. As for all programme countries, especially those with smaller programmes, MCOs must be able to benefit from the full capacities of the UN system at all levels.

On the division of labour among UN entities, RCs and Governments responded in a similar manner. As shown in table 29, the extent to which both Governments and RCs ‘disagree’ on the existence of a clear division of labour among UN entities (27% and 35% respectively) is a strong indication of the challenges that exist in terms of overlap of labour within the UNDS.


**Table 29. Division of labour (versus overlaps) among UN entities**

Question: <i>There is a clear division of labour among the activities of UN entities :</i>		
	PCG survey	RC survey
	%	%
Strongly agree	5	9
Agree	58	54
Disagree	27	34
Strongly disagree	3	3
Don't know	7	n/a

*Source: 2017 DESA Surveys of Programme Country Governments and Resident Coordinators*

Disaggregating the responses by programme expenditure gives rise to additional concerns. Among the 27 countries categorized as having large expenditures, the share of governments that disagreed with the statement was significantly higher; while LDCs and low-income countries also disagreed more than the average country.

**Figure XXXIV. Governments and RCs on the division of labour among UN entities**



*Source: 2017 DESA Survey of Programme Country Governments and Resident Coordinators*

### Box 3. Obstacles noted by Governments on the lack of a clear division of labour between UN entities

- Lack of coordination
- Budget allocation “in silos”
- Individual rather than collective work plans
- Overlapping mandates
- Contradictory instructions to the field from HQ
- Competition for resources
- Some agencies’ presence not needed
- inadequate consultations with the government, and lack of coordination within the government
- Many development challenges are “transversal” in nature

**RCs’ comments broadly echoed those of Governments’.**

## B. The Resident Coordinator function

Through A/RES/71/243 and A/RES/67/226, Member States have called for improvements in the RC system and the Secretary-General has responded to the 2016 QCPR resolution by providing a vision for change. The present report simply presents progress in implementation of the remaining QCPR mandates on the RC system, including those that remain relevant from 2012.

One of the most frequently cited challenges to the RC system, including in 71/243, is a lack of authority, capacity and prerogative on behalf of the RC to effectively lead the UNCT – both in terms of human and financial resources – and deliver on the UNDAF. This view is shared by RCs and Governments alike.

**RCs consistently report that they have limited capacity and prerogative to avoid duplication of efforts in the UNCT**, as shown in table 30. Those RCs who mentioned excellent cooperation in the UNCT generally associated it with personal relations and goodwill than to any institutional requirement. This points to a fundamental gap which needs to be addressed at system-wide institutional level, to include clearly defined roles, responsibility and mutual accountability. The perception of Governments of RCs’ prerogative is more positive, as shown in the same table, noting that governments’ experience would be limited to “external” manifestations of RCs’ prerogative, and thus not being comparable to the RCs’ assessment.

**Table 30. RC capacity and prerogative**

	RC has sufficient capacity	RC has sufficient prerogative	
	RCs	RCs	Governments
Strongly agree	23%	15%	27%
Agree	37%	34%	56%
Disagree	27%	33%	8%
Strongly disagree	12%	16%	0%
Don’t know	1%	2%	9%
Total	100%	100%	100%

*Source: 2017 DESA Survey of Programme Country Governments and Resident Coordinators*



**Most governments would like to see the RC playing a stronger role** as it would reduce the workload and transaction costs on national partners. To do so, RCs need to be able to make final decisions on strategic objectives in the UNDAF, of which 64% of Governments stated was ‘very important’. Furthermore, to improve RC accountability on UN activities in country, more than half of governments (56%) indicated that it was ‘very important’ for the UN to ‘consolidate its country presence’.

### The Management and Accountability System

In 2008, the UNDG developed a tool aimed precisely at addressing the concerns of UNCT members on impartiality while also bolstering RC authority, namely the ‘Management and Accountability System’ (MAS). The MAS includes the concept of a ‘functional firewall’ to address impartiality, and is based on four key elements, shown in table 31.

**After close to a decade, implementation of the MAS remains partial and with many gaps.** All relevant entities (those that have country offices) have implemented the first element of the MAS: revising job descriptions. The extent of implementation among the other elements is more variable. Several entities with substantial field presence mentioned that having an input from the RC to their country representative’s performance appraisal is not systemic, while others indicated that agreements exist on the obligation to report to RCs on programme implementation (58%) and on resource mobilization (46%)..

It is worth highlighting that while the 2015 and the 2017 DESA surveys asked RCs about implementation of the MAS, no significant change can be detected during this period, as shown in Table 31. The implementation of three elements of the MAS has not changed significantly between 2015 and 2017, as picked up by the DESA surveys (Table 31)

**Table 31. Implementation of the MAS at country level, 2017**

	1. The job descriptions of UNCT members, as heads of agencies, recognize the role of the RC		2. The performance appraisals of UNCT members, as agency heads, include UNCT results (2015 data <sup>64</sup> )		3. The RC has contributed to the performance appraisal of UNCT members in the past 12 months	
	# of RCs	%	# of RCs	%	# of RCs	%
All agencies	17	18	14	12	17	16
Most agencies	20	21	35	30	18	16
Some agencies	46	48	56	49	58	54
None	12	13	10	9	15	14
Total	95	100	115	100	108	100

*Source: 2017 DESA Survey of Resident Coordinators*

<sup>64</sup> This question, relating to Indicator 52(iii), was not included in the RC survey in 2017

**Table 32. Extent of participation of UN agencies in the MAS at country level, 2017**

	1. The job descriptions of UNCT members, as heads of agencies, recognize the role of the RC		2. An input from the RC is required for the performance appraisal of UNCT members as heads of agencies		3. Agencies recognize an obligation to report to the RC on programme implementation		4. Agencies recognize an obligation to report to the RC on resource mobilization activities	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Yes	17	63	12 <sup>65</sup>	48	15	58	12	46
No	10	37	13	52	11	42	14	54
Total	27	100	25	100	26	100	26	100

Source: 2017 DESA HQ Survey

**One set of measures that was put in place to bolster the firewall was for the RC/RR to delegate, as much as possible, the responsibility for UNDP operational activities<sup>66</sup> and resource mobilisation<sup>67</sup> to the second most senior UNDP staff member in the country.**

Table 33 shows, that the share of RCs who have delegated authority for resource mobilization is currently 81%, up from 79% in 2015, and 59% in 2014. Moreover, 88% of RCs indicate that they **have delegated responsibility specifically for operational activities**. This demonstrates that, in nearly all countries where there is suitably senior UNDP staff, authority has now been delegated from the RC.

**Table 33. Delegation of authority, 2014-2017**

	The RC has formally delegated authority for <i>resource mobilization</i> to the second - ranking UNDP official						The RC has formally delegated authority for <i>operational activities</i> to the second -ranking UNDP official	
	2014		2015		2017		2017	
	#	%	#	#	%	%	#	%
Yes	44	59	91	79	88	81	97	88
No	31	41	24	21	21	19	11	12
Total number of responses	75	100	115	100	109	100	108	100

Source: 2017 DESA Survey of Resident Coordinators

**However, feedback from UN entities indicates that, despite various measures to address challenges in the implementation of the functional firewall**, the fact that all RCs are also UNDP RRs, and thus accountable for UNDP business, is seen as a critical conflict of interest, and a major obstacle to giving RCs actual authority over the UNCTs, programming and other country-level decisions.

<sup>65</sup> Of these 12 agencies, six reported that this applies in all programme countries, while the remainder reported that it applies in 'most' or 'some' countries.

<sup>66</sup> A/RES/71/243 57(c)

<sup>67</sup> A/RES/67/226 122(h)

**In further examining capacity and authority, 79% of RCs indicate that UNCTs regularly report on programme implementation, while only 28% of RCs receive regular information from UNCT members on resource mobilization. This finding underscores governments' concern about lack of transparency on funding matters.** Moreover, RCs raised concerns on receiving information that is not fully accurate, or in an untimely fashion, including reporting after resources have been obtained.

**Table 34. UNCT reporting to RCs**

The UN country team members report regularly to the RC on :	Resource mobilization		Programme implementation of UNDAF elements led by the agency	
	#	%	#	%
Strongly agree	5	4	12	11
Agree	26	24	74	68
Disagree	62	57	18	16
Strongly disagree	16	15	5	5
Total	109	100	109	100

*Source: 2017 DESA Survey of Resident Coordinators*

When asked what measures could improve UN relevance to the needs of the country, Governments repeatedly returned to the topic of coherence, calling for the UN to strengthen its own coordination, and to grant more authority to the RC.

**Finally, the financial support for the RC system to function effectively and deliver the expected results cannot be underestimated. The UNDG Cost-Sharing Agreement for the RC system continues to have a persistent funding gap.** In 2016, the UNDG Cost-Sharing Agreement for the RC system entered its third year running of funding difficulties. As in 2014 and 2015, this funding shortage was mitigated in 2016 by the deployment of the strategic reserves of the donor-funded UN Country Coordination Fund.

### **C. Integrated support to maximize results**

In the 2016 QCPR, Member States called for the strengthening of the UNDAF's use as a strategic instrument, while also simplifying the UNDAF processes to reduce fragmentation, overlaps and the transaction costs. They also requested that UNCTs use where appropriate, the standard operating procedures (SOPs) and business operations strategies (BOS). As the evidence presented below suggests, there is a mixed picture in terms of the use of these instruments in countries.

#### **Joint Planning**

**Introduced in 1997 to improve coherence, UNDAFs have become nearly universal, while number of countries performing CCAs required as preliminary analysis for UNDAF development is growing.** Among the 110 RCs who responded to the survey, only five stated that the country did not have an UNDAF, and these five were either in high-income countries or facing major humanitarian challenges. Furthermore, 70% of UNCTs reported that they had undertaken a CCA for the current UNDAF. This figure contrasts with the 58% in 2014, and 61%


in 2015. This is an important trend as the CCA aims to assist the UNCT with identifying and targeting those furthest behind.

As part of the overall vision for a new generation of UNCTs, a strategic UNDAF that is better linked to country priorities and that is centered around shared, strategic objectives, is a central element. The surveys provided the opportunity for **RCs to comment on how to improve UNDAF and entity country programming processes**. Among many responses, was the recommendation that UNCT members should consult with each other at the earliest stage of developing their individual country programmes and plans, to identify potential synergies and joint programming opportunities, and avoid duplication of efforts. Several RCs called for eliminating Country Programme Documents (CPDs), and using the UNDAF and Annual Joint Work Plans (JWPs) in their place, while others recommended that Governments approve JWPs, instead of individual agency CPDs. **The current time taken to finalize an UNDAF is 14 months on average, a lead time that could be reduced with changes to the processes.**

Governments also expressed that UN system programming processes could be simplified and harmonized, including as a means to reducing the workload on governments. Particularly strong support was indicated for single formats for programme work plans and progress reports, as well as for joint monitoring and evaluation and coordinated approaches to capacity building. For example, 64% of governments consider that it is ‘very important’ for the UN system to use a single format for annual work plans. A further 32% noted that such a measure was ‘moderately important’, as may be seen in figure XXXIV.

**Figure XXXVI. Measures towards reducing the workload on national partners**

*Question: To reduce the workload on national partners, how important is it for the UN development system to take the following measures?*



Source: DESA 2017 Survey of Programme Country Governments

"DELIVERING AS ONE" PILLAR		Core Elements
Overarching		Joint oversight and ownership agreed between Government and the UN and outlined in agreed terms of reference for a Joint National/ UN Steering Committee ( <u>Generic terms of reference</u> ); Annual reporting on joint UN results in the UN Country Results Report;
One Programme		Signed UNDAF at the outcome level with legal text <sup>68</sup> as appropriate; Joint Work Plans (of Results Groups), aligned with the UNDAF and signed by Involved UN entities (this does not preclude agency specific work plans where required) ( <u>Tips and template for JWP</u> s); Results Groups (chaired by Heads of Agencies) focused on strategic policy and programme content established and aligned with national coordination mechanisms ( <u>Generic Terms of Reference</u> );
Common Budgetary Framework (and One Fund)		A medium-term Common Budgetary Framework aligned to the UNDAF/One Programme as a results-oriented resourcing framework for UN resources ( <u>Guide to the Common Budgetary Framework</u> ); Annual Common Budgetary Frameworks (as a part of the Joint Work Plans) updated annually with transparent data on financial resources required, available, expected, and to be mobilized (Tools and materials); A <u>Joint Resource Mobilization strategy</u> as appropriate to the country context (with the option of a <u>One Fund</u> duly considered) approved by the UNCT and monitored and reported against in the UN Country Results Report;
One Leader		Strong commitment and Incentives of the UNCT to work towards common results and accountability through full implementation of the M&A system and the <u>UNCT Conduct and Working Arrangements</u> ; Empowered UNCT to make joint decisions relating to programming activities and financial matters;
Operating as One		<u>Business Operations Strategy</u> <sup>69</sup> endorsed by UNCT is highly recommended, adapted to local needs and capacities, to enhance operational oneness processes through eliminating duplication of common processes to leverage efficiencies and maximize economies of scale; Empowered Operations Management Team (chaired by a Head of Agency); Operations costs and budgets integrated in the overall medium-term Common Budgetary Framework;
Communicating as One		A joint communication strategy appropriate to the country context approved by the UNCT and monitored and reported against in the UN Country Results Report ( <u>Guide to Communicating as One</u> ); Country Communications Group (chaired by a Head of Agency) and supported by regional and HQ levels, as necessary.

Source: UNDG

**UNDAF guidelines have been revised throughout the years,**<sup>68</sup> including a major review in 2006, which proposed, inter alia, a further voluntary strengthening of coordination arrangements at the field level, known as 'Delivering as One'. In 2014, the SOPs were introduced, as mandatory for DaO countries and voluntary for other countries. In early 2017, the CCA and UNDAF guidelines were revised to ensure that planning processes are well aligned with Agenda 2030, and reflect the progress made through the SOPs.


**The SOPs are baseline requirements to enable UNCTs to work better together** (see adjacent figure). **As a set of good practices distilled from hands-on experience,** they aim to align the system-wide UN contribution in country with national development priorities, while also making the UNDS more transparent, common results oriented, and accountable. Recognizing their value to all programme countries, in the 2016 QCPR Member States encouraged the progressive implementation of the SOPs and of the business operating strategies (BOS).

**One of the elements of the SOPs, the Common Budgetary Framework (CBF), was specifically requested in the 2012 QCPR.** The tables below depict the extent to which the SOPs had been adopted in 2015 and 2017.

Some SOPs are well implemented, namely a signed UNDAF at the outcome level; joint decision-making; country communications group; joint communications strategy; full implementation of M&A system; results group established; OMT chaired by Heads of Agency. However, there has been limited progress where budgeting and harmonization is involved with the following SOPs: joint resource mobilization strategy; having the operations costs included in the CBF; BOS implementation; and having an annual CBF needing much improvement.

<sup>68</sup> [http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/pdf/undaf\\_report.pdf](http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/pdf/undaf_report.pdf)

Figure XXXVII. Implementation of SOPs



Source: UNDG IMS

RCs were asked about the information and support received from HQ, specifically in regard to the SOPs, and in particular the BOS. **Most RCs judged SOPs and BOS support to have been either adequate or very adequate**— with only around 10% noting it as inadequate. More concerns were expressed about support in regard to BOS than to the SOPs in general. A few RCs mentioned a lack of commitment on the part of some entities as a reason for limited progress.

### Delivering as One


The 2016 QCPR requests the UNDS to enhance its cooperation for development to maximize the “Delivering as one” (DaO) approach in the countries that choose it, including through lessons learned and by integrating programmatic and operational functions in order to enhance coherence, effectiveness, efficiency and the impact of country-level efforts.

**37% of programme countries have now formally adopted the DaO approach, compared with 26% in 2014.** Of survey respondents, 37% are implementing DaO, 12% have requested DaO and a further 21% have expressed interest in it. Only 8% indicated that they were not

interested. Considering that the DaO approach has been available to all countries since the 2012 QCPR, it seems surprising that a significant share of countries (23%) stated that they were “not familiar with the elements of DaO”.

**Figure XXXVIII. DaO Status**

Question: *Is your country interested in Delivering as One (DaO)?*




Source: *DESA 2017 Survey of Programme Country Governments*

**In governments’ views, constraints to the implementation of DaO include lack of commitment from UN entities, lack of alignment with national evaluation systems, and misaligned accountability.** Several indicated a perceived lack of commitment to DaO on the part of some UN entities, while others referred to entities not adapting the procedures, and to UNCT members’ “vertical accountability” to their regional heads. The fact that UNDAF reporting was not being aligned with national M&E systems was also mentioned. When asked how the UN could make itself “more effective”, several countries urged that DaO be more fully implemented. One government captured a common theme with a call to “deepen the UN reforms, so as to create unified UNCTs, with the capacity to address cross-cutting themes coherently.” The breakdown of these responses by country income groups reveals that interest in DaO is particularly strong in countries with lower income levels.

Another significant feature of the responses to this question is the very much larger proportion of low-income countries that are implementing DaO, 66%, compared with 37% for all countries that answered the survey. The figure below shows how many countries are interested in DaO, comparing responses by country income level:

**Figure XXXIX. Interest in becoming a DaO country, by income group**

Question: *Is your country interested in Delivering as One (DaO)?*



Source: *DESA 2017 Survey of Programme Country Governments*



Programme countries were asked how satisfied they were with the UN system’s support for DaO, both in terms of providing information about it, and in supporting progress for its implementation. **The UN system is yet to fully meet the demands from programme countries on two levels: to facilitate the introduction of DaO where countries have expressed interest, and to expand DaO in countries that have already adopted it. Unsatisfied countries pointed to lack of commitment by UN entities as a reason for insufficient progress.**

**Table 35. UN system support for DaO**

Extent of satisfaction with the UN system’s support for DaO, with reference to:	The information provided by the RC and other UN officials	The progress to date in fully implementing DaO
Very satisfied	4%	12%
Satisfied	30%	60%
Dissatisfied	13%	23%
Very dissatisfied	0%	0%
Don’t know	53% <sup>69</sup>	6%

### **Delegation of Authority to Country-level representatives**

Progress on delegating authority to country level representatives has been limited. Among the 11 entities with presence in at least 50 countries, six have delegated authority to all country representatives to commit funding as part of a joint programme, two have on a country-by-country basis, and the remaining three up to a pre-defined amount. There has been limited progress on delegated authority for the use of joint work plans and joint reports. With the exception of UNFPA and UNAIDS, only 4 out of these 11 entities delegated authority to use joint workplans and 2 to use joint reports.

**While variation exists between agencies, most RCs perceive head of agencies in the UNCT to have enough delegated authority.** When asked whether UN system field representatives in general enjoy sufficient delegated authority to respond effectively and efficiently to national needs and priorities, 72% of RCs ‘agreed’ and 15% ‘strongly agreed’. There is great variation among entities, with funds and programmes tending to be decentralized, while specialized agencies tend to remain centralized at headquarters or regional level. It is important to bring about more consistency, since activities are implemented more efficiently where authority is sufficiently delegated.

Since 2014, the CEB, through UNDG and the HLCM, has been addressing headquarter bottlenecks. In 2016, the CEB reported that 30 out of 49 planned actions had been completed by the end of 2015. **New actions towards addressing bottlenecks are taking place, which are expected to result in the adoption of the HQ Plan of Action 3.0.**

<sup>69</sup> Most of these responses were from countries that reported they were not familiar with the elements of DaO.

### Box 8. - Draft HQ Plan of Action 3.0

Based on the 2016 QCPR, and designed as a continued set of HQ reforms, the third generation of draft HQ measures consists of 36 actions, 18 of which are new. The measures are structured around the following areas (# of measures):

- a. One programme (4)
- b. One Leader (7)
- c. Operating as One (8)
- d. Communicating as One (1)
- e. Joint Funding and Financing (2)
- f. Coherence across the UN Charter (2)
- g. Additional measures for future implementation (11)

## D. Harmonization and simplification of business practices

The 2016 QCPR has reiterated the calls of the 2012 resolution for simplification and harmonization of business practices.

The UNDG and HLCM have aligned their workplans to jointly manage the harmonization agenda for UN business practices, as requested in the 2012 QCPR. Approximately **half of 29 responding UN entities have submitted plans to their respective governing bodies for intra-agency rationalization of business operation**. This is a positive development, with 20% jump from the last iteration of the HQs survey in 2015.

**The HLCM has identified a service provider model and a pricing model for the Global Service on Reference Checks and Job Classification**, while other service provider models are presently under review. Key performance indicators for customer service and service delivery are expected to be ready in 2018.

As for the UNDG BOS, more UNCTs have begun implementing this medium-term planning tool for common operations. The UNDG IMS reports **26 fully BOS frameworks are in place, while an additional 34 countries are presently in various stages of developing a BOS**. Last year, the UNDG noted 16 completed BOS frameworks and 19 countries in the processing of developing a BOS. UNCTs with a signed BOS currently account for 19% of country-level expenditures.

The common service lines most frequently included in the BOS are: ICT service solutions (25/26) and common procurement initiatives (24/26).. The 4 remaining service lines are less frequently used under the BOS: common admin & logistics services (19/26) common finance solutions and common HR services, each with 18/26 of the BOS frameworks; and common facility services, including common premises, with only 14/26<sup>70</sup>. It should be noted that it is always a challenge for OMTs to quantify cost efficiencies in non-data driven service lines at the beginning of BOS implementation. However, said efficiencies may become evident at the end of the BOS cycle.

<sup>70</sup> See indicator 76d of the Monitoring and Reporting framework

Some RCs indicated that the BOS should be promoted to a much greater extent or even made mandatory, to achieve increased economies of scale in transport, travel, procurement, ICT, conference management, and human resources management. RCs further elaborated that it is challenging to economize human and financial resources given the lack of incentives to pursue such opportunities.

The 2017 OMT survey sought to identify any bottlenecks preventing the implementation of high-quality and efficient operational support services. **Results revealed a trend persisting over the last four iterations of the survey: many OMTs still lack the resources and capacity to effectively conduct operational analyses.** In terms of the main challenges in establishing a BOS, 65% of the responding OMTs answered ‘Conducting the cost-benefit analyses,’ while 42% chose ‘Conducting the baseline and needs analyses’, and 35% reported ‘Lack of financial resources’.

**Table 36: Main challenges when establishing a BOS<sup>71</sup>**

Answer Choices	%
Conducting cost benefit analyses	65
Conducting baseline and needs analyses	42
Lack of financial resources	35
Developing a results framework	35
Lack of agency commitment	31
Lack of support and guidance from agency headquarters	31
Lack of OMT capacity	31
Lack of OMT member commitment	31
Developing a monitoring and evaluation framework	31
Other	27
Lack of delegated authority to OMT members	15
Developing OMT work plans	12
Lack of UNCT support and guidance	-
Lack of RC support and guidance	-

*Source: 2017 DESA Survey of OMTs*

Furthermore, the survey results confirm that **80% of OMTs still see the different policies & procedures, and 75% of the UNCTs view different rules & regulations as the largest barrier to harmonizing business practices at the country level. This, however, may be a perceived barrier.** HLCM has already carried out a system-wide harmonization of policies and procedures in various areas of business operations, and when the OMTs were asked for specific examples of how different rules & regulations and policies & procedures impede joint business operations, only one OMT could do so. In short, there seems to be a disconnect between the harmonization efforts done at corporate level on the one hand, and what staff perceive they can practically implement at field level on the other hand. The UNDG and HLCM are presently working on improving the communication to the field.

DESA surveys of Operations Management Teams between 2013 and 2017 actually show an increase in business operations managed through agency-owned departments – thus, in effect, reversing recent progress. The surveys also indicates that business operations managed by a

lead-agency are now shifting towards a more fragmented approach in all the areas below except for procurement. This trend could be explained by the possibility that some UN entities are consolidating their individual operations services, ahead of consolidation of operations across the UNDS. The continued perception at field level that rules & regulations, policies & procedures are not harmonized *may* also be a contributing factor.

**Table 37: Management of business operation functions**

**Question: How does the UNCT manage the following functional areas of business operations?**

Function	Management through agency-owned departments			Management through a lead-agency			Management through a common UN service centre		
	2017	2015	2013	2017	2015	2013	2017	2015	2013
Finance	92%	91%	88%	27%	25%	34%	7%	8%	6%
Human Resources	95%	87%	92%	24%	30%	28%	5%	8%	3%
Procurement	87%	83%	87%	45%	35%	41%	12%	12%	9%
ICT	84%	83%	84%	33%	30%	42%	16%	16%	8%
Admin & Logistics	92%	82%	88%	20%	29%	36%	9	18%	12%
Facility Services	92%	N/A*	N/A*	24%	N/A*	N/A*	19%	N/A*	N/A*

\* This business operations area was added in 2017


Source: 2017 DESA Survey of OMTs

With the growing number of BOS frameworks, the UNDS has made some progress with the consolidation of support services and achieving efficiencies at the country level. However, this headway will not progress further if the communication gap between the harmonization efforts at corporate level and practical implementation of joint operations at the field is not addressed.

Another constraint to collaboration is the differing levels of authority in the UNCT/OMT: 36% of the OMTs found that the levels of authorization vary moderately to greatly among HoAs, and 66% of the OMTs stated that these varying authorization levels are having a moderate to serious constraints on joint operations.”

**Figure XL. Varying delegation of authority among HoAs**

Question: To what extent does the level of delegated authority enjoyed by agency heads vary from one agency to another?



Source: DESA 2017 Survey of Operations Management Teams

**Even though long-term agreements (LTAs) are an important driver in achieving cost savings and efficiency gains in operational support services, most LTAs are not established jointly.** 62% of the OMT survey respondents noted that existing LTAs were set up to fulfil the requirements of one specific Agency. As a result, 24% of the respondents found that these contracts do not meet the needs of their own organization, and therefore cannot participate in existing LTAs. 38% of the survey participants stated that UN entities cannot piggy-back on existing agreements due to differences in policies and procedures. The CEB reported that, in reality, the HLCM Procurement Network has removed any obstacles preventing entities from piggy-backing off existing LTAs, regardless whether these are agency-specific or jointly established. It may therefore be another example of how harmonization of policies is not efficiently communicated to the field. The rising number of BOS frameworks has the potential of reversing the trend of agency-specific LTAs, as BOS implementation creates an environment where these are jointly set up.

**Table 38: Factors preventing agencies from utilizing existing LTAs 2013-2017**

Answer Choices	2017	2015	2014	2013
UN entities continue to establish agency -specific LTAs	62%	69%	54%	73%
UN entities do not permit other entities to utilize their LTAs	2%	19%	8%	15%
LTAs are not in line with the policies or procedures of all agencies	38%	50%	46%	39%
UN entities do not agree to the service provisions in existing LTAs	24%	60%	8%	18%
External service providers refuse to include other entities into an existing LTA	6%	13%	8%	9%
Other	31%	N/A*	N/A*	N/A*

*Source: 2017 DESA Survey of OMTs*

\* This answer option was added in 2017

The perception that policies, procedures, rules and regulations are not harmonized, is also taking its toll on the overall implementation of common services. Recent uptake has been incremental, and there is a need for substantial progress if the UNDS wants to meet the provisions A/RES/67/226 and A/RES/71/243. The UNDG should continue to develop a wide range of operational service solutions that can be adapted to the local context and readily be implemented. In the 2015–2016 biennium, a start was made with standardized common services packages. However, this has been put on hold due to priorities shifting from practical BOS implementation towards other initiatives such as ‘mutual recognition’.

**The UNDS has taken an important step towards further consolidation of operational services in specific locations** with the integrated service centers in Brasilia, Copenhagen, Hanoi and Praia. The JIU<sup>72</sup> recently undertook a study of the role of these centers in the redesign of administrative service delivery. The JIU found that despite ad-hoc cooperation among service centers, there is “virtually no systematic inter-agency effort to plan, develop or operate facilities for common benefit or for organizations to draw on the infrastructure and capacities developed by others.” This issue has been incorporated into HLCM’s next strategic plan as a matter of priority, and inter agency collaboration between Global Service Centers has since increased, indicating that some Centers are reaching a level of maturity and stability in internal service provision that may lead to opening their availability to other organizations of the UN system..”

<sup>72</sup> [https://www.unjiu.org/en/reports-notes/JIU%20Products/JIU\\_REP\\_2016\\_11\\_English.pdf](https://www.unjiu.org/en/reports-notes/JIU%20Products/JIU_REP_2016_11_English.pdf)

Meanwhile, **the UNDG Business Innovation Group has been working for a strategy towards a common back office.** This long-term vision incorporates one global back office where the existing Shared Service Centers provide non-location dependent operational services, (also called ‘vertical integration’), and whereby country-based common back offices support location-dependent functions and processes (so-called ‘horizontal integration’). This would require that **in addition to mutual recognition of each other’s processes, there must be agreement on common operating principles.**

Furthermore, **the simplification and harmonization of business practices through the UNDG BOS should continue, as there are many benefits to be gained:** 73% of the responding OMTs reported enhanced management control of the common operations agenda, 62% higher quality services, and 58% more consistent approach to common operations.

**Table 39: Non-monetary benefits of the BOS**

Answer Choices	2017	2015
Enhanced management control of common operations	73%	45%
Higher quality services	62%	N/A*
More consistent approach to common operations	58%	58%
Enhanced ability to monitor and track impact of common operations	54%	48%
Enhanced strategic planning	54%	34%
Better prioritization of human and financial resource expenditures for common operations	38%	59%
Better linkages between programme and operations	27%	48%

*Source: 2017 DESA Survey of OMTs*

\*As per the request of UNDG DOCO, this answer option was added in 2017

**It is critical that, in response to the QCPR and repeated calls from Member States, the UNDS commits to a systemic approach to establish common support services at the country level.** The 2017 HQ Survey shows that a mere 50% of the UN entities have submitted a plan to their respective governing body for the consolidation of common support services at the country level, and/or have made concrete plans for intra-agency rationalization of business operations.

Furthermore, it seems that the **UN entities find it challenging to report on the cost efficiencies of business operations.** Only 43% of the responding UN entities reported on the efficiencies achieved through collaborative procurement. The remaining 57% report they are currently leveraging another entity’s LTAs, or have completely outsourced their procurement function to another UN organization.

Finally, many of the UN entities noted that the absence of an agreed methodology on how to quantify cost savings through collaborative procurement (and other operations areas) is preventing adequate reporting on the cost efficiencies of common business practices.

## E. The regional dimension

Member states have consistently emphasized the importance of the regional dimension in the work of the UNDS, and consequently, of coherent and coordinated approaches between different regional actors as a bridge to inform global policies, decisions and other work of the organization, and conversely help translate these into regionally meaningful guidance.

The present report is limited to covering progress on the effectiveness of work at the regional level in terms of the support to and interface with work at country level. In particular, it focuses on the RECs and the two regional mechanisms for coordination. The Secretary-General’s report on repositioning the UNDS [symbol] includes proposals for a revamped regional approach to better support countries in their efforts to realize the 2030 Agenda.

In comparing the UN system with other sources of external assistance for regional or sub-regional support (see table 34), Governments were more likely to select ‘multilateral and regional institutions not part of the UN’ over the UN development system. This is the only area of support in which the UN system was not chosen as the preferred source, and the second survey year in a row where the UN is not in the top ranking in this category. Moreover, support needs to go beyond traditional reporting, as 57% of Governments stated having “received reports or studies” that support them in their mission to implement the 2030 Agenda.

**With regards to RECs support to Governments on regional issues, there is scope for improvement. Roughly half the Governments report that the RECs contribute to the countries’ most pressing regional issues.** Table 40 shows that 7% of Governments considered this support to be ‘very effective’, and 50% to be ‘effective’. However, one third of governments answered ‘don’t know’, and a further 10% reported not receiving any support. Responses from Governments appear more positive than those of RCs, possibly due to direct interactions between the RECs and national governments, of which the RC and the UNCT may not be informed.

**Table 40. Effectiveness of Regional Commissions’ contribution on highest priority regional/sub-regional issues**

Effectiveness of the Regional Commissions’ contribution on the highest priority regional or sub-regional issues of relevance to the country:	%
Very effective	7
Effective	50
Ineffective	2
No support received	10
Don’t know	32
Total	100

*Source: 2017 DESA Survey of Programme Country Governments*



**Table 41. Effectiveness of Regional Commissions’ contribution on highest priority regional/sub-regional issues, by region**

Effectiveness of the Regional Commissions’ contribution on the highest priority regional or sub-regional issues of relevance to the country: %					
UNDG Regional Groupings	Very Effective	Effective	Ineffective	Received No support	Don’t know
Africa - Eastern and Southern	15	45	5	10	25
Africa - Western and Central	5	47	5	11	32
Arab States	0	33	0	27	40
Asia and the Pacific	0	78	0	0	22
Europe and Central Asia	11	33	0	11	44
Latin America and the Caribbean	12	44	0	8	36

Source:

2017 DESA Survey of Programme Country Governments

RCs’ response on the effectiveness of RECs on regional and sub-regional issues of relevance to the country is generally on the less positive side, with 37% of RCs disagreeing or strongly disagreeing and 17% responding ‘don’t know’.

**Table 42. Contribution of RECs to regional/sub-regional issues**

RECs made effective contribution on the regional or sub-regional issues of greatest relevance to the country:	%
Strongly agree	5
Agree	41
Disagree	25
Strongly disagree	12
Don’t know	17
Total	100


Source:

2017 DESA Survey of Resident Coordinators

Additionally, support from RECs to country-level work of the UNDS in four specific areas indicate a perception of limited benefits by the majority of RCs, as detailed below. These areas are: a) normative and policy support; b) technical expertise; c) platforms for policy discussion and exchange of experience; and d) regional SDGs follow-up and review activities.

**Figure XLI. Support from regional commissions to UNCT work**

Question: In the last year, to what extent has the UNCT benefitted from the following kinds of work of the relevant Regional Commission:



Source: DESA 2017 Survey of Resident Coordinators

**A clearer interface is needed between UNCTs and the RECs.** RCs indicated having relatively little interaction with RECs, which frequently interface directly with the government. At present, 43 RCs (39%) report that a REC participates in UNCT activities, of which half as resident agencies, and the other half as non-resident agencies.

There are two regional mechanisms for coordination: the Regional Coordination Mechanisms (RCMs), and the regional UNDGs (R-UNDGs).

#### Box 5. Regional Mechanisms for Coordination

ECOSOC(E/1998/46), mandated the RECs to hold regular inter-agency meetings in each region, to be chaired by the DSG, to improve UN system coordination. These meetings have been convened by the RECs since 1999, focusing on policy and programming issues of regional nature and guided by regional priorities. In 2006, the High-level Panel on System-wide Coherence called for the UN regional setting to be reorganized around two inter-related sets of functions:

- one focusing on the **analytical and normative work** as well as **activities of a transboundary nature**, for which the RECs would act as a catalyst using, inter alia, their convening power at both the intergovernmental and secretariat levels. This is the **RCM—one for each of the five UN regions**.
- the other, focusing on **coordinating services of the UNCTs**, for which UNDP, as Manager of the RC system, is the catalyst. This is the **R-UNDG, of which there are six, two for Africa and one for each other region**.

R-UNDGs receive more favourable responses than RCMs in terms of support provided to RCs on regional or sub-regional issues. This may be due to the significantly more operational nature of R-UNDGs. Notwithstanding, the 2017 survey found that favourability has dropped for both the RCMs and the R-UNDGs since 2015.

**Table 43. Contribution of Regional Coordination Mechanisms and Regional UNDGs to regional/sub-regional issues**

Made effective contribution on the regional or sub-regional issues of greatest relevance to the country:	Regional Coordination Mechanism (RCM)		Regional UNDG (R-UNDG)	
	2015 (%)	2017 (%)	2015 (%)	2017 (%)
Strongly agree	19	8	16	8
Agree <sup>73</sup>	54	41	63	68
Disagree	18	26	17	16
Strongly disagree	4	6	2	4
Don't know	5	19	2	4
	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: 2017 DESA Survey of Resident Coordinators

In the 2016 QCPR, Member States called for the full implementation of a Statement of Collaboration between the UNDG and the RECs. While entities indicate that the statement is being progressively implemented, a number of commitments of the Statement of Collaboration remain unfulfilled and the nature of the actions identified as progress do not allow for a quantifiable report on progress.

<sup>73</sup> 2015 survey answer choice was 'somewhat agree', and likewise 'disagree' was 'somewhat disagree'

Indicator 70c follows progress on cooperation between the R-UNDG and the RCM through a proxy that assesses the number of joint RCM/R-UNDG regional common positions papers advocating on key regional development issues. Feedback from the R-UNDG indicates that some regions have put more effort into system-wide collaboration than others. The R-UNDG and RCM of ECIS reported three joint papers on issues related to sustainable development in both 2016 and in 2017; those of the Arab States reported one joint paper.

## V. Enhancing effectiveness of the UN development system

### A. Managing for results

Member States have called on UNDS entities to improve reporting on results achieved, including in terms of joint programming. The system-wide strategic document mandated by the QCPR is expected to serve this purpose, in areas for collective support by the system for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda. Solid results-based management and reporting, supported by evaluations with a management response also serve to increase objectivity in the decision making process. To the extent that lessons are internalized, policy orientations are more likely to be based on development effectiveness. This cycle can be further reinforced by using country programming processes with clear accountability lines, and feedback mechanisms that inform future programming.

#### Harmonizing and streamlining country programming and reporting

A meaningful step towards a programming standard would include harmonizing and streamlining the UNDAF and individual entities' country programming documents.

As seen in Figure XLII above, 53% of governments judged that it was 'very important' for the UN system to simplify the UNDAF and agency country programming or planning processes, as a way to reduce the workload on national partners, and a further 34% stated that such a measure was 'moderately important'. Similarly, 57% of respondents stated it was 'very important' for the UN entities to 'rationalise agency-specific country programming and planning processes' and 33% said 'moderately important'. In this context, it is important to ensure that the instruments in each process incorporate the same planned outcomes, and lighten the burden on all partners.

**The HQ survey asked whether it is a requirement that the entity's country programme documents demonstrate complete results chains down from the UNDAF. Encouragingly, 14 entities responded in the affirmative,** including nearly all that use country programmes or engage in substantial country level programming. Entities are, however, inconsistent in the matter of 'copying' outcomes verbatim from the UNDAF to their CPDs. Although deemed a best practice—and a requirement by some agencies—there still seems to be a lack of guidance regarding the exercise. Yet, in UNDP's case, not only are UNDAF outcomes copied verbatim into CPDs, but also the CPD outcome indicators are precisely the UNDAF indicators that UNDP is accountable for monitoring.


**Progress is slow around reporting on UNCTs' results.** It has been a requirement for all UNCTs to provide an annual report on results achieved since August 2014<sup>74</sup>, mandated by A/RES/71/243 (OP50f) and included in the UNDG SOPs as a core element for implementation. Nonetheless, in the last year, only 56% of RCs reported having provided a report to the

<sup>74</sup> UN DOCO SOPs

government. The information is corroborated by the governments: 60% indicated that they had received a report from the UNCT in the last year.

**Figure XLII. Reporting to governments on UNCT results**

Question: Did your Government receive a report from the UN Resident Coordinator on the results achieved by the UN system in your country in the last annual cycle?




Source: DESA 2017 Survey of Programme Country Governments and DESA 2017 Survey of Resident Coordinators

**Concerns exist also around the content and the coverage of the reports provided by the UNCTs.** 62% of Governments stated receiving reports frequently enough, while 60% noted that UN system-wide results were included. Less favourable responses were given on whether sufficient financial data was included, where only 48% agreed. However, a higher percentage (74%) of responses indicated that the UN’s report was structured around UNDAF outcomes, while 63% found that reports were linked to national development results. While there is scope to improve in all of these aspects, special attention needs to be given to providing more financial information; to ensuring more complete coverage of the whole UN system; and to establishing firmer linkages to national development results.

**Figure XLIII. Content, timeliness, and coverage of UNCT reports**

Question: To what extent do you agree with the following statements:



Source: DESA 2017 Survey of Programme Country Governments


## Results-based management

In the QCPR, Member States underscored the importance of RBM, and requested the UNDS to develop common methodologies for planning and reporting on results, improving integrated results and resources frameworks and enhancing a results culture.

**Governments were asked whether they had a national RBM system, to which 62% responded in the affirmative.** The survey also asked about the extent to which the UNCT had analyzed with the Governments how results achieved by the UN in the country are defined, measured and reported on, with a view to ensuring compatibility between the national and UN RBM systems. Among the 65 countries with an RBM system, 76% agreed (to a moderate or large extent) that the UN is working with them on promoting compatibility of RBM systems, as shown below.

**Figure XLIV. Promoting compatibility of RBM systems**


*Question: To what extent has the UN country team studied with your Government how results achieved by UN development assistance in your country are defined, measured and reported on, with a view to ensuring compatibility between the national and UN Results-Based Management systems?*




*Source: DESA 2017 Survey of Programme Country Governments*

**Governments and RCs were also both asked about receiving and requesting UN support in strengthening national RBM systems.** 46% of Governments with RBM systems expressed having requested supported from the UNCT to strengthen the systems and receiving it, while 16% did not receive support after having requested it. A further 15% did not request support. On the other side, 57% of RCs noted that the system had responded positively after the Government had expressed interest in receiving support from the UNCT in strengthening its RBM systems, while over a third (36%) indicated that the Government had not expressed interest. A further 7% noted that the UN system had not been able to respond positively after the Government had expressed interest. Results are shown below.

Figure XLV. Supporting national RBM systems



Source: 2017 DESA Survey of Programme Country Governments



Source: 2017 DESA Survey of Resident Coordinators

**There is a number of countries where the government has not received an adequate response to requests for support in strengthening national RBM systems**, as suggested by these results. Furthermore, several RCs noted that responses to date have been provided by entities individually. Overall, there seems to be scope for UNCTs to provide more collective support to RBM-related initiatives, in addition to or in place of responses by individual entities.

#### Box 6: RBM in the UNDS, 8 January 2016<sup>73</sup>

In 2015, DESA commissioned an independent analytical study on progress made by the UNDS in implementing aspects of the 2012 QCPR that related to RBM. The study found that there is room for further harmonization of RBM strategies across the UN system. The report also found that despite some progress made, there is pressure from donors to attribute outcomes to UNDS entities, rather than to report on system-wide results. Key recommendations of the report include:

- The UNDS should build on progress made to implement RBM through developing and sustaining a results culture by: extending capacity development beyond those involved in strategic planning, monitoring and evaluation; ensuring reporting systems are aligned to RBM principles; and exploring new and innovative approaches to RBM.
- UNCTs should address the gaps in annual reporting on the UNDAF. Annual UNDAF reports should reflect progress made towards attaining UNDAF results based on accurate and reliable information, including information on financial resources.
- The 2030 Agenda has implications for how RBM is conceptualized and implemented by both governments and the UNDS, which will require significant investment in an agreed and coherent system-wide approach to planning, budgeting, managing and reporting on results, including the adoption of shared results and common indicators.
- The UNDS is uniquely placed to support governments' efforts towards the development of national results frameworks for the SDGs, strengthening national statistics systems, and improving the quality of data and reporting.

Source: <http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/qcpr/pdf/sgr2016-studies-rbm-8jan2016.pdf>

## Knowledge management

A recent JIU report<sup>75</sup> stated that **knowledge management remains a challenge for UN system organizations; it is not yet a strategic priority, nor are there common practices implemented in a system-wide fashion**. While extensive knowledge management experience exists in the UN system, it tends to be confined within individual organisations, even within different parts of a single organisation. The report recommends, amongst others,

<sup>75</sup> JIU/REP/2016/10



that all entities develop policies and strategies towards system-wide knowledge management. The DESA HQ survey included several questions on knowledge management, tabulated below.

**Table 44. UN entity responses on knowledge management**

Aspects of knowledge management	Yes	No	Skipped	
Does the strategic plan of your entity include provisions for knowledge management strategies?	22	6	1	29
Does your entity use a common authentication system that allows for seamless secure access (e.g. Common Connect)?	15	12	2	29
Has your entity taken steps towards sharing its knowledge management strategies with other UN entities?	22	7	0	29

*Source: 2017 HQ Survey*

**While most entities have a formal knowledge management strategy, others have a variety of knowledge management policies in place.** Notably, UNICEF stated that it plans to develop a full knowledge management strategy by 2018. Furthermore, UNDP and UNFPA indicated that they are members of the common authentication systems, while other entities explained that they have not experienced a demand for sharing information systems with other entities subscribing to Common Connect. Several entities use the One UN Knowledge Exchange Network on Yammer, which hosts inter-agency communities of practice under the UNDG.

Furthermore, to foster peer-to-peer learning and enhance the feedback loop between policy and practice, the UNDG, with support from UNDP, launched an online knowledge-sharing platform. This “One UN Knowledge Exchange” had more than 500 users by the end of 2016, and the JIU noted it could become the primary system-wide online collaborative platform.

### System-wide evaluation

**There is scope for action for a more rigorous evaluation of UNDAFs and for improving the management response.**

A recent meta-assessment of the UNDAF that examined evaluations conducted during 2009-2014, found that **only 37.5% of UNDAFs in operation between 2010 and 2014 had been evaluated.** Among the constraints noted were lack of resources, overlap with other evaluations, and lack of commitment.

The study also found that **only 23 of 36 evaluations were of sufficient quality as to warrant a more in-depth examination of their content,** underscoring the challenge of assessing the extent to which UNDAF evaluations are feeding into organizational learning. A significant weakness in UNDAF processes was a lack of engagement on the part of governments. The study concludes that **there is a lack of commitment from stakeholders in the UNDAF evaluation process,** highlighted by the low level of compliance with the requirement for an evaluation, the quality standards, and issues of coordination and cooperation in the evaluation activities conducted by the UN entities at the country level. The report laid out recommendations to increase participation and engagement, sensitising RCs to its importance, improving coordination among entities and updating the UNDAF guidance.



**Progress is under way in terms of the number of UNDAF evaluations. In the last year, as reported by UN-DOCO, 67 UNDAF evaluations were conducted. However, only a third (23 evaluations) were acknowledged through a management response.**

**The independent review of the ISWE policy requested by the 2012 QCPR was completed in May 2017.** The report concludes that there is strong demand for an effective independent system-wide evaluation function of UN-OAD. In-depth consideration was given to assigning the system-wide evaluation function to the JIU, and brief consideration to existing evaluation offices of UNDP's or OIOS, or an independent evaluation commissioner reporting to the GA. Rejecting these options as inadequate, the report put forward the option of creating a new ISWE office headed by an ASG, with nine new staff, requiring some \$3.5mn per annum to carry out two ISWEs per year. The Secretary-General's proposal to create capacity for system-wide evaluation of performance and results responds to the calls for independent system-wide evaluation with a lighter footprint.

## **B. Follow-up and monitoring**

The GA requested analytical reports on results achieved and measures and processes implemented in follow-up to the A/RES/71/243, to ensure its full implementation. ECOSOC resolution 2013/5 requested DESA to develop a QCPR monitoring and reporting framework, in consultation with the UNDS.

The present report and the monitoring framework are based on data collected from UN-DOCO, the CEB Secretariat, UNDG, HLCM, IATI, OECD Stat, MPTF Office, OHCHR, UN-Women, the Technology Bank for LDCs, , UNISDR, JIU, RCMs R-UNDG, as well as four DESA surveys dedicated to the QCPR. Details on methodology and limitations of the data are contained in each of the survey reports, and, where applicable, in the monitoring framework.

In collaboration with UN DOCO and the UNDS, the monitoring and reporting framework was substantially revised during 2017 to capture the new mandates contained in A/RES/71/243, and to improve the monitoring of ongoing mandates from A/RES67/226. As much as possible, the framework also draws on the UNDG IMS. If available, comparable data from previous years was included in the baseline column.

To track progress in a coherent and consistent manner on mandates which are either not reported elsewhere or not reported in a way that enables system-wide tracking, information was gathered through four surveys targeting Governments of programme countries, RCs, OMTs, and entity HQs. All four surveys were fully revised to be brought in line with the 2016 QCPR resolution, including the indicators of the monitoring framework. The four surveys were conducted between July and September 2017.

The completion rate for the surveys is exceptionally high: 80% for programme countries; 85% for RCs; and 88% for the OMTs. Combined, the entities of the UNDS that completed the HQ survey are responsible for 98% of total OAD expenditures.

## CONCLUSION

It has become evident that the three major agreements adopted two years ago imposed very high demands on the system. This has been widely acknowledged, including in the QCPR, which provided guidance on how the system needs to evolve to meet the ambition of the new agenda.

The UN development system has been recalibrating, and the present report offers a base of evidence on the current state of play in response to the QCPR mandates for immediate implementation.

The analysis suggests that the UNDS has taken initial steps to adapt to match the ambition of the 2030 Agenda. There is some progress, but results are mixed in relation to delivering, as a system, the kind of integrated and coherent support that the new agenda demands.

The unfinished business of the MDGs is where the UNDS has made the greatest contribution over the past two years. However, the topmost priority areas programme countries governments identified for UN assistance over the coming four years are not amongst those mentioned more frequently for best performance. Closely related is the feedback from governments that the UN is successful in assisting them to identify those furthest behind, and, to a lesser degree, in helping them to actually reach this population. Innovative approaches to reaching those furthest behind first are limited. This speaks to gaps in skills sets, capacities and approaches, and suggests that the full transition from MDGs to SDGs is still to be completed.

In terms of key functions of the UNDS, evidence shows that the UN is effective in developing national capacities, but governments see the need for more systematic, comprehensive and coordinated approaches to capacity development based on a more thorough analysis and underpinned by strong national ownership. In terms of the provision of high quality, evidence-based, and integrated policy advice, evidence shows that the system has not yet shifted from sectoral entity-based approaches, with just 1 in 8 RCs reporting that policy advice is provided in an integrated manner. In terms of partnerships, the system engages, inter alia, through multi-stakeholder partnerships at the global level as well as through numerous entity-specific partnerships at the country level. However, few UN entities report tracking the status and results of partnerships, or sharing information and knowledge – a significant gap when the success of the 2030 Agenda relies on finding new ways for all stakeholders to work together to leverage genuine partnerships for sustainable growth.

Evidence from both governments and the UN system continues to indicate that the division of labour between entities could be improved and that presence could be better tailored to national needs. There is urgent need to explore alternative programmatic models at both the country and regional levels for support that is provided in flexible, collaborative ways, takes advantage of advances in information and communications technologies, and is cost-effective. Tailoring the footprint of the organization need to combine programmatic coherence and accelerated and deeper integration of back-office functions. This is further confirmed by operations management teams on the ground who also view the benefits of integration to go beyond savings, with the provision of *better quality* services as a key benefit.

RCs have consistently reported that they have limited capacity and prerogative to effectively lead the UNCT, including avoiding duplication of efforts, while national partners continue calling on the RC and the system to reduce transaction costs, in particular those related to multiple planning and reporting processes. Over the past decade, the system has made

incremental progress to bolster the authority of the RC while maintaining impartiality, but there is general recognition that returns on these efforts are diminishing, in addition to the cost-sharing agreement of the RC system entering its third year of funding difficulties.

Underpinning some of the issues above is a funding architecture which continues to be highly earmarked, thus increasing the potential of competition and duplication, and hampering the UNDS's ability to work strategically towards collective results. Improvement in the quantity and quality of resources has primarily been on the humanitarian side, while fragmented funding continues to be the norm for development-related activities. And while there has been some strengthening of the transparency and accountability of funding flows, progress has so far been slow.

The current report is focused on steps that the system is taking in pursuance of the QCPR implementation. While doing so, it is clear that longer-term measures for repositioning the UN development system are required. The analysis from this report complements the Secretary-General's reports of June and December 2017.

The sum total of the analysis indicates a gradual transition which requires determined action by the system and Member States, guided by a shared vision and commitment to make the UN development system more relevant and effective. A UN that is evolving to ensure that no one is left behind.

## DRAFT QCPR 2016 MONITORING AND REPORTING FRAMEWORK<sup>76</sup>

#	&	71/243 OPs	67/226 OPs	Indicator	Source / respon- sibility <sup>77</sup>	Baseline (year)	SGR 2018 <sup>78</sup>
<b>A. Alignment with the SDGs</b>							
1		19		A system-wide outline of present functions and existing capacities of all UNDS entities carrying out operational activities for development with recommendations carried out by June 2017 [Y/N - date]	EOSG <sup>c</sup>		Yes (June 2017)
2	a	20		A system-wide strategic document translating recommendations of system-wide outline into actions developed by end 2017 and presented for consideration by the 2018 ECOSOC Operational Activities for Development Segment [Y/N - date]	EOSG <sup>c</sup>		Yes (December 2017 for OAS 2018)
	b			Options for aligning funding modalities with the functions of the UNDS developed by end 2017 and presented for consideration by the 2018 ECOSOC Operational Activities for Development Segment [Y/N - date]			
	c			Options for aligning funding modalities with the functions of the UNDS reflected in new strategic plans and similar planning documents of its entities (once options presented) [X/Y entities]	HQ survey <sup>c</sup>		
3		1,2,49, 59	5,7,12,1 13,115	% of PCGs that consider UNDS activities closely aligned with national needs and priorities i. 'Closely aligned' ii. 'Very closely aligned'	PCG Survey <sup>d</sup>	(2015) 67% 19%	52% 32%
4	a	17a,6		Fraction of UNDS entities (as applicable <sup>g</sup> ) that outline how they will target the furthest behind first i. In their strategic plan ii. In their annual reporting to their Governing Body	HQ Survey <sup>79</sup>		23/24 17/24 <sup>80</sup>
	b			% of UNDAFs that outline how they will target reaching the furthest behind first	RC Survey <sup>b</sup>		86%
	c			% of PCGs that 'agree' that the UN ensures adequate attention and resources are given to the development needs of the poorest and most vulnerable in society i. 'Agree' ii. 'Strongly agree'	PCG Survey <sup>d</sup>		74% 17%

<sup>76</sup> The framework may be adjusted for technical considerations, to align with new guidance of the Secretary-General and UNGD, and/or to track progress of new mandates of the General Assembly or ECOSOC

<sup>77</sup> Each indicator will be reported upon annually unless otherwise indicated in the end notes

<sup>78</sup> See Annex II for a full list of acronyms.

<sup>79</sup> The denominator for answers to the HQ survey varies as it reflects the relevance of the question to specific entities or because entities chose not to respond to the question

<sup>80</sup> WFP, IFAD, IMO, ITU, UNWTO, UPU, WHO, ITC, and UNODC did not respond to the request for data

#	& 71/243 OPs	67/22 6 OPs	Draft indicator	Source / responsibility	Baseline (year)	SGR 2018
---	-----------------	----------------	-----------------	----------------------------	--------------------	----------

	d		Fraction of joint programmes that include addressing inequalities (SDG 10)	DOCO	36/365 (2016)	39/373	
5	17b		[Placeholder for new indicator when UNDG reverts back on planned actions to deliver OP17(b)]				
6	18,78, 79		Fraction of UN funds, programmes, and specialized agencies that identify in their strategic plan specific actions on how they plan to engage in coherent and integrated support, as called for in the 2030 Agenda <sup>a</sup>	HQ Survey		26/29	
7	16		Fraction of Voluntary National Reviews by programme countries that were presented at the HLPF that have benefitted from the support of UNDS entities	PCG Survey <sup>d</sup>		35/40	
			# of regional knowledge products produced as part of the Regional Forums on Sustainable Development through <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. ECA</li> <li>ii. ECE</li> <li>iii. ECLAC</li> <li>iv. ESCAP</li> <li>v. ESCWA</li> </ul>	HQ Survey		27 6 3 18 N/A	
			Fraction of UNCTs <sup>b</sup> that have assisted governments in producing a national SDG report	RC Survey		31/34	
8	a	8	69-73	% of PCGs indicating that poverty eradication is an area where UNDS contribution has been especially significant over the past two years	PCG Survey <sup>d</sup>		53%
	b			Fraction of UNDS entities (as applicable <sup>g</sup> ) that outline in their Strategic Plan how they plan to mainstream poverty eradication	HQ Survey		22/24
	c			Fraction of UNDS entities (as applicable <sup>g</sup> ) that address the goal of poverty eradication in their Strategic Plan			24/25

## B. Alignment of Planning Processes

9	a	48,50f, 21c,22, 49	9,124,5, 7,12,21, 113,114 ,182	% of UNCTs with a: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. joint National/UN Steering Committee chaired by the Government</li> <li>ii. signed UNDAF at the outcome level with legal text as appropriate or equivalent</li> </ul> [SOP Indicator Element 1 and 2]	DOCO	42% 38%	50% 50%
	b			% of PCGs that agree that the UNDS is 'effective' or 'very effective' in facilitating in its UNDAF development, the participation of <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. Parliamentarians</li> <li>ii. Civil Society</li> <li>iii. IFIs</li> <li>iv. Bilateral &amp; Multi-lateral actors</li> <li>v. the Private sector</li> </ul>	PCG Survey <sup>d</sup>		55% 85% 57% 77% 52%
	c			% of PCGs that 'agree' <sup>a</sup> that the UNCT engages as much as possible with <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. Parliamentarians</li> </ul>			62%

#	& 71/243 OPs	67/22 6 OPs	Draft indicator	Source / responsibility	Baseline (year)	SGR 2018
---	-----------------	----------------	-----------------	----------------------------	--------------------	----------

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>ii. Civil Society</li> <li>iii. IFIs</li> <li>iv. Bilateral &amp; Multi-lateral actors</li> <li>v. The Private Sector</li> </ul>			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>88%</li> <li>68%</li> <li>85%</li> <li>56%</li> </ul>
	d		Fraction of joint national Steering Committees (or similar group) that conducted annual UNDAF review in the past 12 months	DOCO	45% (2016)	38%
	e		Fraction of most recently completed UNDAFs for which: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. an evaluation was conducted</li> <li>ii. a Management Response was prepared</li> </ul>		(2016) 62/131 23/62	67/131 26/67
	f		Average quality criteria score for new UNDAFs: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. Relevance and strategic focus</li> <li>ii. Principled</li> <li>iii. Effectiveness</li> <li>iv. Efficiency</li> <li>v. Sustainability</li> </ul>	DOCO desk review (2017)		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>3.0/5.0</li> <li>3.3/5.0</li> <li>2.6/5.0</li> <li>2.6/5.0</li> <li>2.8/5.0</li> </ul>
10	17c		[Placeholder for new indicator when UNDG reverts back on planned actions to deliver OP17(c)]	tbc		
11	a	50b,62	% of PCGs that 'agree' that there is an improved focus on common results among UNDS entities at the country level in the last year <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. 'Agree'</li> <li>ii. 'Strongly agree'</li> </ul>	PCG Survey <sup>d</sup>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>69%</li> <li>16%</li> </ul>
	b		% of RCs that 'agree' that there is an improved focus on common results among UNDS entities at the country level in the last year <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. 'Agree'</li> <li>ii. 'Strongly agree'</li> </ul>	RC survey		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>76%</li> <li>19%</li> </ul>
	c		% of UNCTs with Result Groups aligned with national coordination mechanisms [SOP Indicator for Element 5]	DOCO	53%	69%
	d		% of UNCTs with Joint Workplans (of Results Groups) that are aligned with the UNDAF and signed by all involved entities [SOP Indicator Element 4]		24%	36%

## C. FUNDING

### I. Overview and Trends

12	a	25,7,26, 27	24,26,2 9	Funding for OAD: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. Total</li> <li>ii. Core</li> <li>iii. % core share</li> </ul>	DESA	(2015) \$27.4bn \$6.1bn 22.4%	\$29.5bn \$6.4bn 21.9%
----	---	----------------	--------------	--	------	--	------------------------------

#	& 71/243 OPs	67/22 6 OPs	Draft indicator	Source / responsibility	Baseline (year)	SGR 2018
---	-----------------	----------------	-----------------	----------------------------	--------------------	----------

	b		% of core share of funding for development-related activities from governments (excluding local resources)		(2015) 42%	43%	
	c		% of programme countries indicating that <b>core</b> funds are 'closely aligned' with the country's development needs and priorities i. 'Closely aligned' ii. 'Very closely aligned'	PCG Survey <sup>d</sup>	(2015) 55% 15%	56% 10%	
	d		% of programme countries indicating that <b>non-core</b> funds are 'closely aligned' with the country's development needs and priorities i. 'Closely aligned' ii. 'Very closely aligned'		(2015) 45% 8%	50% 7%	
	e		% of UNDAFs aligned with the national planning and budgeting cycles of programme countries i. Aligned ii. Planning to align in the next cycle	RC Survey <sup>b</sup>	(2015) 66% 21%	62% 16%	
13	28		# of Member States providing at least 0.7% of GNI to ODA	OECD Stat	(2015) 6	8	
14	7	11,24	% share of funding for UN-OAD relative to: i. Total ODA ii. Total multilateral ODA	DESA + OECD database	(2015) 20.0% 31.3%	19.7% 32.8%	
15	a	33,25, 36,39, 50g	118, 124g, 135, 141,27, 28,44	Total contributions to inter-agency pooled funds i. Country pooled funds ii. Global/regional pooled funds	MPTF Office	(2015) \$924mn \$611mn	\$1,100mn \$589mn
	b		% of programme countries where Over 10% Over 15% Over 20% of non-core resources are channelled through inter-agency pooled funds;	DESA + MPTF Office	(2015) 24.8% 14.8% 10.7%	29.8% 20.5% 12.6%	
	c		# of Member States that contribute Over 10% Over 15% Over 20% of their UN non-core contributions through UN inter-agency pooled funds		(2015) 15 13 10	17 14 12	
	d		Fraction of UNDS entities that receive Over 10% Over 15% Over 20% of their non-core resources from inter-agency pooled funds		(2015) 5 3 2	4 2 2	
	e		% of non-core resources for:	DESA	(2015)		



#	& 71/243 OPs	67/22 6 OPs	Draft indicator	Source / responsibility	Baseline (year)	SGR 2018
			i. Development-related activities ii. Humanitarian assistance-related activities channelled through inter-agency pooled funds		6.4% 10.1%	4.5% 10.3%
	f		Funding channelled to thematic funds		(2015) \$529mn 2.6%	\$407mn 1.7%
			i. Total ii. % of total non-core			
			Fraction of UNDS entities with more than 20% of total programme expenditures constituting part of a joint programme	HQ Survey		6/24
16	32		Median UNDAF fulfilment (i.e. actual development-related country-level expenditures as % share of UNDAF indicative budget), dis-aggregated cumulatively by year - Year 1: - Year 2: - Year 3: - Year 4: - Year 5:	DOCO for indicative budget  DESA for fulfilment		18% 46% 57% 93% 129%
17	34a,31, 32	33	Fraction of UNDS entities indicating that at least 50% of their contributions are part of multi-year commitments i. All entities ii. Funds and Programmes iii. Specialized agencies iv. Other entities	HQ survey		12/25 <sup>81</sup> 1/6 5/8 6/11
18	a 34c,37	24,33,7 7,35	Funding from programme countries: i. Core ii. Non-core (excluding local resources) iii. Local resources	DESA	(2015) \$467mn \$1,081mn \$1,406mn	\$494mn \$888mn \$1,920mn
	b		Total funding received from non-State partners i. Core ii. Non-core		(2015) \$662mn \$3,242mn	\$808mn \$3,234mn
	c		% share of total funding coming from non-State partners		(2015) 14.6%	13.7%
	d		Fraction of UNDS entities reporting annually to their governing bodies on concrete measures to broaden the donor base	HQ Survey	(2015) 23/25	15/20
19	43	46	Fraction of UNDS entities that in their respective governing bodies i. held structured dialogues in the past year on how to finance the development results agreed in the new strategic planning cycle	HQ Survey	(2015) 17/25	17/27

<sup>81</sup> Excludes entities that are primarily humanitarian

#	& 71/243 OPs	67/22 6 OPs	Draft indicator	Source / responsibility	Baseline (year)	SGR 2018	
			ii. presented options for improving the functioning and effectiveness of the structured financing dialogues.		N/A	9/27	
20	a	38	Fraction of UNDS entities reporting resources generated from 'innovative funding modalities' as part of their regular financial reporting	HQ survey		13/27	
	b	38	Fraction of UNDS entities that have included information about knowledge sharing and best practices on innovative funding as part of their regular financial reporting			10/27	
21	a	39,62	42	% of UNCTs with a Joint Resource Mobilization strategy that is approved by the UNCT as well as monitored and reported against the UN Country Results Report [SOP Indicator Element 8]	DOCO	13%	13%
	b		% of UNCTs that have a Common Budgetary Framework (CBF) that is: Medium-term and aligned to the UNDAF Updated annually (i.e. annual CBF) [SOP Indicator Element 6 and 7]		37% 19%	57% 28%	
	c		% of UNCTs <sup>b</sup> that have mapped overall financing flows of the country (i.e. public, private, domestic and international) as part of the support to national government in delivering the SDGs.	RC survey		10%	
22		63		Median change (%) in country-level development-related expenditure after requesting DaO (based on average expenditure in 3 years before and after) <sup>82</sup>	DESA		19.6% increase
<b>II. Implementation of full cost recovery</b>							
23	a		47,53, 43,48, 51,54	Fraction of UNDS entities that have adopted harmonized cost recovery frameworks	HQ survey	17/25 (2015)	19/29
	b		% of total expenditures directed to programme activities i. Core ii. Non-core			(2015) 68% 92%	65% 89%
	c		Fraction of UNDS entities that report annually on the implementation of their approved cost recovery policies and rates to their respective governing body			17/29 <sup>83</sup> (2015)	15/29
<b>III. Enhancing Transparency and Accountability of Funding Flows</b>							
24	a	34b,29, 25,43,	41	Fraction of UNDS entities consolidating all projected core and non-core resources within an integrated results and resources framework	HQ survey		27/29
	b			Median % fulfilment of integrated budgets of UNDS entities (actual versus indicative)			96%
25		30,47, 50h,69, 70		Fraction of UNDS entities publishing data as per the IATI data standard i. All entities ii. Funds and Programmes	IATI website	10/39 5/9	14/39 6/9

<sup>82</sup> The intention of this indicator is not to prove a cause and effect. It only specifies whether or not there is an average decline in financial flows to countries that have recently chosen the DaO approach.

<sup>83</sup> Baseline reports "Fraction of UNDS entities that have adopted harmonized cost recovery framework"

#	& 71/243 OPs	67/22 6 OPs	Draft indicator	Source / responsibility	Baseline (year)	SGR 2018
---	-----------------	----------------	-----------------	----------------------------	--------------------	----------

			iii. Specialized agencies iv. Other entities		3/13 2/17	5/13 3/17	
26	a	29	38,39	Fraction of UNDS entities that have defined common principles for the concept of 'critical mass' of core resources v. All entities vi. Funds and Programmes vii. Specialized agencies viii. Other entities	HQ Survey	N/A 7/12 (2015) N/A N/A	12/29 5/9 2/8 5/12
	b			Fraction of UNDS entities that have determined and reported on their level of 'critical mass' of core funding: i. All entities ii. Funds and Programmes iii. Specialized agencies iv. Other entities			8/29 2/9 2/8 4/12

## D. FUNCTIONS

### I. Functions and comparative advantages

27		21	57-63	% of PCGs that 'agree' that UN funds, programmes, and specialized agencies have been effective in developing national capacities i. 'Agree' ii. 'Strongly agree'	PCG Survey <sup>d</sup>		71% 18%
28	a	21a		Fraction of PCGs that 'agree' that the UNDS provides <b>evidence-based</b> policy advice tailored to national needs and priorities i. 'Agree' ii. 'Strongly agree'	PCG Survey <sup>d</sup>		68% 25%
	b			Fraction of PCGs that 'agree' that the UNDS provides <b>integrated (where appropriate)</b> policy advice tailored to national needs and priorities i. 'Agree' ii. 'Strongly agree'			62% 17%
	c			% of RCs stating that the UNCT generally provides policy advice that is developed through a: i. Single-entity process ii. Coordinated process iii. Integrated process	RC survey		21% 66% 13%
	d			Fraction of UNCTs that have supported Governments i. mainstream the SDGs into the national development plans ii. on SDG measurement and reporting iii. with general orientation on SDGs iv. with requests on specific SDGs	DOCO		77/114 66/114 75/114 21/114

#	& 71/243 OPs	67/22 6 OPs	Draft indicator	Source / responsibility	Baseline (year)	SGR 2018
---	-----------------	----------------	-----------------	----------------------------	--------------------	----------

			(of those UNCTs that have had support requested from them)				
29	a	15,21b	58	% of UNCTs that have in the past year: i. completed a human rights analysis ii. developed a strategy and taken subsequent action to address the issues set out in the human rights analysis	DOCO & OHCHR	(2016) <u>61/131</u> 36/ <u>61</u>	<u>61/131</u> 36/ <u>61</u>
	b			% of UNCTs that have in the past year: i. supported the government to develop a report for the UPR ii. facilitated follow-up of the UPR recommendations by the government iii. supported the government to develop a report for the human rights treaty bodies iv. facilitated follow-up of the treaty body recommendations by the government v. supported the government in preparing for the visits of Special Procedures vi. facilitated follow-up of the Special Procedures recommendations by the government		(2016) 63% 92% 62% 74% 45% 44%	63% 50% 60% 75% 50% 50%
	c			% of UNCTs which have drawn on human rights recommendations, either of i. Universal Periodic Review ii. Human rights treaty bodies, or iii. Special procedures to inform UN analysis programming or advocacy strategies	DOCO	(2016) 66% 75% 34%	55% 78% 39%
30	a	21c, 50h	23,58	% of programme countries that 'agree' <sup>a</sup> that the UN funds, programmes, and specialized agencies have contributed to the strengthening of national capacities in i. planning ii. management iii. evaluation iv. statistics	PCG Survey <sup>d</sup>		89% 76% 75% 80%
	b			% of RCs that 'agree' <sup>a</sup> that UN funds, programmes, and specialized agencies have contributed to the strengthening of national capacities in i. planning ii. management iii. evaluation iv. statistics	RC survey		98% 90% 84% 96%
	c			Fraction of UNCTs i. that provide support to national statistical capacity ii. that provide this support through an inter-agency effort	DOCO	(2016) <u>125/131</u> 77/ <u>125</u>	<u>127/131</u> 78/ <u>127</u>
	d			% of UNCTs <sup>b</sup> that state they have access to 'adequate' official government data on: i. income level ii. sex iii. age iv. disability v. ethnicity vi. religion vii. race	RC survey		60% 59% 61% 28% 32% 43% 30%

#	& 71/243 OPs	67/22 6 OPs	Draft indicator	Source / responsibi lity	Baseline (year)	SGR 2018
---	-----------------	----------------	-----------------	--------------------------------	--------------------	----------

	e		Fraction of UNDS entities that have implemented a common approach to strengthening of country-level data and statistics (once developed)	HQ Survey		Not yet developed
31	a	50h, 21c,47, 69,70, 71	% of PCGs that state that the UN works 'more closely' together to support capacity building on disaggregated data collection and analysis compared to four years ago i. 'more closely' ii. 'much more closely'	PCG Survey <sup>d</sup>		48% 18%
	b		% of RCs indicating that UNDS entities work 'more closely' together on support for capacity-building on disaggregated data collection and analysis compared to four years earlier i. 'more closely' ii. 'much more closely'	RC Survey		59% 19%
	c		% of UNCTs that participate in the government's formal mechanisms to coordinate statistical development efforts with development partners (of those governments that have such mechanisms according to the UNCT)	DOCO	53% (2016)	57%
32		23	% of UNDAFs that substantively address the needs of persons with disabilities	RC Survey <sup>b</sup>		65%
33	a	22,30, 38,39, 40,49	% of PCGs that 'agree' that the UNDS plays a catalytic role in facilitating partnerships i. 'Agree' ii. 'Strongly agree'	PCG Survey <sup>d</sup>		69% 18%
	b		% of PCGs that stated that the UNDS has contributed to building the capacity of the country to engage in partnerships i. 'to a moderate extent' ii. 'to a large extent'			53% 26%
	c		Fraction of UNDS entities that have in place a functioning monitoring and reporting partnership platform or mechanisms that tracks annually the status and results of each partnership	HQ Survey		21/29

## II. Support to LDCs and other countries in special situations

34	a	28,10, 40,11	10,11,1 3,19,30	# of Member States providing at least i. 0.15% ii. 0.20% of GNI to ODA to LDCs	OECD Stat	(2014) 8 6	(2015) 7 5
	b			% share of <b>total</b> country-level programme expenditures spent in <sup>84</sup> i. LDCs ii. LLDCs iii. MICs iv. SIDS v. Africa	DESA	(2015) 47.2% 24.2% 58.0% 2.7% 45.8%	46.2% 24.3% 58.8% 2.6% 44.2%

<sup>84</sup> Disaggregation lists overlapping groupings i.e. some countries will fall into two or more categories.

#	&	71/243 OPs	67/22 6 OPs	Draft indicator	Source / responsibi lity	Baseline (year)	SGR 2018
	c			vi. Countries with a humanitarian response plan % share of <b>core</b> country-level programme expenditures spent in i. LDCs ii. LLDCs iii. MICs iv. SIDS v. Africa vi. Countries with a humanitarian response plan		48.3% (2015) 38.5% 20.3% 63.2% 3.8% 40.3% 40.4%	50.7%  41.3% 21.8% 63.6% 3.7% 44.8% 42.8%
35	a	41		Technology bank for LDCs operationalized (yes/no)	Technology Bank for LDCs		Yes [22 Sep '17]
	b			Annual contributions provided to Technology Bank			\$2.45m <sup>85</sup>
36		40		Fraction of PCGs of recently graduated and scheduled to graduate from LDC status that 'agree' that the UNDS has provided effective support in the formulation of their national transition strategies i. 'Agree' ii. 'Strongly agree'	PCG Survey <sup>d</sup>		3/6 2/6
<b>III. Providing greater complementarity among humanitarian, development and sustaining peace efforts</b>							
37	a	14,24	97,106.	Total # of <sup>86</sup> : i. SRSGs ii. DSRSGs/RC/HC/RRs iii. RC/HC/RRs iv. RC/RRs v. HCs	DOCO (ii-iv)	(2016) Unavailable 12 16 89 Unavailable	11 11 18 88 1
	b			Fraction of PCGs that state there is 'close collaboration' among UNDS entities engaged across development, disaster risk reduction, humanitarian action and sustaining peace (as applicable <sup>86</sup> ) i. 'Close collaboration' ii. 'Very close collaboration'	PCG Survey <sup>d</sup>		20/109 76/109
	c			Fraction of RCs that state there is 'close collaboration' among UNDS entities engaged across development, disaster risk reduction, humanitarian action and sustaining peace (as applicable <sup>86</sup> ) i. 'Close collaboration' ii. 'Very close collaboration'	RC survey		28/109 56/109
38	a	24,24a, 24b,56	106,107 ,102	[Placeholder for new indicator when UNDG reverts back on planned actions to deliver these mandates]	tbc		

<sup>85</sup> \$2mn of this amount was pledged as the first of five equal annual instalments beginning 2017

<sup>86</sup> Part i. and part v. based on online desk-review rather than formal database

#	& 71/243 OPs	67/22 6 OPs	Draft indicator	Source / responsibility	Baseline (year)	SGR 2018
---	-----------------	----------------	-----------------	----------------------------	--------------------	----------

	b			Fraction of UNCTs that provide i. support to national DRR efforts ii. DRR support in an inter-agency effort	DOCO	<u>116/131</u> <u>94/116</u>	<u>117/131</u> <u>98/117</u>
	c			Fraction of UNCTs that participate in the government's formal mechanism that coordinates DRR efforts with development partners		95% (2016)	93%
	d			Fraction of UNCTs <sup>b</sup> in countries (as applicable <sup>g</sup> ) with humanitarian assistance needs where humanitarian and development actors have in the last 2 years engaged in: i. joint needs assessments ii. joined-up planning iii. joint monitoring and evaluation on progress on collective outcomes	RC survey		74/85 68/83 52/74
	e			Fraction of UNCTs <sup>b</sup> in countries (as applicable <sup>g</sup> ) in conflict or post-conflict situations with an institutionalized and country-led national mechanisms to coordinate development and peacebuilding efforts that are supported by the UNCT	RC survey <sup>b</sup>		46/53
	f			Fraction of UNCTs <sup>b</sup> in countries (as applicable <sup>g</sup> ) where UN humanitarian and development activities are based on: i. collective and/or complementary results or outcomes ii. joint or joined up analysis iii. joined up planning iv. joint coordination mechanisms	RC Survey		46/91 44/92 41/92 40/90
	39			56,24a	104,105	Fraction of UN missions that have: i. a multi-year joint (mission-country team) strategy that includes coordination and division of labour throughout the lifecycle of a mission, including initial planning and strategic assessments ii. a joint plan for draw down and/or withdrawal of the UN mission	RC survey
40	a	56,24	93,94	Fraction of UNDAFs that substantively address: i. disaster and climate risk reduction ii. the drivers of needs, risks and vulnerability iii. sustaining peace action (as applicable <sup>g</sup> )	RC survey		94/106 95/107 48/62
	b	24	93,94, 108-110	% of PCGs that report biennially on progress on disaster risk reduction.	UNISDR <sup>d</sup>	74% (2015)	N/A <sup>88</sup>

#### IV. Cross-cutting dimensions

41	a	13, 72, 73	87,81,82, 83,85,	System-wide evaluation of the effectiveness, value added and impact of the System-Wide Action Plan on Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women completed	JIU <sup>c</sup>	Deferred (2015)	No
----	---	---------------	---------------------	--	------------------	--------------------	----

<sup>87</sup> New indicator that will be reported on from the results of the 2018 DESA surveys

<sup>88</sup> Not yet available due to transition from the Hyogo Framework for Action to the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction



#	& 71/243 OPs	67/22 6 OPs	Draft indicator	Source / responsibility	Baseline (year)	SGR 2018
---	-----------------	----------------	-----------------	----------------------------	--------------------	----------

b		86,89,88 ,91,92	Fraction of UNDS entities that meet or exceed all UN-SWAP minimum standards	UN-Women	0/41 (2015)	1/41	
c			Fraction of UNCTs that have conducted at least one gender scorecard exercise in the past 4 years		19/131 (2015)	35/131	
d			Fraction of UNCTs that have conducted a gender scorecard exercise in the past 4 years, and met or exceeded requirements in at least half of the performance indicators		3/19 (2015)	9/35	
e			Fraction of UNDS entities that track and report on allocations and expenditures using gender markers		15/41 (2015)	19/41	
f			UNDAF gender marker methodology piloted (once developed)	UN-Women <sup>c</sup>	N/A	No	
g			% of UNDAFs that feature gender results at the outcome level	UN-Women	61% (2015)	62%	
h			Percentage female staff among, <sup>89</sup>	CEB			
			a) International Professional Staff				
	i) P1	65.5%					
	ii) P2	59.4%					
	iii) P3	47.6%					
	iv) P4	44.2%					
	v) P5	38.1%					
	b) National Staff						
	i) NO-A	50.3%					
	ii) NO-B	45.3%					
	iii) NO-C	46.3%					
	iv) NO-D	44.7%					
	v) NO-E	33.3%					
	c) High-level Posts						
	i) D1	34.7%					
	ii) D2	33.7%					
	iii) ASG	29.4%					
	iv) USG	28.6%					
	d) General Service Staff						
	i) G2	3.7%					
	ii) G3	22.9%					
	iii) G4	58.2%					
	iv) G5	68.2%					
	v) G6	62.6%					
	vi) G7	60.2%					

<sup>89</sup> Data is as at the 31 December 2016

#	& 71/243 OPs	67/22 6 OPs	Draft indicator	Source / responsibility	Baseline (year)	SGR 2018
---	-----------------	----------------	-----------------	----------------------------	--------------------	----------

	i		Fraction of UNDS entities that have high-level posts (D1 and above) filled by nationals of programme countries, disaggregated by gender <sup>90</sup> : - <25% - Between 25% and 50% - >50%	HLCM		<b>F</b> 16/39 14/39 9/39	<b>M</b> 6/39 22/39 11/39
42	a	23,21e	74,77	Fraction of UNDS entities that integrate SSC into their strategic plan	HQ Survey		25/29
	b			Fraction of UNDS entities that actively report on SSC in their annual reports;			21/29
	c			% of UNDAFs that substantively addresses south-south and triangular cooperation	RC survey	43% (2016)	56%
	d			% of PCGs indicating that the UN has undertaken activities in that country to support South-South or triangular cooperation	PCG Survey <sup>d</sup>		67/119
	e			% of PCGs indicating the UNDS is a preferred partner for supporting South-South cooperation and triangular cooperation			55%

## E. FUNCTIONING

### I. System-wide accountability and coordination

43	45		Report of Secretary-General on improving the accountability and overall coordination of the entities of the UNDS and their oversight by Member States, i. presented to ECOSOC for its consideration by end June 2017 (Y/N - date) ii. presented to General Assembly's 72 <sup>nd</sup> Session for review and further action [Y/N - date]	EOSG		Y - Jun 2017 Y - Oct 2017
----	----	--	---	------	--	------------------------------

### II. Flexible, cost-effective and collaborative models for field presence

44	a	50b,68, 61,17c 64,50, 50b,68,	115, 117, 120,	% of PCGs that 'agree' <sup>a</sup> that: i. UNDS presence is adequately tailored for meeting the specific challenges of the country ii. there is a clear division of labour among UNDS entities at the country level	PCG Survey <sup>d</sup>		86% 63%
	b			% of RCs that 'agree' <sup>a</sup> that: i. UNDS presence is adequately tailored for meeting the specific challenges of the country ii. there is a clear division of labour among UNDS entities at the country level	RC survey		75% 63%
	c			% of PCGs that 'agree' <sup>a</sup> that UNDS presence i. is flexible ii. is cost effective iii. operates collaboratively	PCG Survey <sup>d</sup>		86% 67% 86%
	d			% of RCs that 'agree' <sup>a</sup> that UNDS presence i. is flexible ii. is cost effective iii. operates collaboratively	RC survey		70% 56% 89%

<sup>90</sup> Data is as at the 31 December 2016

#	& 71/243 OPs	67/22 6 OPs	Draft indicator	Source / responsibility	Baseline (year)	SGR 2018	
45	a	50c,57f, 50,67, 74	18,116	% of PCGs that find it 'easy' to access technical expertise from across the UN system	PCG Survey <sup>d</sup>		65%
				i. 'easy'			5%
	b			Average # of RC office staff per country (not including the RC), by programme country expenditure <sup>91</sup>	DOCO	(2016)	
				i. All		1.6	1.7
				ii. Large		2.0	2.1
				iii. Medium		1.7	1.8
				iv. Small		1.4	1.4
46	a	68,64, 50d,50 e, 50f,51, 52, 61, 62, 66	18, 116	Average number of resident UNCT members in countries disaggregated by programme country expenditure:	DOCO		
				i. All		12.0	12.8
				ii. Large		16.4	17.5
				iii. Medium		13.4	14.4
				iv. Small		9.0	9.6
	b			Average # of single-entity office premises per country, by programme country expenditure <sup>92</sup>	DOCO <sup>93</sup>		
				i. All			16.1
				ii. Large			34.3
				iii. Medium			22.3
				iv. Small			5.7
	c			Average # of common premises <sup>94</sup> per country, by programme country expenditure	DOCO		
				i. All			3.0
				ii. Large			7.2
				iii. Medium			4.0
				iv. Small			1.0
	d			Average # of UNDS entities in each common premise, by programme country expenditure <sup>95</sup>	DOCO		
				i. All			4.1
				ii. Large			3.7
				iii. Medium			3.9

<sup>91</sup> Includes all staff contracts of all lengths. Excludes personnel with contract modalities of International Consultant, National Consultants, Service Contracts, International UNV, National UNV, JPO, and SARC. Includes global funding sources (UNDG Cost Sharing, Donor and UNDP)

<sup>92</sup> When comparing indicators 47b and 47c, it is important to note that single-entity premises and common premises are not mutually exclusive, i.e. a UN agency can be in a common premise, and still have single-entity offices in other locations. A combination of fewer single entity office premises, an increase in common premises, and an increase in the average # of entities within each common premise, would together indicate consolidation of office presence.

<sup>93</sup> Data on premises (indicators 46b, 46c and 46d) represent 88% of the UNDSS figures as of November 2017.

<sup>94</sup> A common premise entails the co-location of **two or more** resident United Nations entities present in a country. A Common Premises can be established at national and sub-national level, as per the UNDG business operations working group for Common Premises definition, adopted February 2017

<sup>95</sup> Of the OMTs stating they had common premises, only around 80% provided information on the number of UNDS entities within each common premises, and therefore is a sub-set of all OMT respondents

#	& 71/243 OPs	67/22 6 OPs	Draft indicator	Source / responsibi lity	Baseline (year)	SGR 2018
---	-----------------	----------------	-----------------	--------------------------------	--------------------	----------

	e		iv. Small Fraction of UNCTs with a UN House <sup>96</sup> , by programme country expenditure	TTCP		5.9	
	f		i. All ii. Large iii. Medium iv. Small Average # of entities per UN house, by programme country expenditure	DOCO		62/131 6/27 11/45 40/59 N/A <sup>97</sup>	
47	a	50i, 21	64, 66	% of PCGs that 'agree' that UNDS uses national systems wherever possible	PCG Survey <sup>d</sup>	(2015) <sup>98</sup>	
				i. 'Agree' ii. 'Strongly agree'		45% 22%	59% 19%
	b			% of RCs that 'agree' that the UNDS is using parallel implementation units as little as possible	RC survey	(2015)	
				i. 'Agree' ii. 'Strongly agree'		37% 25%	52% 18%

### III. Resident coordinator system

48		54, 55		% of PCGs that 'agree' that the RCs effectively and efficiently leads and coordinates the UNCT strategic support for national plans and priorities	PCG Survey <sup>d</sup>		
				i. 'Agree' ii. 'Strongly agree'			62% 30%
49	a	55		% of PCGs that 'agree' that the RCs has sufficient prerogative to effectively fulfil her/his mandate			
				i. 'Agree' ii. 'Strongly agree'			56% 27%
	b			% of PCGs that state the RC has demonstrated <b>impartiality</b> :			
				i. 'Effectively' ii. 'Very effectively'			54% 34%
	c			% of PCGs that state the RC has demonstrated <b>management skills</b> :			

<sup>96</sup> A UN House entails the co-location of **two or more** resident United Nations entities present in a country as well as the office of the Resident Coordinator. The United Nations House is not necessarily a standalone building, and it may have satellite premises and may be referred to as United Nations House Annex. There can only be one UN House in any given country. The name UN House is conferred upon recommendation of the UNDG.

<sup>97</sup> Indicator will be reported on from 2019

<sup>98</sup> The baseline shows the average response to the use of i. national procurement systems, ii. national financial systems, iii. national monitoring and reporting systems, and, iv. national statistical systems.

#	& 71/243 OPs	67/22 6 OPs	Draft indicator	Source / responsibility	Baseline (year)	SGR 2018
			i. 'Effectively' ii. 'Very effectively'			53% 32%
50	56		Fraction of PCGs (as applicable <sup>99</sup> ) that state that the RC/HC has provided a joint (humanitarian and development) impartial, comprehensive assessment of needs	PGC Survey		45/85
51	57, 57(c) 57(a)	42, 124h 130a, 130c, 13	Full implementation of the following elements of the Management and Accountability system: Fraction of UNDS entities that have i. updated the Job description of their country representative to recognize her/his role vis-a-vis the RC; ii. included RC's inputs in UNCT Head of Agency performance appraisal system in all programme countries; iii. included UNCT results in entity representatives' performance appraisal system [SOP Indicator Element 8]	HQ survey	(2015) 14/25  12/25  15/25	17/29  6/27 <sup>99</sup>  14/27 <sup>100</sup>
52	57a		% of RCs that 'agree' <sup>a</sup> that they are fully empowered within the UNCT to i. make final decisions on the strategic objectives in the UNDAF ii. substantially increase common resource mobilization iii. distribute common resources	RC survey		86% 66% 61%
53			% of RCs that contribute to the performance assessment of: - < one third - between one and two thirds - > two thirds of resident UNCT Heads	RC Survey		65% 19% 16%
54			% of RCs that 'agree' <sup>a</sup> that all UNCT members report to the RC regularly on: i. resource mobilization ii. programme implementation performance of UNDAF elements led by the entity	RC Survey		29% 79%
55	57b		% of RCs that 'agree' that they receive sufficiently regular and useful information from UNCT members to ensure effective communication with the Government regarding UNDS activities in the field i. 'Agree' ii. 'Strongly agree'	RC survey		51% 18%
56	a 57c	124j, 42, 124h, 130a, 130c, 131	% of RCs that 'agree' that UN system field representatives enjoy sufficient delegated authority to respond effectively and efficiently to national needs and priorities i. 'Agree' ii. 'Strongly agree'	RC survey		71% 15%
	b		% of RCs that have signed delegation of authority letters on UNDP business to a Deputy			

<sup>99</sup> In the 2015 Survey, HQ entities responded to a 'yes/no' question for this sub-indicator. In the 2017 survey, respondents were asked for more details. 6/27 refers to the number of entities that responded 'Yes, this is done in all programme countries'. See DESA HQ survey report for more details.

<sup>100</sup> IFAD, IMO, ITU, UNWTO, UPU, and UNODC did not respond to the request for data

#	& 71/243 OPs	67/22 6 OPs	Draft indicator	Source / responsibility	Baseline (year)	SGR 2018
---	-----------------	----------------	-----------------	----------------------------	--------------------	----------

			UNDP official, including for: i. Resource mobilization ii. Responsibility for operational activities		(2015) 88% N/A	81% 90%	
57	57d		Fraction of programme countries that had a departing RC in the past two years and were duly informed of when the tenure of the out-going RC was coming to an end	PCG Survey <sup>d</sup>		54/57	
58	a	57e 72	124b, 124 92	% of RCs that are female	DOCO	(2016) 43% 19% 24%	45% 19% 26%
				i. Total			
				ii. From programme countries			
				iii. From non-programme countries			
				Geographic diversity of RCs from programme countries			
i. Asia/Pacific	(2016) 6%	7%					
ii. Arab States	4%	4%					
iii. Europe & the CIS	1%	1%					
iv. Latin America & the Caribbean	10%	9%					
v. Africa	18%	18%					
c			RCs from non-programme countries		61% (2016)	61%	
d			% of RCs with entity of origin other than UNDP		43% (2016)	39%	
59	a	57f, 55, 54	% of PCG that 'agree' that the RC has helped minimize duplication of efforts among the UNDS	PCG Survey <sup>d</sup>		61% 16%	
			i. 'Agree'				
			ii. 'Strongly agree'				
			% of RCs that 'agree' that they have the <b>capacity</b> to avoid duplication of efforts	RC survey		37% 23%	
			i. 'Agree'				
			ii. 'Strongly agree'				
c			% of RCs that 'agree' that they have the <b>prerogative</b> to avoid duplication of efforts			33% 15%	
i. 'Agree'							
ii. 'Strongly agree'							
c			% of RCs that 'agree' that the UNCT has reduced overlap and duplication of work in the last four years			75% 9%	
iii. 'Agree'							
iv. 'Strongly agree'							
d			% of RCs that 'agree' that the RC has sufficient access to the expertise available within the UNDS			52% 21%	
i. 'Agree'							
ii. 'Strongly agree'							
60	a	57g	128	Fraction of UNDG entities paying their full contribution of the UNDG RC system cost-sharing arrangement	DOCO	13/19	13/19
				Fraction of UNDG entities that report on use and contribution to the UNDG RC cost-sharing	HQ survey		14/29

#	& 71/243 OPs	67/22 6 OPs	Draft indicator	Source / responsibility	Baseline (year)	SGR 2018	
	c		mechanism to their respective governing body				
	d		Total contributions paid to the UNDG RC cost-sharing arrangement	DOCO	\$27.5m (2016)	\$29.4m	
			Shortfall to the UNDG RC cost-sharing arrangement		\$8.4m (2016)	\$7.7m	
61	a	57h	42,124h, 130a, 130c, 13	Fraction of UNDS entities recognizing reporting obligations to the RC on: i. planning ii. resource mobilization iii. programme implementation performance	HQ survey	N/A N/A 17/25 (2015) <sup>101</sup>	14/29 12/29 15/29
	b			Fraction of RCs in countries with humanitarian assistance needs that 'agree' that UNCT members regularly reports to the RC in relation to the UNDAF, in a way that ensures strong coherence of development and humanitarian activities i. 'Agree' ii. 'Strongly agree'	RC survey		61% 20%
62	a	57i		Fraction of UNDS entities with a documented risk assessment policy that includes; i. security risks ii. medical risks iii. IT disaster recovery risks iv. business continuity risks	HQ survey		24/29 20/29 23/29 23/29
	b			Median % policy compliance rate of risk assessment policy for UNDS entities (once policy developed)			N/A
63		58		Comprehensive proposal on further improvements to RC system presented to: i. ECOSOC for its recommendations by end 2017 (Y/N) ii. The General Assembly 72 <sup>nd</sup> Session for further action (Y/N)	EOSG <sup>c</sup>		i. Yes (Dec 017 for OAS 2018) ii. Yes (XXX '17)
<b>IV. Programmatic and operational coherence and effectiveness</b>							
64		50e, 50d, 62, 64, 52, 66, 61	117, 119	Average number of months between the UNDAF roadmap development to final draft	DOCO	14 months	14 months
65	a	50f,50e, 48,39,5	130b, 171	Fraction of PCGs that confirmed receipt of a report on the results achieved by the UNCT as a whole in the last annual cycle	PCG Survey <sup>d</sup>	61/128 (2015)	66/110

<sup>101</sup> Fraction of entities recognizing reporting obligations to the RC on resource mobilization and programme implementation performance of any UNDAF/One Programme elements led by the agency



#	& 71/243 OPs	67/22 6 OPs	Draft indicator	Source / responsibility	Baseline (year)	SGR 2018	
	b	0d,62,6 4,52,66, 61,48,5 0b	% of PCGs, in respect of annual reports provided to them, that 'agree' <sup>a</sup> that: i. they receive reports regularly enough to meet their needs ii. the information is up-to-date iii. the results of the whole UN system are included iv. sufficient financial data is included v. reporting is structured around UNDAF outcomes vi. reporting is linked to national development results			63% 68% 58% 45% 74% 63%	
	c		% of UNCTs that have made their annual results report publicly available	RC Survey		87%	
66	50d,50e, 50f,62, 64,52, 66,61	152	Fraction of UNDS entities that submitted to its governing body a plan for consolidated common support services at country level, including in the areas of financial management, human resources, procurement, ICT and other services i. All entities ii. Funds and Programmes iii. Specialized Agencies iv. Other entities	HQ survey		5/29 3/9 0/8 2/12	
67	a	60	141, 137	Fraction of PCGs that considered adopting DaO that were 'satisfied' with information provided to them by the RC/UNCT to enable them to take an informed decision on DaO v. 'Satisfied' vi. 'Very satisfied'	PCG Survey <sup>d</sup>	42/88 22/88	16/53 2/53
	b			% of RCs who state that they have received 'adequate' information and support from headquarters in regard to the implementation of the SOPs i. 'Adequate' ii. 'Very adequate'	RC survey		58% 32%
	c			HQ Plan of Action updated in light of mandates of the 2016 QCPR	DOCO		No
	d			Fraction of actions undertaken in the updated UNDG HQ Plan of Action to address challenges and bottlenecks in relation to the roll-out of the SOPs, that are i. fully implemented ii. partially implemented iii. not yet implemented		(2016) <sup>102</sup> 11% 70% 19%	N/A
68	61	141	[[Placeholder for new indicator when UNDG reverts back on planned actions to deliver an integrated package of support that includes, i. Programming ii. Monitoring, evaluation and reporting iii. Pooled and flexible financing	tbc			

<sup>102</sup> These figures reflect the implementation status of the HQ Plan of Action 2.0, endorsed by the UNDG in June 2016. The updated HQ Plan of Action 3.0, consisting of rolled-over actions and reflecting the relevant 2016 QCPR mandates, is expected to be endorsed by the UNDG in Q4 2017.

#	& 71/243 OPs	67/22 6 OPs	Draft indicator	Source / responsibility	Baseline (year)	SGR 2018	
			iv. <i>RC Support</i> v. <i>Simplification &amp; harmonization of business practices</i> vi. <i>flexible and differentiated and multi-country presence</i>				
69	a	69	146 - 150	% of PCGs stating that regional commissions provide 'effective' support on regional or sub-regional issues of greatest relevance to the country i. 'Effective' ii. 'Very effective'	PCG Survey <sup>d</sup>		50% 7%
	b			% of RCs stating that regional UNDG teams provide 'effective' support on regional or sub-regional issues of greatest relevance to the country i. 'Effective' ii. 'Very effective'	RC survey	(2015) <sup>103</sup> 63% 17%	68% 8%
	c			# of joint RCM/R-UNDG regional common positions (papers) to advocate on key development issues i. Total ii. Arab States iii. Europe and Central Asia iv. Asia Pacific v. Latin America and the Caribbean vi. Africa	RCMs R-UNDG	8 (2015) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A	4 1 3 0 0 0
	d			% RCs that stated the UNCTs benefitted 'to a great extent' from the Regional Commissions': i. normative and policy support work, ii. technical expertise iii. platforms for policy discussion and exchange of experience	RC survey		26% 31% 31%
	e			% of UNDAFs with a Regional Commission(s) participating	DOCO	32%	34%
	f			% of UNCTs in which the relevant Regional Commission is a member		24%	24%
	g			[Placeholder for indicator following Regional Review of the Secretary-General]	TBC		
70		37,104 ,105& 46 of 2015/ 15	Fraction of UNCTs which have: i. joint assessments ii. agreements iii. joint strategic frameworks iv. joint funding mechanisms with Bretton Woods institutions	RC survey		54% 27% 24% 11%	
<b>V. Harmonization and simplification of business practices</b>							

<sup>103</sup> The response metric in 2015 was 'strongly agree' / 'somewhat agree' / 'somewhat disagree' / 'strongly disagree'

#	& 71/243 OPs	67/22 6 OPs	Draft indicator	Source / responsibility	Baseline (year)	SGR 2018	
71		155	Fraction of UNDS entities that presented plans to their governing bodies for intra agency rationalization of business operation	HQ survey	10/25 (2015)	7/29	
72	a	51	119	UNDG/HLCM joint analysis completed on actions required to unpack and align common business processes for further simplification and harmonization of Business Practices	DOCO & HLCM		No
	b		UNDG/HLCM Policy on common business processes developed and adopted	HLCM		No	
	c		Service Provider models and standardized Key Performance Indicators [KPIs] on customer service, pricing, and delivery developed and adopted	DOCO & HLCM		No <sup>104</sup>	
	d		Other actions on simplification and harmonization of business practices implemented <i>[specifics to be identified in time]</i>				
73	62, 39 50d, 50f	140, 141, 4, 5, 7, 12, 21, 113, 114	% of UNCTs that have <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. a Country Communications Group (chaired by a Head of Agency)</li> <li>ii. a joint communication strategy approved by the UNCT and monitored and reported against in the UN Country Results Report</li> <li>iii. operations costs and budgets integrated in the overall medium-term CBF</li> </ul> [SOP Indicator Element 1, 14, 15 13]	DOCO	(2016) 59% 44% 11%	73% 57% 18%	
74	a	52	Fraction of UNDS entities that have adopted the UNDG/HLCM Mutual Recognition policy (once developed)	HQ survey		Not yet developed	
	b		UNDG joint analysis and policy on business processes that have potential for mutual recognition completed	DOCO & HLCM		Not yet completed	
75	a	50d, 50e, 50f, 62, 64, 52, 66, 61	% of UNCTs that: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. have an approved Business Operations Strategy (BOS) (monitored and cost savings reported on)</li> <li>ii. have developed a BOS, but BOS not signed by the participating UNCT entities (or is not being implemented/monitored)</li> <li>iii. have not developed a BOS</li> </ul> [SOP Indicator Element 11]	DOCO	12% 17% 68%	20% 26% 54%	
	b		UNCTs with an approved BOS, disaggregated by programme expenditure <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. All</li> <li>ii. High</li> <li>iii. Medium</li> <li>iv. Low</li> </ul>		(2016) 17/131 7/34 4/39 6/58	26/131 6/27 11/45 9/79	
	c		Average % of UNCT members included in each approved BOS	DESA Desk review <sup>105</sup>		95%	

<sup>104</sup> HLCM has taken a decision to review Global Service Centers (CEB/2017/3)

<sup>105</sup> Based on the 13 of the 26 BOS that were provided by DOCO and included a signature page

#	& 71/243 OPs	67/22 6 OPs	Draft indicator	Source / responsibility	Baseline (year)	SGR 2018	
	d		% of total country-level OAD expenditures delivered in countries with a BOS		20% (2016)	19% <sup>106</sup>	
	e		Fraction of common service lines adopted within each implemented BOS: i. Common procurement services ii. Common finance services iii. Common ICT services iv. Common logistics services v. Common human resources services vi. Common facility services, including Common Premises	DOCO	(2016) 15/17 9/17 16/17 10/17 14/17 13/17	24/26 18/26 25/26 19/26 18/26 14/26	
	f		% of RCs who state that they have received 'adequate' information and support from headquarters in regard to the implementation of the BOS i. 'Adequate' ii. 'Very adequate'	RC survey		61% 26%	
	g		% of Operations Management Team chaired by i. A Head of Agency ii. the RC [SOP Indicator Element 12]	OMT Survey		31% 1%	
	h		% of OMTs that meet at least 7 out of 10 of the UNDG criteria for an empowered OMT	DOCO	50% (2016)	52%	
76	a	64, 50d, 50e, 50f, 51, 52,	Number of agency-specific vertical centers expanded into Inter-Agency Joint Service Centers	HLCM		N/A <sup>107</sup>	
	b	61, 62, 66	Number of inter-agency service centers at country level	DOCO & HLCM	4 (2016)	4	
77	a	65 66, 65	154 156	% of countries implementing five or more common services, based on the implementation of inter-agency agreements and common long-term agreements	OMT Survey	5% (2016)	4%
	b		% of countries implementing a minimum of five common Long-term Agreements		33% (2016)	58%	
	c		% of countries with 25 or more per cent of the annual UN financed procurement volume done by the government			23%	
	d		Fraction of UNDS entities that report to their respective governing bodies on efficiency savings through collaborative procurement	HQ survey		12/29	
<b>VI. Managing for results</b>							

<sup>106</sup> Reported decline due to the Afghanistan UNCT reporting it no longer has an approved BOS in 2017. Excluding Afganistan from the 2016 figures gives 14%.

<sup>107</sup> HLCM has taken a decision to review Global Service Centers ([CEB/2017/3](#))

#	&	71/243 OPs	67/22 6 OPs	Draft indicator	Source / responsibility	Baseline (year)	SGR 2018
78	a	12, 81	172	RBM and system-wide results reporting across UNDS reviewed	JIU <sup>c</sup>	In progress (2015)	[Yes (month tbc) 2017]
				Fraction of UNDS entities that i. meet UNEG standards for independence ii. have an evaluation tracking system that includes the status of evaluations and management responses?	HQ survey	(2015) 20 20	25/29 27/29
	b			UNDG RBM Handbook revised reflecting common methodologies for: - results-based planning [Y/N] - results-based reporting [Y/N] - integrated results and resources frameworks [Y/N]	DOCO <sup>c</sup>	23/25 <sup>108</sup>	No No No
	c			Fraction of UNDS entities using the revised RBM Handbook's common methodologies for each of: - results-based planning - results-based reporting - integrated results and resources frameworks	HQ survey		N/A N/A N/A
79	a	70		Fraction of entities that have included provisions for knowledge management strategies in their strategic plans <sup>a</sup>	HQ Survey		22/29
	b			Fraction of UNDS entities implementing the UNDG policy on a system-wide open data approach for a common knowledge base (once developed)	DOCO		Not yet developed
	c			Fraction of UNDS entities using a common authentication system	HQ survey		15/29
80	a	71	106	Fraction of UNDS entities using CEB's Data Management Platform for the system-wide data gathering and reporting needs of the CEB Secretariat (once launched)	CEB		Not yet developed
	b			Fraction of UNDS entities implementing common standards for machine readability of data (once developed)	DOCO		Not yet developed
	c			Fraction of UNDS entities implementing a common open data policy, which includes a set of minimum standards (once developed)			Not yet developed
81	a	74	125	# (%) of UNDS inter-agency staff transfers <sup>109</sup>	HLCM		1,415 (2%)
	b			% of PCGs that 'agree' <sup>a</sup> that i. the staff in the UNCT has the right mix of capacities and skills to support their country's development ii. the UNCT heads of agencies have the highest standards of leadership skills	PCG survey		76% 85%

<sup>108</sup> # of UNDS entities using common RBM tools and principles as identified in the 2011 UNDG RBM handbook

<sup>109</sup> Inter-agency moves are based on a comparison of 2016 versus 2015 data, comprising all movement of staff across organizations (moves across Departments of the UN Secretariat are not counted as inter-agency moves).

#	& 71/243 OPs	67/22 6 OPs	Draft indicator	Source / responsibility	Baseline (year)	SGR 2018
82	75	181	Independent review of ISWE considered by ECOSOC (Y/N)	DESA <sup>c</sup>		No
<b>F. QCPR FOLLOW-UP, MONITORING AND REPORTING</b>						
83	79	121	Fraction of UNDS entities which have 'aligned' planning and budgeting cycles to the QCPR timeframe <sup>110</sup> i. Fully aligned ii. Partially aligned iii. Not aligned	HQ survey	15/25 <sup>111</sup>	14/27 5/27 8/27
84	78, 79		Fraction of UNDS entities reporting to their governing bodies on implementation of the present resolution i. Funds and programmes ii. Specialized Agencies iii. Other UNDS entities	HQ survey		6/9 5/8 6/12
85	a	80	Fraction of UNDS entities individually submitting financial data to the CEB i. Funds and Programmes ii. Specialized Agencies iii. Other UNDS entities	CEB	(2016) 9/9	9/9
			13/13		13/13	
	b		Fraction of UNDS entities with ongoing activities at country level that report expenditures disaggregated by country to the CEB;		5/17	5/17
	c		Fraction of UNDS entities that report on expenditures disaggregated by SDG	HQ survey		18/39
						6/29

The monitoring framework is accompanied by a methodological note which can be accessed from the DESA website <<https://www.un.org/ecosoc/en/node/1158673>>

#### End Notes

<sup>a</sup> Sum of 'strongly agree' and 'agree'

<sup>b</sup> The RC survey requires respondents to answer only for their country of location. Therefore, "Fraction of UNCTs" is a subset of the total number of countries.

<sup>c</sup> The frequency of reporting is one-time or annually until completed

<sup>d</sup> The frequency of reporting is biennial

<sup>e</sup> This information may be provided by DSS in future years

<sup>f</sup> For analytical purposes, some indicators are disaggregated by country-level UN-OAD programme expenditures in 2016. There are 27 programmes with high expenditures (>\$200mn); 45 programmes with medium expenditures (>\$50mn & <200mn) and 78 programmes with low expenditures (<\$50mn). For full breakdown of country-level expenditures, see the statistical annex, tab [B-4] <<https://www.un.org/ecosoc/en/node/1158673>>

<sup>g</sup> Self-assessed by the respondent of the survey

<sup>110</sup> Excludes the 12 Secretariat departments, including regional commissions, as they have a different planning and budgetary cycle

<sup>111</sup> Reported decline due to addition of answer option 'partially aligned' for entities with 2-year cycles

#	&	71/243 OPs	67/22 6 OPs	Draft indicator	Source / responsibi lity	Baseline (year)	SGR 2018
---	---	---------------	----------------	-----------------	--------------------------------	--------------------	----------